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Thesis Abstract 
This dissertation is about public research and development (R&D) subsidies to support 
private firms doing innovative activities and quantitative impact evaluation of the policy on total 
factor productivity (TFP) change and additional R&D effort. Public R&D subsidization as a public 
R&D policy, beside different types of public interventions, has been widely used by governments 
to stimulate private R&D. These policies aim to fill the gap between the private and social rates of 
returns by encouraging business enterprises to spend on additional R&D, produce more innovation 
output and inventions, or change their innovative behavior. These changes can be carried out either 
individually or in collaboration with other entities. One ultimate goal of R&D policy is increasing 
the total factor productivity and relative performance both at firm and aggregate levels. This study 
deals with direct place-based public R&D subsidies and empirically measures the effects of this 
type of public incentives on productivity growth and R&D input additionality.  
In order to evaluate the policy effect, a quasi-experimental counterfactual setting for subsidized 
(treated) and non-subsidized (non-treated) firms can be framed thank to the characteristics and 
mechanism of the local R&D program in the Province of Trento in Italy. The average treatment 
effect of the policy on target variables is measured for subsidized units (Average treatment effect 
on treated: ATET) and for the whole population of the firms (Average treatment effect: ATE), 
using techniques capable of tackling the problems of endogeneity and selection bias which arise 
in empirical evaluation studies.  
Propensity score matching (PSM) and  structural modeling methodologies are used to measure the 
effects of the R&D subsidies on target variables, TFP change and additional R&D expenditure, 
respectively. The former approach is non-parametric and does not assume a functional form for 
the effect of policy on R&D and productivity change, while the latter models the optimizing 
behavior of the firm (agent) and the public agency, searching for an equilibrium in a pre-
determined game theoretical framework. Although the PSM method takes advantage of no pre-
defined structure assumption, however and in contrary, the structural model with simultaneous 
equations, takes into account the effect of unobservables on subsidized firms’ selection procedure, 
beside R&D spillovers effect. 
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In order to design the evaluation framework to estimate ATE and ATET on the target variable of 
interest (TFP change), we have built a firm-level panel dataset (maximum 5 years of information) 
constructed by combination and merge of datasets related to public (provincial) R&D policy, 
firms’ characteristics, firms’ R&D activities and TFP change measures. The time span of the 
dataset allows us to capture the effects in both short-term and long run, consequently tracing the 
short and long term effects of the R&D  program. This helps us to consider the usual longer effect 
lag an innovation policy entails, specifically on a target variable such as productivity and a 
treatment such as innovation incentive, which the effects may take time to be realized in 
comparison with other types of outcomes and investment policies. The dataset represents the 
outcome of a long process of combining and merging various datasets related to firms’ financial 
statements and balance sheet (AIDA: Italian company information and business intelligence) and 
APIAE’s R&D policy information provided by ISPAT. 
TFP change and its decompositions, technical efficiency change and technological frontier change 
are realized using Malmquist Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. DEA takes a system 
approach towards the firm as decision making unit (DMU) and only applies the input(s) and 
output(s) measures to calculate the relative (in)efficiency of the firms. Malmquist method based 
on index theory, captures the (in)efficiency change and the technological frontier movement within 
a time interval. TFP change measures are calculated by CRS output-oriented DEA dual model 
using a new package introduced in STATA software and merged into the reference dataset 
described previously.  
To sum up, after the formation and construction of dataset by combining and merging different 
datasets, treatment effect analysis is carried out using PSM nearest neighbor and kernel estimators. 
The balancing property satisfaction on pre-treatment observable factors (age and size in our 
setting) is primarily investigated and propensity distribution graphs have been also provided. 
Taking into account the dataset features, R&D subsidies effect is measured for manufacturing and 
ICT industries (using 4 techniques to measure both ATE and ATET), beside low-medium 
technology and high-tech industries classifications (Both ATE and ATET). Moreover, the 
subsidies effect on TFP measures have also been measured for different categories of selection 
procedures. Results show heterogenous and mixed effect of R&D subsidies based on different 
settings of evaluation (sectors and selection categories), targeted outcome, PSM method (different 
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PSM algorithms for nearest neighbor and kernel) and time of the effect (short-term or long run). 
The complete results have been discussed in detail in the related sections in chapter three. 
To address the effect of unobservable factors, beside spillover effect on R&D subsidies allocation 
and the effect on outcome, a structural model is estimated using a cross-sectional dataset. The 
dataset is formed by merging R&D policy-related (linked to Provincial Law LP 6/99  enforced by 
provincial agency for the promotion of economic activities :APIAE) dataset and firms’ 
determinants provided by ISPAT (Statistical institute of Province of Trento).This approach 
complements the drawbacks due to estimation using PSM methodology. However, the pre-defined 
functional form for equations is a limitation of this approach. The structural model applied includes 
application decision, selection (subsidies allocation) and R&D investment equations to be turned 
into econometric equations for empirical estimation. The context and dataset features allow for 
different empirical modifications with respect to the benchmark model applied. The results 
determine the effect of firm (project) characteristics on all stages of the subsidization game. Size, 
age, exporting status, board size and sector are main factors being investigated. The results show 
not only there is no additional R&D expenditure, but also some crowding out of subsidies occurs. 
The base model is determined in such a format which makes it possible to evaluate the spillover 
effect and spillover rate of R&D spending as well. The results show that on average half (50%) of 
each euro spent on R&D spill overs. 
The results shed light on the effects and impacts of a place-based R&D policy on TFP change 
,R&D additionality and spillovers, while suggesting policy implications to the local public 
authorities. Furthermore, the design and process of impact evaluation using two different 
complementary approaches in a new context on a different target variable (TFP change in addition 
to classical input additionality variable) can be referred and applied in any policy evaluation related 
studies. 
In the following, chapter one deals with the theoretical and empirical reasons for the existence of 
different public R&D policies based on Schumpeterian growth theory, spillovers effect and 
tackling market failure. It further provides a review of R&D and innovative activity indices at 
different levels of analysis (regional, national and international) and reviews the literature of 
empirical innovation policy evaluation studies related to the effect of R&D policy on additionality. 
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The review concerns both micro and macro perspectives in approaching public R&D policy and 
the impact of the policy on additionalities and TFP growth. Studies in R&D policy usually concern 
either the macro growth accounting approach and measure the effect of R&D policies on aggregate 
growth indices regardless of pointing out to micro foundation effects leading to the aggregate level 
changes or they only focus on the micro-econometric firm-level evaluation without addressing the 
relationship between firms’ additional R&D activities and the economic growth. Moreover, the 
R&D activities expenditure and growth indices at international, EU, national (Italy) and regional 
(Trento Province) have also been briefly pointed out and tracked over time, to realize the practical 
importance of R&D incentives.  
In order to introduce and spot the areas this research addresses, the traditional market failure and 
the logic and reasons behind public R&D policies (aimed at increasing positive externalities and 
R&D spillovers) and subsequently different innovation policy instruments and their interaction 
with firms’ R&D decision making have been reviewed. This provides a comprehensive perspective 
over the importance and the forms of R&D policies.  
Chapter two primarily discusses about the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP change. The discussion 
addresses the relationship between R&D and total factor productivity (TFP) as a channel which 
subsidies may affect TFP. In addition,  other channels and interactions which can explain the effect 
of R&D subsidies on TFP change and the components of TFP change, will be investigated and 
discussed. Afterwards, in line with the review of the previous chapter, the empirical literature of 
studies dealing with evaluation of the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP (as a different outcome 
variable from additionality variables discussed in the previous chapter) will be reviewed. This 
theoretical background helps us to shape the R&D policy evaluation framework to investigate the 
direct casual impact of R&D subsidization policy on target outcomes including TFP change 
(Chapter 3) and R&D expenditure (Chapter 4). Finally, taking into account the evaluation 
framework, we hypothesize the research questions based on the theoretical concepts and literature 
review discussed through the previous and current chapters.  
Chapter three measures the effect of the provincial R&D subsidies on technical efficiency and 
technological frontier change as the decomposing elements of productivity change. It empirically 
measures  the impact of R&D subsidies on productivity change using counterfactual treatment 
effect analysis. Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) based on the non-parametric method of Data 
v 
 
Envelopment Analysis (CRS output-oriented dual DEA model) is applied to measure the 
productivity change and the disentangled elements of productivity change. The chapter has 
contributed to the literature in some different aspects.  
The main focus of this chapter is measuring the effects of R&D subsidies on decomposing 
elements of  TFP, technical efficiency and technological frontier change. In the whole literature, 
there is only one other similar work in which the effects of R&D subsidies on TFP decomposed 
components have been assessed. There are few other papers in which they measure the impact of 
other type of investment subsidies (mainly capital subsidies) on targeted variables of TFP 
decompositions. However, they all use a parametric approach to measure the TFP components in 
contrary to non-parametric Malmquist DEA method applied in our study making no predefined 
assumption about the production function.  
The subsidies effect evaluation is implemented using both PSM nearest neighbor and kernel 
methods (to check the robustness) to measure the average treatment effect of R&D subsidies on 
subsidized (treated) and all (the population) firms labeled as ATET (average treatment effect on 
treated) and ATE (Average treatment effect), respectively. The analysis is mainly carried out in 
manufacturing and ICT sectors as two main sectors in which R&D incentives allocations occur. 
The elaboration on classification of firms in different main industries based on ATECO 2007 
system of firms’ economic activity coding has been carried out. It has also been defined and 
described in detail how 6-digit industry code is categorized into sectors. 
Another important feature of this study different with a considerable share of empirical literature, 
is construction of a panel dataset on subsidies allocation and firms’ characteristics which allows 
us to capture the effect of the policy both in short term and long run (maximum of 5 years). 
Moreover, the effect of the evaluation based on two different types of selection and allocation 
procedures (automatic, evaluative (combined with negotiation method) is implemented.  
The limitations of this chapter imposed by the methodology used, are excluding the effect of 
unobservable factors on selection process and not taking into account the spillovers effect. 
Consequently, Chapter’s four structural modeling puts effort to overcome these restrictions and 
suggest a complementary approach.  
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Chapter four empirically estimates an equilibrium oriented structural game model to investigate 
the relationship between firms’ characteristics with application cost (application decision 
equation), spillover rate (subsidization equation) and R&D investment (investment equation). The 
chapter reviews, modifies and estimates a structural model describing the mechanism through 
which the R&D subsidization policy influences R&D activity and the R&D spillover rate. The 
empirical contribution of this chapter is proposing a simplified model of a reference 4-staged game 
model with a Nash Bayesian Equilibrium (NBE), based on the contextual setting of the region 
under study and data availability. The advantage of using this structural model is the ability to 
assume spillovers effect. This optimization approach relaxes the incapability of evaluation 
approach used in Chapter three to assume the presence of spillover effect due to the violation of 
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). Moreover, chapter four takes into account 
the effect of unobservables on selection procedure and targeted variable, while in chapter three the 
unobservables are assumed uncorrelated with selection (subsidy) variable and the outcome. 
Nevertheless, opposed to structural modelling, the method used in chapter three does not assume 
any parametric form to evaluate the impact. Hence, chapter three and chapter four complement 
each other in measuring the impact of R&D policy on targeted variables.  
The empirical evaluations and results of both final chapters are explained and concluded in the 
related essays. Moreover, the features and contribution of chapters will be restated in the abstract 
at the beginning of each chapter.
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Chapter 1: 
R&D policy evaluation: Theoretical background and empirical review  
Abstract 
Chapter one predominately discusses the perspectives and approaches related to theoretical 
background regarding public R&D policy, followed by a review of change of practical measures 
related to R&D input and output over time at regional, national (EU) and international levels. The 
chapter mainly deals with theoretical and empirical logic behind different public R&D policies 
embodied into Schumpeterian growth theory and in line with innovation spillovers and tackling 
market failure. After all, it reviews the literature of empirical innovation policy evaluation studies 
related to the effect of R&D policy on additionality due to investigation of the hypotheses related 
to Chapter four. 
1. Why innovation policy: Theoretical background  
1.1 Innovation activity and economic growth 
Innovation activity1 is considered as the main element determining steady state (long-run) 
economic growth, based on the endogenous growth theory originated by Schumpeter’s theory of 
creative destruction2. The creative destruction introduced by Schumpeter (1942) as an essential 
fact about capitalism refers to the phenomenon in which “prospect of more future research 
discourages the current research by threatening to destroy the rents created by current research” 
(Aghion & Howitt, 1998). Schumpeter (1942) describes “how capitalism administers existing 
structure is essentially irrelevant” since “the relevant problem is how it creates and destroys them”. 
Therefore, an endogenous source of energy within the economic system would, of itself, disrupt 
or destroy any equilibrium attained. This is in contrast to Walras’ view that the economic system 
                                                          
1 Innovation activity is defined as “[A]ny systematic and creative work undertaken in order to increase the stock of 
knowledge, including knowledge of [hu]man [kind], culture and society, and the use of this knowledge to devise new 
applications.” (OECD-Eurostat manual on standard practice for statistical surveys on R&D activities_ Frascati Manual, 
6th edition, 2002). [The 7th edition has been published in 2015: Frascati Manual - 2015 Edition: Guidelines for 
Collecting and Reporting Data on Research and Experimental Development]. 
2 Schumpeter introduced the idea in his book “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”, which his visions are still 
popular and discussed amongst economists especially in the recent years where capitalism has been challenged by 
populism. For a very recent common debate and discussion about his predictions on capitalism, see ‘The Economist, 
Business Section: Schumpeter (Capitalism and Democracy), 24th December 2016. 
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is essentially passive to natural and social influences (exogenous factors) which may be acting on 
it. Schumpeter argues that there is an inevitable tendency of the system to disequilibrate (Mokyr 
in Hall & Rosenberg; 2010). 
Following Schumpeter, the pioneering works of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) identifies 
the accumulation of knowledge as the source for sustained economic growth in the form of income 
per capita.3 Innovation activity consisting of R&D and non-R&D activities (according to Oslo 
Manual4) counts for a channel through which the economy accumulates knowledge. In this vein, 
research and development (R&D)-based growth models have been developed (Romer, 1990; 
Aghion & Howitt, 1992, 1998). Aghion & Howitt (1998) introduce an endogenous growth model 
which is developed by vertical innovations, generated by a competitive research sector. These 
vertical innovations constitute the underlying source of growth. They determine an equilibrium 
using a forward-looking difference equation, in which the amount of research in any period 
depends on the expected amount of research in the next period. One source of this intertemporal 
relationship is creative destruction, which as previously noted means the rent of current research 
gets destroyed by the prospect of more future research (new technological innovation). In 
particular, the fact that private innovative firms do not internalize the destruction of rents generated 
by their innovations leads to a business-stealing effect which makes innovations too small. 
Aghion and Howitt (2008) portray a free economy being constantly disturbed by 
technological innovations and in which competition is a Darwinian struggle whose survivors are 
those that succeed in creating, adopting and improving new technologies. Schumpeterian models 
on the contrary to AK model5, takes technological change as a social process, and since the start 
of the industrial revolution, “people’s skills, capital equipment and technological knowledge have 
been rendered obsolete and destroyed by the same inventions that have created fortunes for others”. 
The Schumpeterian approach explains how innovation and a process of creative destruction may 
influence the economic growth. Innovating enterprises introduce new products or processes to 
                                                          
3 The growth models enhanced by Romer and Lucas endogenized the technological advancement in contrary to 
Solow-Swan model which explains technological progress as an exogenous factor. 
4 Oslo manual: Guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) and Eurostat (Statistical Office of the European Communities). Oslo Manual is one of 
the following documents of “Frascati Family” documents developed by NESTI group (National Experts on Science 
and Technology Indicators).  
5 AK is the simple production function model with total factor productivity (A) and capital and human capital (K) 
elements. The difference with new  endogenous-growth model is that AK assumes no diminishing returns to capital. 
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appropriate from a temporary monopoly by making old technologies or products obsolete. This 
destroys the rents generated by previous innovations and leads to economic growth.6  
There have been modifications to endogenous growth theory model, known as semi-
endogenous and fully-endogenous growth models. Semi-endogenous growth models, introduced 
primarily by Jones (1995) as a modification to Romer’s model, show that the productivity growth 
rate is still generated endogenously through R&D, though only in a transient path rather than long-
term. This happens because of diminishing returns to R&D (Kortum,1997). Semi-endogenous 
means that technological change is endogenous while in the long-term the growth only relies on 
population as the ultimate driver for productivity growth rate, implicating the economic growth as 
independent of government actions and public policy (Li, 2000). 
The final strand of the research fully bears endogenous growth theory, eliminating the scale 
effect by allowing an increase in product lines (or expansion of number of firms) while the R&D 
for each product line keeps unchanged. Knowledge spillover (determined in the following section) 
affects the productivity growth rate generated by investment in knowledge and consequently 
investment in innovation (Peretto, 1998; Acs et al., 2004; Ha & Howitt, 2007). Fully-endogenous 
growth model identifies R&D intensity and population growth (not necessarily in all conditions) 
as factors influencing the economic growth (in terms of income per capita growth). This is in 
contrast with semi-endogenous models, presuming solely population growth as the predictor of 
the economic growth. Therefore, according to fully-endogenous model, R&D public policy will 
influence the steady-state productivity growth rate through stimulating firms’ R&D intensity 
(Minniti & Venturini, 2017). 
The arguments discussed above explain theories debating the relationship between 
innovation activity in general, and R&D in specific with the economic growth. The theories 
explain how a change in innovation activity influences an economy, either in the short-term or 
long-run. Changes in innovation activity by private business enterprises can be triggered by public 
interventions. Therefore, investigating the innovation policy and its impact on the determinants of 
economic growth provide policy makers insights about how public R&D policy may increase 
                                                          
6 It is worth to remind this section focuses on the relationship between innovation and economic growth. However, 
there are other fundamental causes to economic growth. The role of history, geography and institutions has been 
studied in the outstanding work by Acemoglu et al. (2002) and Acemoglu’s book of ‘Introduction to Modern 
Economic Growth’, (2008).  
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economic growth. This investigation can take different approaches and perspectives: 
macroeconomic approach takes the growth accounting perspective, industrial organization and 
public finance approaches focus on the policies for encouraging private sector innovation activities 
and investment in innovation and finally economic development approach deals with innovation 
systems and technology transfer. However, all these approaches measure the effect of innovation 
policy through applied economics approach (Cohen in Hall & Rosenberg, 2010).  
This study deals with evaluating the effect of public R&D policy on private business R&D 
activities and productivity change as possible determinants of economic growth. Following an 
applied economic approach, the study addresses whether innovation policy, as an intervention of 
public authority in the form of industrial policy, affects productivity growth or the additional 
private R&D expenditure as the factors influencing economic growth.  
1.2 Innovation Spillovers 
Previous section addressed the potential role of public R&D policy in economic growth. 
Another main theoretical aspect which justifies R&D policy is related to the effect of policy on 
innovation spillovers. The diffusion of knowledge between firms, universities and research 
institutes is the main logic for incentives by public authorities in a systems approach to innovation. 
Creation of  the new technologies as the outcome of private firms’ R&D effort and transfer of this 
knowledge through the network is one main reason that the government supports R&D activities. 
Therefore, system approach besides the market failure approach supports incentives which 
complement private R&D spending (Clausen, 2009).7  
A firm undertakes research and development (R&D) activities which can lead to a new 
technology. The technology spills over to other firms over time, propagating the knowledge 
obtained from the R&D activities (Konno, 2016). Spillover of knowledge as a positive externality 
produced by diffusion of R&D outcomes is considered as one of the main factors of economic 
growth (Griliches, 1992; Aghion, Howitt, 2008). Technological progress depends on the adoption 
                                                          
7 In the last chapter the maximization of spillover is assumed as a main element of the goal of the public agency. 
Hence, the spillovers effect arrives directly in the agency’s  profit equation. The optimized spillover rate is the 
solution of an equilibrium effect of R&D subsidies for the firms doing innovation. 
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of the new technologies as much as their invention In reality, spillovers are likely to diffuse among 
all the firms across the world simultaneously.  
Samandar Ali Eshtehardi et al. (2017) point out to studies by Marshall (1920), Arrow 
(1962), Romer (1986) and Porter (1990) which  declare that the source of knowledge spillover 
within a region and additional innovative activities in the region, is an increase in specialization of 
a particular industry within a specific geographic region. They also mention Jacobs (1969) who 
argues that diversification of industries within a specific region is a major source of knowledge 
spillover as it increases the interaction of actors between industries.  
Spillovers can happen in the same industry (vertical collaboration), or across sectors8 
because of user or firm R&D collaborations (one dimension of network effect or because of 
horizontal collaboration). It can also occur cross national via trade or foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Spillover effect is usually measured by considering the distance of a unit to other spilling 
units. The distance can be intellectual, scientific, technological or geographical (spatial) (Cerulli 
& Poti`, 2009). The direction of the spillovers can be measured using for example technology flow 
tables introduced for the first time by Scherer (1982). Jaffe (1986) introduced disembodied 
spillovers which the distance measure is defined as the proximity in technology which means the 
overlap in the distribution of the firms’ patents. On the other hand, there are embodied spillovers 
which are categorized into direct method (technology-based) and indirect method (transaction-
based) (Cerulli & Poti`, 2009). Spillovers are subjected to long lags, therefore it is noteworthy to 
look for the patterns of spatial correlations within and across industries and over time in measuring 
the spillovers (Griliches, 1957; Singh & Marx, 2013).  
Finally, there is a distinction between R&D intensive inputs bought with a lower quality 
price compared to real knowledge spillovers. A famous example may be found in the computer 
industry, which usually does not appropriate fully its own benefit but lends to other industries the 
profit of progression. This purchase mainly affects the productivity and the purchasing industry 
                                                          
8 Photographic equipment industry may not buy much from scientific instrument industry but they probably do 
research on the same fields and benefit much from each other’s research results.  However, measuring the closeness 
between industries  requires detailed data at business-unit level due to trace the spillovers. It is difficult to say for 
instance ‘leather’ industry is closer to ‘food’ industry or ‘textile’ industry without detailed clear informative datasets. 
6 
 
but does not import all the R&D from the computer industry, which means the spillover measure 
is not real spillover happening between two industries (Tirole, J., 1988).  
1.3 Market failure, public R&D policy and additionality 
The main theoretical aspect used to justify R&D policy is related to traditional market 
failure caused by firms’ underinvestment in R&D.9 The classical market failure argument points 
to the gap between private and social rates of return for R&D activities (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 
196210). The R&D investment by private entities is usually less than the socially optimum expected 
amount. The stylized fact that private rate of return is lower than social rate of return for R&D has 
been widely investigated by the literature11 (Mansfield et al., 1986; Bernstein, 1989; Griliches, 
1992; Jones & Williams; 1997). 
 Firms do not sufficiently invest in R&D when the investment rate of return will be lower 
than socially optimal rate. This may happen as the private enterprise mainly concerns about the 
revenues and gains appropriated from R&D inputs and consequently R&D outputs in order to 
maximize the profit out of investment in knowledge. The source of this concern arises from that 
knowledge becomes common and public good after being produced and the knowledge producing 
firm might not sufficiently benefit from the temporary monopoly caused by her invention. The 
other point is that knowledge can spill out and diffuse into the network as positive externalities, 
i.e. spillover effect or network effect. Thus, before a private firm fully appropriates from its 
innovation output (product or process innovation), other entities imitate the output dependent to 
their absorptive capacity. Hence, this market failure discourages the private firm to invest 
optimally in R&D (Arrow, 1962; Griliches, 1992). 
                                                          
9 In a historical point of view, before industrial revolution, technological changes (caused by investment in 
innovation) were undermined by either greedy of poorer or violent tax collectors. After industrial revolution and 
consequently industrial enlightenment, Francis Bacon (1744) spreads the idea that useful knowledge is rich 
storehouse for the glory of the creator and relief of the man’s estate. After this period when still Britain was the 
leading industrial nation, it comes the transition to modern growth (1830_1880) while because of progress in 
transport technology mainly railroads, the “push” for improvement dominated. 
10 Arrow (1962) discusses about non-perfect appropriability of knowledge representing the public good as the reason 
for this gap. 
11 It has been widely approved by empirical studies that R&D social rate of return is higher than R&D private rate of 
return and the private rate of return is higher than other more “conventional types of investment” rate of returns 
including capital investment (Martin, 2002). One reason referred to rent-seeking literature can be overbidding 
problem proposed by Fundenberg and Tirole (1987). 
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In other words, if the firm invest additionally in R&D, the society including competitors 
can benefit more than the firm due to lack of full appropriability of R&D activity due to knowledge 
spillovers or innovators’ inability to price-discriminate (Fölster, 1995).  
Hall (2002) points out to another reason for market failure, which occurs due to the wedge 
and the gap between the firm investing in innovation and the external investor for the expected 
rates of return related to the R&D project. This gap leads to the higher cost for external capital, 
specifically for the small, young and financially constrained firms. In addition, firms doing R&D 
are investing in knowledge as an intangible investment and public good. The liquidity constraints 
of the firms is particularly important for investment in intangible inputs subjected to uncertainty 
and information asymmetry (Hall & Lerner, 2009; Bronzini & Iachini., 2014).  
In other words, being all other factors equal, firms that encounter more difficulties in 
financing their projects usually submit their proposals to benefit from public funds. These 
difficulties can happen because of informational asymmetries leading to higher costs for capital 
and more barriers to access the capital markets. 
At the same time investing in innovation is riskier than investment in tangible assets. The 
risk originates from the facts that innovation requires more expertise in comparison with other 
types of investment. Furthermore, as mentioned the knowledge can leak and spillover, therefore 
the firm might not be willing to share the information of its R&D project with intermediaries or in 
the form of collaboration. Moreover, shortcomings in network knowledge flows and lack of 
interactions between innovators, mainly due to reluctance of entities to cooperate in R&D projects 
can also discourage firms in doing additional R&D (Kastelli & Caloghirou, 2004; Lundvall & 
Borrãs, 2005; Bond & Van Reenen, 2007; Hall & Lerner, 2009). These all can increase the risk of 
failure for an innovative project.  
The social planner or public authority, aiming at growth and social welfare maximization, 
is eager to encourage research and development by institutions such as firms, research institutions 
and universities, both at micro and aggregate level. In order to increase innovation activities that 
lead to higher social welfare for the whole society, incentives are offered to firms conducting R&D 
individually or in collaboration. Incentives can be in the forms of grants, tax incentives, or 
government contracts with R&D performing firms in the private sector, often called as 
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procurement contracts12. Public authorities fund and subsidize R&D as a policy or intervention to 
support innovation activities by entities. Innovation incentives in general, and subsidies for private 
R&D activities in specific, are policies or programs to compensate for market failures (Busom, 
2000; David, Hall & Toole, 2000). 
The society and (let us subsequently assume) the public authority, benefit from R&D 
output because of the spillover effect leading to consumer surplus. At the same time, private firms’ 
appropriability and R&D rate of return matter for public agency. As long as private firms are also 
considered as a part of the society. Therefore, the government is responsible to design a framework 
to maximize spillover (in terms of positive externalities), while simultaneously setting up the 
institutions to promote the private firm to invest more in knowledge (R&D). This all implies that 
public agency intervention to encourage private R&D is required even in a market system. The 
instruments used to reinforce this intervention will be more explained in the following sections in 
current chapter. 
The main question for policy makers is whether the adopted innovation policy promotes a 
firm to undertake an R&D project or to invest additionally in existing R&D project(s) that the firm 
would not have undertaken without the intervention (Jaffe, 2002). In other words, public authority 
is interested to evaluate whether public R&D spending is a complementary or a substitute13 for 
private R&D spending as R&D input. Input additionality happens when the firm spends more than 
the amount it would have spent without the incentives on R&D projects. In this case, the policy 
affects positively on firms’ additional investment (complementary or crowding-in effect). On the 
other hand, if the firm applies and substitutes the fund received to spend on the R&D project that 
it would have done even without the public support, there will arise input crowding out effect14.  
                                                          
12 According to David et al. (2000), “[G]overnment R&D contracts are financial outlays to procure research results 
that are expected to assist the public agency in better defining and fulfilling its mission objectives.” These contracts 
are in the shape of awards set by public authority for for-profit firms to push firms to perform R&D in the area in 
which  the government is interested. This category covers much of the public aerospace and defense expenditures. 
13 Complementarity or additionality is the case in which the subsidized firm undertakes additional effort (investment) 
in doing R&D project(s), whereas it would not have done the same if it was not awarded the subsidy. Substitution or 
crowding-out is the case in which the firm substitutes a proportion of the incentive with the amount of money which 
would have been spent even in the case of no subsidy. 
14 The term ‘free riding’ in this context also means spending the subsidies on projects which would have been carried 
out even without the incentives or spending the granted amount in other activities (Bronzini & Iachini, 2014). 
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Besides input additionality, additionality can also be referred to output additionality and 
behavioral additionality. The former refers to the production of more innovation outputs such as 
inventions and patents. The latter refers to the R&D activity which firm would have done even 
without the subsidy but in a different way (doing the research differently such as collaborative 
R&D or applying different innovation methods).  
Output additionality is realized when the private firm introduces a new innovative output 
(product or process innovation) which would have not been obtained without being granted. 
“Output can either be defined in terms of direct firm-level innovation outputs like patents, papers, 
prototypes or in terms of indirect firm-level innovation outputs such as the introduction of new 
products or the application of new processes and services. 
Behavioral additionality first introduced by Buisseret et al. (1995), also called as second-
order additionality by Autio et al. (2008), aims to complement and not to replace the traditional 
input and output additionality concepts. It follows an evolutionary approach towards innovation, 
is interpreted as cognitive capacity additionality and refers to the impact of public R&D support 
on the firms R&D strategies or decisions on scale, scope, investment timing, etc. (Barbieri et al., 
2012). The subsidies can change the innovation and R&D behavior of the firm and the R&D 
strategies taken by the firm. This means that temporary subsidies (and R&D incentives in general) 
to the firms can influence the firms’ long-term R&D effort and commitment to innovate (Clausen, 
2009).  
Bronzini and Piselli (2016) take into account spending more on research rather than 
development, starting new collaborations and change in R&D conducting management as 
examples of behavioral additionality. Data collection for this type of additionality is more 
challenging as the other types of additionalities are more quantifiable (Barbieri et al., 2012). 
Effective and efficient innovation policy requires public authorities to realize the impact of 
the policy on innovation activities and to understand the mechanisms and channels through which 
input, output and/or behavioral additionalities are linked to each other and investigating  how the 
policy is related to additional innovation activities and other target variables. 
In sections related to theoretical background, the position of innovation activities in the 
growth theories has been spotted. Afterwards, the spillover effect as a main criteria for the policy 
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maker and an important phenomenon happening in the network of innovators (and non-innovators) 
has been addressed. The famous market failure related to private firms’ R&D underinvestment 
together with different public policies to tackle this failure in order to stimulate different types of 
additionality were also discussed. Now, the dissertation’s theoretical and practical review can be 
directed towards more detailed explanation of R&D policies and finally evaluation of these 
policies as the main focus of the thesis.  
However, beforehand we turn into these topics, it seems necessary and it can add value to 
review and discuss the R&D activities and R&D policies in a more practical perspective according 
to input and output R&D activity. Therefore, as our empirical data in this work links to a provincial 
context in one of the main players and founders of EU, we review the goal and programs of 
European Union and some indices related to innovative activities of EU countries in addition to 
Italian provinces. The main focus will then tend to the measures related to our case study, Trento 
Province in Italy.  
2. Innovation (R&D) activity and R&D policy in practice 
2.1 R&D and European perspective (Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020)  
Innovation (R&D) activity as a motive for the economic growth and higher productivity 
has been a core concept for Lisbon Strategy 2000_2010, which has set a 3 percent of R&D 
expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic production (GDP) by 2010 (European Commission, 
2000)15. However, according to Eurostat16 data, there has been a decreasing investment in R&D in 
several European member states in this period. The average R&D expenditure barely reached the 
average of 2% of the GDP in the EU-27 as a whole by 2007. 
Although there have been improvements in unemployment rates through 2010, the goals 
related to innovation activities and R&D expenditure increases by member states set by the Lisbon 
Strategy have not been fulfilled. Moreover, the Commission stimulates knowledge and innovation 
through greater investment in R&D and information and communication technologies (ICT),  as a 
                                                          
15 This amount is still one of the  Europe 2020 program headline targets (European Commission, 2010). 
16 Eurostat first established in 1953 is the statistical office of the European Union and Directorate-General of the 
European Commission, situated in Luxembourg. Its mission is to provide high quality statistics for Europe. 
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major objective to deal with “employment and productivity growth lagging behind due to limited 
investment both in ICT, as well as in research and development” (Rodriguez et al., 2010).  
2.2. R&D expenditures to GDP17 ratio at international, national and regional 
levels  
Hereby, it is worth to review statistics related to the R&D expenditures for EU2818 at the 
international level, followed by the statistics at European and finally regional levels in Italy for 
specific periods of time. This will provide insights about R&D expenditures in Italy compared to 
other states, as the case of this study relates to a province in Italian context.  
Figure (1) extracted from Eurostat shows the changes for gross domestic expenditure on 
R&D to GDP ratio for EU28 compared to China, Japan and United States over the period between 
2005 to 2015. The R&D spending for EU has gradually risen since 2005, followed by a close to 
zero change from 2012 onwards, while others have experienced more versatile changes over the 
period. China increased the ratio on a more stable trend from a lower  point in 2005, catching up 
Europe by 2012. Japan and USA have always performed respectively higher than 3.2% and 2.5% 
since 2005. The graph brings up the idea that the EU needs effective and efficient R&D policies 
in order to ramp up the average gross domestic expenditures on R&D for being more competitive. 
Figure (2) defines the gross domestic expenditure on R&D the same as previous figure (1) 
but separately for each EU-28 countries besides some other states outside the European Union for 
the years 2005 and 2015. Except Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg and Croatia, other EU28 states 
have experienced an increase in total expenditure on R&D, point to point in time (2005-2015). 
Figure (3) focuses on the changes of the average EU-28 R&D expenditures based on 
different sectors. The business (private) sector holds the highest share. Interestingly, the higher 
education sector possesses a larger part of the GERD/GDP percentage than the government sector. 
 
                                                          
17 “Research and experimental development (R&D) comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order 
to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of 
knowledge to devise new applications. R&D expenditures include all expenditures for R&D performed within the 
business enterprise sector (BERD) on the national territory during a given period, regardless of the source of funds. 
R&D expenditure in BERD are shown as a percentage of GDP (R&D intensity).” [Eurostat, 2017] 
18 The European Union (EU) comprises 28 member states. 
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 Figure 1. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, 2005–2015 (% of GDP)  
Source: Eurostat  
The same index illustrated in figure (3) for average EU28, is shown for each state in 2015 
besides some other Non-EU28 countries in figure (4). Private (business enterprise) sector share 
of R&D expenditures represents the largest part of the total expenditures for Italy like the same 
pattern for many other countries. However, the share of higher education is interestingly higher 
than business sector in countries like Estonia, Lithuania and Cyprus. 
Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden bear the lowest proportions of government 
expenditures in the total GERD ratio. Business enterprise sector and higher education sector handle 
almost the whole R&D expenditures. Although the government has not participated largely in 
R&D, but these countries have obtained high shares of GERD/GDP.
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Figure 2. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD%) for different states, 2005 and 2015 (% of GDP) 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 3. The share of gross national expenditures for R&D to GDP (GERD%) for different 
sectors, 2005-2015 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure (4) shows the amount of gross national R&D expenditures to GDP at national level 
for year 2015. R&D expenditure in the EU-28 countries accounted for 2.03% of the EU GDP.19 
Figure (4) identifies the total national R&D intensity as one of the key factors of Europe 2020 
strategy in the forms of gross national R&D expenditure to GDP20 (GERD%) and business 
(private) enterprise R&D expenditure to GDP21 (BERD) within the European context. 
                                                          
19 For Euro area the amount is slightly higher as 2.12%. 
20 The gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) 
21 Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) 
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Figure 4. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (%GERD) by sector, 2015 (% of GDP) 
Source: Eurostat
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Sweden (3.26%), Austria (3.07) and Denmark (3.03%) are the only countries performed 
above the 3 percent ratio in 2015. These were followed by Finland (2.9)22, Germany (2.87%) well 
above Belgium (2.81%), France (2.23%), Slovenia (2.21%), the Netherlands (2.01%), Czech 
Republic (1.95%), Norway (1.93%) and the United Kingdom (1.7%).  
As one of the largest economies in the EU, Italy (1.33%) is carrying out R&D less than 
Ireland(1.5%), Estonia (1.5%) and Hungary (1.38%) whilst higher than Luxembourg (1.31%), 
Portugal (1.28%) and Spain (1.22%). The R&D intensity (the ratio of GERD to GDP) increased 
from 1.31% in 2013 to 1.38% in 2014 and then decreased to 1.33%.23 Italy’s 2020 target of 1.53% 
is not out of reach; however, the country still should spend more on R&D to achieve the 3% target 
of the 2020 strategy, currently matched only by two Scandinavian economies and Austria. 
The total R&D expenditure to GDP (GERD/GDP) and business R&D expenditure to GDP 
(BERD/GDP) at EU national level for the year 2012, have been also shown in figure (1.a.1) in 
appendix (1.a) and discussed using a different source (ISTAT)24 from Eurostat. These additional 
data description together with previous figures can depict a general comparative picture of the 
R&D expenditure at all sectors and private business sector at national level.  
The research in this paper relies on firm-level data from the autonomous province of 
Trento, Italy. It therefore requires a general perspective on R&D expenditure at regional level in 
comparison with other regions in the state. Figures (5) and (6) show the annual ratios of total R&D 
expenditure (GERD%) and business R&D expenditure (BERD%) to GDP for different regions. 
The change of the ranking can also be traced over time. In 2001, Trento province shows a low 
amount, slightly higher than 0.6% of total R&D expenditure/GDP ratio, while this year is just the 
outset for the first R&D subsidy installment related to new provincial law LP 6/99 (set in 1999). 
The law commits the province, to allocate R&D subsidies to enterprises operating in the province 
for R&D applied research projects.    
                                                          
22 Finland has decreased the amount of GERD% from 3.75% in 2009 (as the highest amount ever recorded) to 2.9% 
in 2015. 
23 To see the detailed GERD% to GDP measures check: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tsc00001&language=en 
24 ISTAT report based on The European system of national and regional accounts (ESA 2010). ISTAT (In Italian: Istituto 
nazionale di statistica) is a public research organization founded in 1926 as the main producer of official statistics at 
the service of citizens and policy-makers. ISTAT has been performing the role of directing, coordinating, and 
providing technical assistance and training within the National Statistical System (Sistan) since 1989.  
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Figure 5. Regional total and business R&D expenditures for Italy, (2001,2003,2005 and 2007) 
Source: ISTAT report 201425
                                                          
25 ISTAT, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in Businesses. In Italian: Le tecnologie dell'informazione 
e della comunicazione nelle imprese, Comunicato stampa, 22 dicembre 2014. 
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Figure 6. Regional total and business R&D expenditures in Italy, (2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012) 
Source: ISTAT report 2014
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The law and the R&D program will be described in detail in the following. Two years later, 
in 2003 the province experiences an amount higher than 1% for total R&D expenditures, while the 
share of private R&D expenditure is still very low in the total spending and even lower than 2001. 
The expenditures grow in 2005 with a GERD% amount around 1.1% and gradually higher in 2007. 
Lazio and Piedmont (Piemonte) are the regions dominating on top of the list over this 
period, while changing their best and second-best positions in 2007 (first happening in 2006). 
Lazio and Piedmont regions have the highest amount of public total R&D expenditure and private 
R&D expenditure, respectively. The former has probably spent the most on R&D projects related 
to state, while the latter has spent the most on private R&D projects related to private industries 
and large private-owned manufacturing firms.   
Figure (6) shows the dynamics of R&D expenditures for different regions for 2008, 2009, 
2011 and 2012. Trento spends an amount slightly higher than 1.2% for GERD%, more than 
Lombardy (Lombardia) in 2008. In 2009, the amount grows incredibly to a ratio higher than 2%, 
putting up the region in the first place higher than Piedmont and Lazio. The business R&D 
expenditure enormously increases to an amount higher than 1% as well. To be more discussed in 
the next chapter, the province has introduced an agency responsible for allocating funds to R&D 
projects in the province just in 2009 in line with the law LP 6/99. Thus, this new setting and 
allocation of new budgets for R&D projects in the province can explain this sudden rapid increase.  
Although the amount of the GERD% slightly decreases to 1.93% in 2011, however the 
province keeps on top of the list and consequently higher than Italian average of 1.25%. In 2012, 
The northern part of Italy still possesses the highest share of national R&D expenditure (60.6%). 
In terms of R&D public expenditures to GDP (at regional/provincial level), Trento province with 
a ratio of 1.71% remains among the best R&D performers after Piedmont (1.94%) and Lazio 
(1.73%) in 2012.  For the private sector (excluding non-profit institutions), Trento stands after 
Piedmont (1.51%), Emilia Romagna (1.09%) and Lombardy (0.94%) as the three best performing 
regions. In Southern Italy, Campania shows the highest ratio between R&D expenditure and GDP 
(0.54%), while Calabria has the lowest (0.01%).  
In a new ISTAT report for total R&D expenditures to GDP ratio (2016), the amount of 
GERD% for Trento province in 2012 is 1.8% leading as the second best performer (and not the 
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third one) among other regions just after Piedmont.26 Moreover, the share of innovative enterprises 
in total number of enterprises at national (for 2012) and regional level (the average of 2010-2012) 
have also been shown and discussed in detail in figure (1.b.1) and (1.b.2) in Appendix (1.b).  
 At this point, the indices for total R&D expenditure and private enterprise R&D 
expenditure with respect to total GDP for Italy and the Province of Trento have been spotted 
compared to other countries (specifically in EU28) and other Italian provinces for different recent 
years. This provides us a picture of R&D expenditure in the aggregate level in contrary to our 
study’s firm level analysis. This picture  helps us to understand what and where, the final effect of  
R&D policies and particularly the local-based R&D policy in our context  would impact on. In 
line with Lisbon treaty’s target of spending 3% of GDP on research and development investments, 
Trento province as an autonomous region in northern east Italy, has set objectives to increase 
investment in research and technology direct investment (RTDI) specifically for information and 
communication technologies (ICT) sector. These objectives include the support of small and 
medium sized enterprises in promoting their competitiveness, innovation and productivity.  
A detailed description and review of the local-based R&D policy and the objectives it aims 
at, will be discussed in the following chapters. The public state and/or regional authorities set and 
apply different types of R&D policies to stimulate private R&D expenditures in order to finally 
increase the indices on R&D expenditure and input additionality. Next sections identifies and 
explains these different instruments and the evaluation of these different R&D policies. 
3. R&D Policies  
3.1 The economic importance of R&D policy  
“Perhaps the most necessary thing that British institutions and after 1815 much of the 
western world contributed to the innovation progress was what they ‘did not do’ ”; for instance not 
to highly tax the wealth of innovators to limit their venture capital which was vital for innovation. 
Therefore, innovators mainly relied on their own financial resources and private informal financial 
networks (Mokyr in Hall & Rosenberg, 2010). Centuries later, the modern government noticed not 
only it should stop deterring innovative activities, but also the state has the responsibility to 
                                                          
26 This difference between data exists for some other years as well. The new data is provided based on the new 
available Istat website for data on science, technology and innovation. 
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encourage innovative activity for higher social welfare. However, innovation started to get 
supported by powerful institutional ties, access to the support of large investment banks and 
government guarantees and subsidies. At the same time, governments were mainly subsidizing 
research based on state priorities (Hall & Rosenberg, 2010). 
Section 1, besides the importance of R&D and subsequently R&D policy for economic 
growth, discussed about how R&D policy aims to tackle underinvestment in private R&D due to 
the financial market failure and externality-induced reasons. Before reviewing the literature for 
R&D policy studies, this section develops the argument about the market failure for innovation 
(pointed out in section 1.3) and links it to the necessity for R&D policy to compensate the market 
gap. The idea is initially developed in articles by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) following the 
work of Schumpeter (1942), the father of economics of innovation. 
Knowledge as a basic resource for invention and making new goods or services, does not 
remain secret and is diffusible and nonrival. Hence, copy and imitation of a new invention 
(innovation) does not allow the inventor(s) to completely appropriate the returns to investment in 
knowledge. Therefore, the inventor (innovator) becomes reluctant to invest in innovation, which 
finally leads to R&D underinvestment in the economy. 
In other words, risk and uncertainty in appropriation of the returns to R&D investment can 
make enterprises to carry out additional R&D activity lower than required for an optimal social 
return to R&D. In intellectual property right (IPR) literature, patents are known as a fundamental 
policy to encourage R&D activity by offering such a  monopoly for the output of innovation 
activity carried out by the private firms (Barbieri et al., 2012). However, not only the input side of 
the innovation activity does not necessarily result in inventions or patents; but also large part of 
innovation output is not patented. Therefore, additional instruments such as monetary incentives 
for research and development are widely adopted by the social planner.  
Even if problems with incomplete appropriability are solved using intellectual property 
right (IPR)27, it can still be costly to finance R&D for a firm or an entrepreneur using capital from 
external sources. This can happen when there is a difference between the rate of return to R&D 
                                                          
27 At the output level the appropriation of the R&D outcomes depend on the patent length (Nordhaus, 1969). 
There are theoretical analysis focusing on the optimal patent length as well. 
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investment required by an entrepreneur and that provided by an external investor which means the 
external finance for R&D might be more costly than internal finance. Reasons for this difference 
mentioned in the literature, are asymmetric information between inventors/entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists, moral hazard generated by the entrepreneur because of ownership and 
management separation, and tax considerations (Hall & Lerner in Hall & Rosenberg, 2010). 
Taking for granted that innovation activity and knowledge in all its forms play a crucial 
role in economic growth, therefore research on innovation policy as a part of science and 
technology and industrial policies becomes essential to provide literature and policy makers new 
insights about the issue. According to the discussion about market failure, innovation policy is 
required to “design legal methods of protecting innovations” (OECD, Oslo manual, 2005). The 
following section defines different types of R&D policies applied to encourage the private sector 
to spend more on R&D.  
3.2 Different types of R&D policies  
The line of reasoning provided in the previous section, justifies public policy interventions 
for increasing R&D activity by private firms. The R&D public policy appears in various forms, 
more frequently in form of government support for business R&D, R&D tax incentives and 
encouraging firms for cooperation in different types of research partnerships (R&D collaboration) 
and less frequently as award or prize system and procurement contracts. These policies are applied 
and implemented besides the current innovation protecting system or intellectual property system 
(for instance a patent protection system).  
Becker (2015) categorizes the public R&D subsidies into three main forms, namely R&D 
tax credits and direct subsidies, support for university research system and training high skilled 
human capital and finally support for R&D cooperations across institutions. The first category, 
direct R&D grants and tax credits, represents the tools the government uses as the public finance 
solution for private R&D investment lower than social optimal amount.  
The general features of research and development actors are universities and colleges, 
government labs and R&D intensive industries beside the federal states. The state make decisions 
on R&D investment and incentives. Investment decisions include funding for infrastructure for 
research (facilities and equipment), the development of human resources for business R&D and 
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funding the research activities in labs and universities. Incentive decisions include encouraging the 
activities that stimulate economic growth through the use of knowledge, incentives for inventions 
in form of patents (a temporary monopoly claim), tax credits for increasing spending on R&D 
activities, support of small businesses’ R&D projects and encouraging interaction between 
universities and industries in strategic areas (Shapira & Kuhlmann, 2003). This study’s main focus 
is on direct R&D subsidies. In the following, first the award system and procurement mechanism 
are discussed. Afterwards, the discussion about main R&D stimulating policies will be developed 
and a review of the previous studies on R&D policy and the aspects these studies deal with will be 
provided.  
3.2.1 R&D Award (Prizing) 
A mechanism to encourage R&D is the award system. Design of an optimal award system 
to set the award size is difficult because the public authority must be knowledgeable about the 
feasibility of the inventions and the demand for the innovation. The award (prize) system has some 
drawbacks; the administrative body usually estimate the amount of the prize for innovation 
conservatively. Moreover, in contrast to the patent system the award system requires the innovator 
to transfer or define the knowledge or invention and to transmit the technological information to 
the decision maker which can be tricky. As long as the firms have more information about the 
market demand therefore, a less centralized solution like patent system functions better while there 
is also a correlation between the monopoly profits and the social value of an invention (Rockett in 
Hall & Rosenberg, 2010).  
3.2.2 Procurement contracts or contractual mechanism 
Procurement has features in common with award system, but there are major differences 
which makes this type of policy more widely used. In procurement, the government has control 
and access to the research market by signing more detailed contracts with a certain number of 
firms, while at the same time covering a part of the research costs. Excessive duplication of R&D 
projects would be avoided in this mechanism. Similar to the award system in which the agency 
must know the innovation value, in these types of contracts the government has information about 
the type of the project. This can be a reason why procurement policy is mostly used by space and 
defense projects (Edquist et al., 2000).  
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3.2.3 Tax Credits 
Tax incentives beside the grants for R&D are widely used as a fiscal incentive and 
advantageous tax treatment in different forms to encourage higher R&D effort by private firms. 
Since 2015, 28 out of 34 OECD member states has provided tax treatments for business R&D 
expenditures (OECD, 2016).Tax credits can be divided into volume-based or incremental-based 
categories. The latter determines the tax relief on the total amount of R&D expenditure while the 
former is applied for the increased amount in R&D spending. In general the tax offset relates to 
the size or to the profit or loss making status of the firm (Wu, 2005) . Tax crediting is supposed to 
be more market oriented policy, as it let the private corporation to decide about the timing and 
amount of investment more flexibly (Klette et al., 2000). 
R&D subsidies have a higher impact to increase R&D expenditures by private firms in 
medium or long-run term in contrast to tax incentives which affect the expenditures mainly in the 
short-run. Therefore, the tax credits have a quicker effect rather than direct subsidies for R&D 
(Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003). One interpretation can be that firms who use 
tax offsets in the market have already decided about the amount of R&D they carry out, while the 
firms being provided R&D subsidies have been selected by the government on a long-run aspect 
of their projects which may promote the firm to do more innovative activity at a later stage using 
their own internal funding. A study shows how direct subsidies and tax credits can be substitute 
for each other meaning that an increase in one may dampen the effect of the other in private R&D 
(David et al., 2000).  
Furthermore, different internationally taxing regulations may lead to R&D mobility, and 
R&D in one country can be affected because of a change in tax credits in another country. This 
may further lead to foreign tax competition (Bloom & Griffith, 2001).   
3.2.4 Incentives for collaborative R&D 
Next strand of policies to encourage R&D activity is allocation of incentives for 
cooperation in R&D. Policy makers can facilitate R&D activity by industry linkages with national 
labs and universities. These linkages can be in the form of cooperative research and development 
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relationships, interaction of companies and federal labs and university-industry relationships28. 
Collaborations can occur between knowledge exploiting organizations (firms and companies) and 
knowledge producing institutions (universities and research centers) or between the enterprise and 
its competitors (horizontal collaboration) and suppliers or customers (vertical collaboration or 
supply chain collaboration) (Fölster, 1995).  
One form of cooperation in R&D is ‘research joint ventures’ (RJVs), which represents the 
agreements or contracts in which collaborating firms agree to share the costs and the profits of a 
research project (Marin & Siotis, 2008). There are similarities between RJV and licensing. They 
are both contractual mechanisms which may influence the R&D level at input or even output and 
the diffusion of innovation. 
In contrast to appropriability problem which discourages firms to invest in R&D, business 
stealing effect may cause firms to spend higher than expected in R&D. The firm in a patent race 
increases its R&D effort in order to avoid the rival firms in the market to obtain the patent, leading 
to an overinvestment in R&D and duplication of R&D effort in the market. In addition to provide 
complementary use of other participants’ assets, RJVs can help firms to cooperate and coordinate 
together to avoid and prevent the excessive duplication of similar R&D activities. 
 Promoting firms to participate in RJVs is considered as a policy to stimulate R&D 
especially when the patent protection system does not function effectively. The firms share the 
risk and uncertainty or the high fixed cost of conducting R&D individually, with other firms 
specifically when there is innovation spillover which makes the R&D-doing firms not to 
completely internalize the profits out of their R&D output. However, in the literature there have 
been evidence of RJVs leading to underinvestment in R&D when the collaborating firms may 
collude to avoid competition by the rivals in the research and development market (Cassiman, 
2000; Shapira & Kuhlmann, 2003).  
Growth of international collaboration programs (one evidence is the growth of international 
co-publication) and increased international mobility of researchers and scientists has led to 
globalization of science and industry. At the same time, this creates regional economy concerns 
                                                          
28 University-led technology transfer, university linkage with economic development and movement of scientists and 
engineers are among university-industry relationships. 
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on labor market for researchers both about brain-drain and the methods to attract foreign 
researchers (Qiu & Tao, 1998).  
3.2.5 R&D direct subsidies (grants or funds) 
In public good argument a patent race winner might lose pay offs out of the new invention 
because of imitation by losers who free ride in the industry. This probably happen more often in 
industries with high spillovers. Spence (1984) suggests that government R&D subsidies can be a 
good substitute for a failing patent system (e.g. the innovation systems in developing countries 
with a weak IPR system). 
As well as direct impact on additionality, the R&D subsidies can indirectly influence 
multiple potential variables together with R&D investment. The grant might convey signal on the 
profitability of the project and reduce the information asymmetries that subsidized firms face, 
leading to a lower private costs of capital (Meuleman & De Maeseneire, 2012). Moreover, by 
benefiting from the grants, firms may expand or upgrade their research facilities, train better their 
researchers, increase the revenue of other current or future projects, and eventually increase the 
marginal returns of the investment. These mechanisms can amplify the impact of the policy and 
induce firms to increase R&D outlays by even more than the amount of the grants (crowding-in).  
In contrary, there can also be indirect effects acting in the opposite direction. Bronizini and 
Iachini (2014) describe a situation in which when the supply of the R&D inputs (such as 
researchers in a tight local labor market) is price inelastic and the subsidy program is sufficiently 
large, demand shift for inputs triggered by the public program might increase the costs, ultimately 
crowding out the subsidies. 
Furthermore, subsidies can also impact the quality of the R&D activity. For instance, R&D 
subsidies can encourage a private firm to employ more scientifically skilled workers (e.g. by 
employing labour force holding PhD or M.Sc. degrees), which consequently may affect the quality 
of the project (Clausen, 2009).  
Finally after reviewing different types of instruments used for stimulation of private R&D, 
the effectiveness of an incentive program is the main question of an evaluation study. In the 
following, we discuss the R&D policy (mainly subsidization policy) evaluation and the related 
literature and empirical works referred to the topic in the following sections.  
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4. R&D Policy Evaluation  
When it is about policy, then policy evaluation comes after. Evaluation findings should 
effectively be linked with policy outcomes. In a world of complex innovation systems, evaluation 
plays a mediating role to inform and improve policy decision making. It is difficult to assess all 
benefits and costs of research and technology programs because of related spillovers, 
counterfactual explanations and learning effects. The policy design should also consider the new 
patterns of industry collaboration with growth of industry consortia, university-industry linkages, 
public-private partnerships and multinational research programs. The debate for public policy is 
how much government should invest in research, in what fields, under what conditions and with 
what economic and political goals. Annual monitoring of research provides us official indicators 
like number of published articles for academic research or number of patents for applied research. 
However, there are unobserved hidden impacts29 and aspects of research which must be traced to 
have a comprehensive evaluation (Steinmuller, in Hall & Rosenberg, 2010).  
The evaluation can be ex-ante (before program) or ex-post (after program) to demonstrate 
the value-added of a program30. Ex-ante evaluations evaluate plans before starting a program 
(policy). The ex-ante evaluation results are used to improve the plan and to judge the relevance of 
the program. Ex-post Evaluations verify whether the outcomes that the program (policy) aimed for 
are continuing after a certain period of time since the end of the program (JICA: Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, 2017). Positive evaluation of a program does not necessarily guarantee the 
program to pass political scrutiny, while at the same time negative evaluation of the program does 
not always lead to termination of the program. Mixed findings can happen in the evaluation 
particularly when there are multiple objectives or a change of objectives over time as stakeholders 
or political agenda change. 
The main approach towards research policy evaluation and consequently the largest part of 
public R&D policy evaluation literature relate to the assessment of the effect of the policy on 
additionality. Evaluating the input additionality means investigation of  how much extra the private 
enterprise spends on research with respect to the subsidy it receives. Measuring output 
                                                          
29 Such as indirect effects of R&D policy discussed in section 3.2.5. 
30 Mid-term evaluation can also be considered as another evaluation method based on timing of the evaluation. Mid-
term evaluation assesses the program while the program has already been implemented and is still being carried on. 
This study only deals with ex-post evaluation.  
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additionality evaluates what has been incrementally produced as a new production or produced by 
a new process as a result of public R&D funding. Behavioral additionality measurement is the last 
additionality effect evaluation which deals with the R&D activity the firm would have done even 
without the subsidy but in a different way (doing the research differently). For instance subsidies 
for R&D collaboration would motivate a firm to do the planned R&D project in cooperation with 
other institutions rather than doing it solely. The interpretations for additionality measurement can 
differ according to either the neoclassical or evolutionary approaches. Public R&D policy, in order 
to be effective on additionality must be capable to change firms’ preferences and to push the firm 
to do the projects it would not have done without the public support (Bronzini et al., 2017). 
The effectiveness of R&D support program depends on the success of the public agency to 
distinguish between marginal and inframarginal projects and provide the incentives to the former 
group (Lach, 2002). Subsidies should encourage the best unprofitable R&D projects to make the 
firm to carry out the project (Clausen, 2009). Public R&D subsidies are expected to trigger firms’ 
investment in R&D projects which are marginally profitable. A project is marginally profitable 
when it would not have been undertaken without the public support. These projects are usually 
unprofitable if they get privately financed as their cost is higher than their rate of return. The impact 
of a successful effective public R&D support program on R&D expenditures and other interested 
target variables is realized by decreasing the cost of capital and increasing the investment 
profitability for marginal projects (Bronzini et al., 2014). 
However, even assuming that the public agency performs quite well in selection of the 
firms to be subsidized, still the agency might not be totally capable of recognition of marginal 
projects. Furthermore, in order to be politically correct, the public authority concerned with public 
opinion can allocate the support to inframarginal projects with a higher probability of success 
(Lach, 2002). If a policy subsidizes the projects which are profitable even in the case of not 
receiving the subsidy (inframarginal projects), then the R&D support program would be 
ineffective. This happens because the firm will substitute the public grant with the private R&D 
investment to take advantage of the lower cost of the public funds. The effect of R&D incentives 
is usually studied through firm-level investment behavior due to the maximization of the profits 
by firms (Bronzini et al., 2014).  
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Furthermore, in a broader empirical point of view, the effect of R&D policy can be 
measured on other different target measures of interest (either theoretically or related the practical 
policy maker’s goals).The optimal policy to stimulate R&D even if we know whether there is 
underinvestment in science and technology or not, must be determined. In the following sections 
we review some of targeted variables of interest, besides additionality measures, which the effect 
of the policy on them has been empirically measured.  
The challenges evaluation of complex research programs faces include intangible learning 
and network effects of research and fuzziness of objectives. In policy evaluation the scope of the 
evaluation, beside the direct effects of the policy should deal with the indirect effects of the policy 
as well. The direct effect is related to the main objective of the policy, while the indirect effect 
represents the factors which go beyond the objectives of the program. Indirect effects of the policy 
consist of technological effects (transfer of the new technology to other activities of the firm), 
commercial effects (the good image of doing research as a marketing tool), the organizational and 
methods effects and competence and training effects (the effect the innovation may have on human 
capital) (Shapira & Kuhlmann, 2003). 
All in all, an ecumenical view to evaluation can help to choose the appropriate strategy for 
research evaluation. After second world war, the post evaluation of science and research did not 
seem to be necessary as there was an endless frontier approach to science, but the time for this 
approach has already passed. Now, the strategic mission-based research decision making brings 
the emergence for ex post evaluation of research programs to respect the social contract between 
science and the society due to the concerns about wealth creation, life quality improvement and 
policy relevance (Asheim et al., 2003).  
Allison commission’s review of signal service in 1884 can be an evidence showing that 
evaluation of science and technology (S&T) programs is not a new concept. However, S&T 
programs evaluation hardly developed until the end of 1980s. The logic for why we need 
systematic science and technology program evaluations, can be referred to generic questioning of 
public sector to improve private sector allocation of resources, to consider opportunity cost of 
public expenditures, and to promote technology for citizens through public support for 
fundamental research. In addition, the evaluation is required to ensure the accountability of the 
agent in a principal-agent framework (Shapira & Kuhlmann, 2003).  
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Since early 80s, the European commission has set different waves of framework programs 
to evaluate R&D programs. Six frameworks have been introduced, while the importance of socio-
economic targets has been emphasized in the last one leading to a redesign of the assessment 
mechanisms and related methods of data provision.  The European approach towards R&D policy 
evaluation is bound up with national administrative culture. In Europe there are countries with 
centralized evaluation framework (like UK), countries in which the evaluation system is well 
established but still uncoordinated between ministries (like Germany and the Netherlands) and 
Nordic countries which the evaluation heavily uses the panelists. However, the European Research 
Area (ERA) concept has been developed to form a common understanding on science and 
technology policies and to integrate and develop the evaluation culture across Europe. One 
dimension of ERA is to identify the best practice in public policy and to spread the benchmarking 
policies for science and technology (Shapira & Kuhlmann, 2003).  
In a local aspect, evaluating regional innovation is not simply as the national evaluation in 
a smaller scale. The European regions as innovation policy actors have been expected to follow 
the interactive model of innovation replacing the traditional linear model, to focus on SMEs as a 
specific target groups, to motivate innovation activity and dissemination of knowledge in the 
region and to promote proximity of regional actors in regional innovation system. The term 
“learning region” represent a region which monitors, measures and evaluates the research activity 
in the region and feedbacks the outcome of the policy evaluation to optimize future policies 
(Asheim et al., 2003). The question whether public R&D subsidies stimulate or substitute the 
private R&D expenditure is an empirical issue. Hence, the institutional settings and context 
differences can have an impact on the effect of subsidies on additional R&D spending (David et 
al., 2000).  
5. Literature review of R&D Policy Evaluation 
The first effort to evaluate R&D policies dates back to 1957 as Blank and Stigler 
investigated the relationship between public and private R&D in US, as the R&D budget had 
already raised much in 50s. As previously discussed, the literature for R&D policy evaluation 
mainly deals with studies measuring the effect of the policy on additional private R&D to 
investigate whether the policy has been effective in encouraging the business entity to increase its 
R&D activities or not. This section reviews the empirical studies in which the effect of R&D policy 
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on R&D input and output and some other target outcomes have been measured. However, before 
literature review, we address the main challenges and issues R&D policy evaluation studies are 
exposed.  
5.1 Challenges in Empirical Evaluation Studies 
5.1.1 Selection bias and endogeneity problem in policy evaluation literature 
Regarding  the review of the works related to the effect of public R&D, one main issue in 
impact analysis of public subsidies is considering the selection bias which happens in non-random 
allocation of subsidies. Firms’ decision to apply for subsidies and the decision by public 
authorities to support R&D projects are not random (Blanes & Busom, 2004). In a non-
experimental setting, firms decide whether to apply for subsidies for R&D and public authorities 
perform a non-random selection based on their own criteria for assigning subsidies to firms to 
conduct private R&D (Kauko,1996). This makes the subsidies evaluation to be carried out only 
for a sample of firms whose applications to receive subsidies have been admitted, but not for the 
whole population of the firms. This mechanism causes endogenous subsidies allocation which 
leads to sample selection bias.  
However, there are evaluation studies in which the impact of R&D subsidy programs has 
econometrically been measured, to investigate a causal relationship assuming that allocation of the 
subsidies by the public agency can take a random pattern (Griliches, 1986; Branstetter & 
Sakakibara, 1998; Griliches & Regev, 1998). If subsidies are allocated randomly, the data for 
supported and all non-supported firms can be analyzed using a quasi-experimental counterfactual 
setting. As long as there are many factors in political economy influencing the allocation, the 
evaluation results while treating the allocation as a random process can be valid and not misleading 
(Klette et al., 2000). However, in most cases the governments do not allocate funds randomly and 
select applications by firms based on some criteria or evaluation. Moreover, the firm previously 
self-selects to participate in the program based on some determinants.  
As long as the R&D support given to firms, follows a selection process by the public 
agency, one can take R&D policy as a treatment to business enterprises. That means R&D 
subsidies are not allocated to firms randomly and the grants are assigned by decision and 
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selection.31 Therefore, not all firms in the non-supported sample have the same probability to be 
subsidized and this may lead to a bias in the difference between the performance of the treated 
versus non-treated firms and subsequently in the impact evaluated. At the same time, in the case 
unobservable firm characteristics impact the selection procedure, the subsidy variable is assumed 
to be correlated with the error term in an R&D equation. This will result in the bias in estimation 
of the effect of subsidies on the dependent variables (Clasuen, 2009).  
The bias mainly arises when the unobservable term in the equations, identifying the impact 
of subsidy support on performance is correlated with support variable. To explain this, for instance 
if the public agency decides to support firms which perform inefficiently or to aid firms because 
of some uncontrollable shocks, or in reverse the government decides to pick winners and support 
firms with e.g. a high profit, all these may result in selection bias or generally the endogeneity 
problem.32 The studies evaluating the impact of the policy, measure how the supported firms would 
have performed had they not been supported; that is, the difference in the outcome between 
supported and non-supported is the impact of the public policy. However, this difference can also 
stem from the fact that non-supported firms systematically perform differently, and this can be 
referred to selection bias. Accordingly, these studies dealing with policy impact evaluation have 
to use methods to remove this selection bias.  
If the selection bias is not corrected, the analysis of policies and treatments may bring up 
misleading results (Czarnitzki et al., 2007). There are different methodologies to correct selection 
bias; those who benefit from a structural model like instrumental variable (IV) estimation, 
selection model (Heckit) first proposed by Heckman (1978) and control function which is based 
on the standard multiple regression analysis; and those who do not make functional form and 
statistical assumptions like difference-in-difference (DID) estimator and non-parametric method 
of matching. The most effective method depends on the available data, the characteristics of the 
database and R&D subsidy environment (Cerulli & Poti`, 2012). Cerulli (2010) reviews and 
discusses the econometric models measuring the effect of R&D public support on R&D 
                                                          
31 Because the subsidies are not allocated randomly to the firms, the initial differences between subsidized and non-
subsidized firms must be controlled (Clausen, 2009). 
32 In other words, there can be a ‘picking the winner’ or ‘supporting the weaker’ strategy in allocating R&D subsidies 
to the private firms. That means the public agency will not randomly assign subsidies to the firms eager to do R&D. 
This brings up the endogeneity and makes the subsidy variable endogenous, leading to biased results for policy 
evaluation. 
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investment. The models are described based on type of the policy (binary vs. continuous), the 
estimation method used (systems of equations vs. reduced form) and the type of data applied 
(cross-sectional versus longitudinal). The study continues with reviewing the main features of 
structural models and the important problem of endogeneity. Afterwards, the next generation of 
structural models (selection models) and their advantage in describing the two player (principal- 
agent) setting of the R&D incentive scheme  are discussed. Subsequently, the more data driven 
empirical strategies analyzing R&D policy as a treatment are addressed. Control function and more 
in specific matching method are among these techniques. Afterwards, the study points out the 
evaluation methods using dynamic models of imperfect competition as the new strand of 
evaluation methods. In the following we make a brief review of different methods of innovation 
policy evaluation.33 
According to Heckman (1978), sample selection bias can be viewed as omitted variable 
bias problem. The main Heckit model has been proposed by Heckman on wage level regressed on 
education. The problem arisen is that when data on wage and education is only available for those 
being employed. Consequently, the estimation of parameters to find out the relationship between 
education and wage would be biased without provision of the data for unemployed individuals. 
The same situation can occur for R&D output variables and subsidies. The data for R&D variables 
such as R&D expenditure or patents etc. are usually available only for the firms doing R&D. 
Therefore, the effort to measure the effect of R&D subsidies on R&D investment or R&D output 
will suffer from the selection bias if we cannot apply the data for the firms not doing R&D.  
The IV estimation and selection model explain the interaction between public authorities’ 
and firms’ selection behavior within a system of equations. Endogeneity caused by selection on 
observable and unobservable factors can be tackled by these models. However, IV estimation 
requires additional information for instrumental variables, while the selection model assumes 
strong distributional hypotheses (Wallsten, 2000; Busom, 2000). For instance, Clausen (2009) 
used the total amount of funding in an industry (or the average subsidies in an industry) and also 
distance to R&D program as the instruments for the amount of subsidies in an Instrumental 
Variable (IV) setting to remove the endogeneity bias. Furthermore, the control function method 
                                                          
33 We will briefly address the selection bias problem again in the next chapters (in other words and with brevity) to 
keep the cohesion and coherence of the chapter which is related to empirical evaluation of R&D subsidies.  
34 
 
uses a standard regression to identify treatment effects when the treatment is continuous (Florens 
et al., 2008).  
Matching as a non-parametric estimation reduces the unsubsidized firms to a subsample of 
firms that are homogenous in characteristics with subsidized firms. A matching procedure finds 
untreated firms in a counterfactual state that are homogenous with treated firms with respect to a 
set of characteristics, in order to examine the effect of treatment (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; 
Pearl & Glymour, 2016). The usual method applied is for one unique treatment, but it has also 
been extended to evaluate the effects of multiple programs. As the advantage in contrary to 
previous estimators, matching is neither constrained to any functional form for the equations nor 
assumes a distribution on the error terms of the selection and outcome equations. The disadvantage 
is the technique only controls for observed homogeneity characteristics among treated and 
untreated firms, hence it will not be that reliable in case unobservable factors influence selection 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2007). The next chapters articulate matching technique and different types of 
matching procedures as the approach taken to tackle the bias problem and measure the average 
treatment effect.34 Moreover, the reasoning and logic behind the choice for the methodologies will 
be explained in both following chapters.  
Finally, difference-in-difference method can be applied when a longitudinal dataset is 
available. DID estimates average treatment effects (ATEs)35 of panel data without any use of 
instrumental variables or assumption about the distribution of unobservable characteristics (Lach, 
2002). If there is the possibility to combine DID with matching procedure, the mix provides an 
additional advantage to matching method; i.e. removing the probable bias of correlation between 
unobservables and firms’ investment without the need for instrumental variables or statistical 
distributional hypotheses. However, the drawback of the method is the need to an enriched 
longitudinal dataset embracing a long period of non-missing data for all observations. If this 
condition strongly holds, there is even the possibility to go beyond and use difference-in-
difference-in-difference together with matching which adds the capability to investigate multiple 
                                                          
34 In addition, the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on treated (ATET) will be 
discussed more in detail through next chapters. Chapter 4 provides a description on structural model approach 
towards treatment effect analysis as well.  
35 The average treatment effect on treated and the whole sample will be discussed in detail through Chapter 3. 
35 
 
treatments (subsidies program) to the options and properties of DID (or DD) (e.g. the study by 
Barbieri et al. (2012)).  
Instrumental variable(IV) method (Busom, 2000; Wallsten, 2000, Clausen, 2009); control 
function (Florens et al., 2008); Difference-In-Difference (Lach, 2002; Marino et al., 2016); 
Regression Discontinuity (RD) method (De Blasio et al., 2009; Bronzini et al., 2014; Cerqua and 
Pellegrini, 2014; Wang et al., 2015, Bronzini & Piselli, 2016; Dechezlepretre et al., 2016), two-
stage econometric model (Bannò and Piscitello, 2010),  matching techniques36 (mainly  nearest 
neighbor propensity score matching) (Atzeni and Carboni, 2008; Gonza´lez and Pazo, 2008; 
Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015; Hud and Hussinger; 2015, ) structural modelling 
(Takalo et al., 2013),  and mixed-methodologies like Matching DID (MDID) (Bernini and 
Pellegrini, 2011) are among the various studies coped with the selection bias challenge. Propensity 
score matching procedure which is the methodology used in this paper, will be discussed more in 
detail in the following chapters.  
The robustness of these econometric models other than IV estimation has been examined 
regarded to the choice of target variables in the study by Cerulli and Poti`(2012). When target 
variables are expressed as ratios (such as R&D intensity and R&D per employee), all the methods 
that they investigated were significantly robust. However, when R&D expenditure is taken as the 
target variable, there is a strong variability between analysis methods. 
5.1.2 Multiple treatment (Co-presence of Incentives) 
In empirical policy evaluation, when the researchers investigate the effect of one specific 
public policy, there is a possibility that firms receive grants or support from more than one 
incentive program. This case particularly occurs when there is no restriction on benefiting from a 
single source of public support for the applicants. In situations where the firm can take advantage 
of applying for regional and local subsidies, beside national (or EU) subsidies, the impacts of two 
policies might intervene and mix up. Subsequently, there arise the problem of distinguishing the 
pure effect of a single program for the sake of monitoring indices for policy makers. However, in 
                                                          
36 Including propensity score matching (PSM), Nearest neighbor(s) matching, Kernel matching and Radius matching 
which will be defined in the following chapter.   
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many cases the public agency regulates the law to allocate funds not allowing for an overlap in 
public support policies.  
The idea can be better clarified with a simple example. Assume there are two incentive 
policy programs; let us call them 𝐴 and 𝐵, that the firm is benefiting from. Policy 𝐴 has the effect 
𝑋 while policy 𝐵 has the effect 𝑌. Assuming of no overlap between policies, the global impact of 
policies 𝐴 and B, has to be 𝑋 + 𝑌. However, the total impact is usually less due to the overlap and 
substitution of the policies. In some cases, the effect can be even higher than the sum of the effects 
due to behavioral additionality and learning effect. This can happen when the agent learns from 
policy 𝐴, hence she can gain more from policy 𝐵. In rare cases, the impact can get less than 𝑋  
because of severe distortions in the system of policies.  
In the empirical literature Barbieri et al. (2012) study the effect of Italian law 46/82 and its 
revisions on R&D expenditures and R&D employment generation. The research considers the 
overlap of different state policies on the firms in different categories. Law 46/82 has been the main 
public instrument to regulate incentive programs to support R&D and innovation of Italian firms. 
The authors use DDD (difference in difference in difference: referring to Wooldridge (2007) and 
Imbens & Wooldridge (2009)), to distinguish and realize the impact of different simultaneous 
incentives. The DDD estimator adds a term in the regression equation which captures the effect of 
the multiplication of policies to investigate the effect of the co presence of policies. The results in 
this case suggest the existence of some inefficiency in overlapping the instruments for R&D 
stimulation. Nevertheless, this technique demands a rich panel or longitudinal dataset which cover 
a quite long period of analysis.  
Moreover, Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015), estimate the impact of three different R&D 
policies functioning together in the same context.  They cope with this issue of multiple (hidden) 
treatment by applying only a standard matching technique in which three R&D policy instruments 
(i.e., R&D subsidy, innovative public procurement and R&D tax credit) are considered as 
treatment variables and evaluated first in isolation and then in combination with each other (3 
policies and 10 combinations). 
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5.1.3 Time span 
Turning into the review of the findings of net impact evaluation for public R&D, studies may deal 
with short-run and long-run effects. A limitation in many studies is that they analyze mainly the 
short-term effect of the subsidies. Hence, using a panel data analysis like the one in our study 
provides the effects over a long run which can show whether the effects of the support through a 
longer time span is the same as short run effects. In addition, The effects measured are likely to be 
ambiguous and mixed between complementarity and crowding out according to literature review. 
The direction and magnitude of short-run or static effect is almost evaluated without consideration 
of long-run or dynamic effect stemming from knowledge spillovers and training new scientists and 
engineers in the long run (David et al., 2000).  
5.1.4 Mixed heterogenous findings and lack of result conclusiveness  
Dimos and Pugh (2016) in a meta-regression analysis of 52 micro-level evaluation studies, 
published after the David, Hall and Toole’s 2000 paper, reject crowding out of private  investment 
by public subsidy but without any substantial additional effect for the subsidies. However, they 
come to the conclusion of inconclusiveness of the effect direction in evaluation studies. 
More than a decade before, as one of the most cited references in R&D policy evaluation, 
David, Hall and Toole (2000) have also reviewed the literature of empirical papers over past 35 
years before 2000, in which the net effect of public R&D (government subsidies) on private R&D 
have been evaluated at laboratory, firm, industry and aggregate levels. The studies investigating 
the literature answer to the question whether the public R&D complements (is additional to) or 
substitutes (crowds out) the private R&D using the time series or cross-section data. They analyzed 
33 studies in all levels of aggregation investigating the relationship between public R&D 
(subsidies) and the private R&D. Eleven of these studies were showing the crowding out effect, 
while others had a different conclusion. They suggested that the heterogenous findings can be 
because of the tendency of these papers to eschew a structural model in the policy evaluation. This 
leads to lack of specifications in evaluations’ econometric analysis and ambiguity and uncertainty 
in interpretation of each individual research findings and evidence. They propose setting out a 
conceptual framework which identifies the micro-level determinants of private R&D investment 
and is capable of linking these determinants to a macro-level setting. 
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However, the empirical literature even years after David et al.’ s study still believes in 
mixed findings and results of the effect of R&D policies on innovative activity and other growth 
measures (Caloffi et al., 2016)37. At the same time, Bernini et al. (2017) notice that the investment 
subsidies including R&D subsidies evaluation literature is very versatile in terms of the estimated 
impact of the subsidies which according to (Brandsma et al., 2013) reflects differences in the 
institutional context between countries, regions, sectors and firms, differences in the design of the 
policy and policy implication mechanisms and differences in the quality of data and the analytical 
method used in the empirical studies. There are studies showing that public R&D subsidies 
stimulate R&D expenditures and innovation output by private firms (Levin & Reiss, 1984; Klette 
& Moen, 1998; Busom, 1999; Czarnitzki & Fier, 2002; Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; Heshmati & 
Lööf, 2005, Hall & Bagchi-Sen, 2007, Block & Keller, 2008); while on the other side, there are 
articles finding a crowding out or R&D substitution effect, i.e. a negative impact of policy on 
private R&D (Wallsten, 1999; Lach, 2002; De Jorge & Suarez, 2011). Moreover, Some other 
studies conclude  there is not such a clear evidence if public funding positively affects higher R&D 
spending (Lichtenberg, 1987; Kauko, 1996), while a few found significant effect but both positive 
and negative mixed based on different research settings related to the target variable38, time effect 
etc. (Fölster, 1995; Clausen, 2009). Therefore, The effects measured are likely to be ambiguous 
and mixed between complementarity and crowding out regarded to the literature. In their 
taxonomy, David et al. (2000) have categorized previous studies on impact evaluation of public 
subsidy on private R&D based on the levels of analysis. They discuss the net effect findings of 
each study under a specific categorization to see if there is complementarity or substitutability 
effect. They conclude that the findings are heterogeneous and mixed.  
On the other hand, the evolutionary approach towards the R&D policy focuses on the 
reasons behind the different behavior of the firms which can lead to this heterogeneity of the 
effects. Evolutionary approach takes the firm, as well as the public agency, as complex entities 
which adapt to the changing environment with uncertainty, asymmetric and bounded rationality. 
The dynamic changes of the environment make firms’ choices diverged. Hence, the firms’ capacity 
                                                          
37 Caloffi et al. (2016) in their working paper review 43 studies related to the micro-economic evaluations of 
innovation policies in Italy using a meta regression analysis. They find out that most of the program evaluations show 
positive probability of success. In addition, the probability of success is higher for the regional governments. 
38 For instance Basic research vs. applied research, or Research vs. Development (Clausen, 2009), and results sharing 
vs. non-result sharing (Fölster, 1999).  
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to accumulate knowledge and to learn by interacting to other actors are addressed in this approach. 
In other words, the evolutionary approach deals with opening up the black box to show how the 
policy may impact a firm as an agent. At the same time, the idea of ‘best policy’ or the ‘optimal 
instrument’ does not hold in this approach. 
Concentrating more into firms’ responses to policy, Barbieri et al. (2012) while measuring 
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET),  capture the average effect of the policy on the 
target variable on the whole sample of different beneficiary firms. However, they admit the 
response of these firms to the policy can be heterogenous with very divers positive or negative 
effects. 
Evaluation methods and research on measurement of the net or overall causal effect of 
R&D incentives, without a framework, do not describe the mechanisms through which the 
incentives probably make an impact on R&D expenditures, and solely concern the magnitude and 
the sign of the effect. On the other hand, evaluation methods using a framework or analytical model 
get restricted to a theoretical model based on the mainstream trend in industrial organization to 
show inside the black box in which the subsidy policy affect the R&D investment by the firms. 
Evaluation studies should consider the individual firm’s determinants of investment behavior in 
innovation.39 If one study does not involve micro-level analysis then the findings of the 
econometric analysis will be only a magnitude of net effect at the macro-level with a specific 
direction of effect (positive or negative) disregarded of the channels which relates the evidence of 
the experiment to individual firm’s determinants (David et al., 2000). 
In this line and to deal with the heterogenous response problem (firms probable 
heterogenous responses to R&D policy), Sissoko (2011) suggests to categorize firms based on the 
distance to technology frontier. He believes firms far from the frontier are more likely to benefit 
from R&D support.  
A considerable part of the investment subsidies evaluation refers to R&D subsidies 
evaluation. However, almost the whole literature has focused on the effect of the public subsidies 
on R&D input or output additionality. There could be found few studies in which they have 
evaluated the impact of the public capital investment subsidies on TFP. Furthermore, even fewer 
                                                          
39 This study takes into account both approaches in R&D policy evaluation. 
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number of studies have focused on the impact of the R&D subsidization policy on TFP (Bernini 
et al., 2017). The next section reviews some of these studies in brief and Chapter 2 extends this 
review. 
5.2 The literature of the effect evaluation of R&D policy on targeted outcome 
There is a large literature in policy impact evaluation dealing with the effect of investment 
incentives on additional investment or some other outcome measures. Investment can be 
categorized as capital investment, investment in human resource, investment in restructuring, 
research and development investment and etc. One main share of this literature links to the studies 
investigating R&D incentives’ effect.  
As noted previously, a main classical study referred for a review of evaluation studies has 
been carried out by David, Hall and Toole (2000). More updated, the meta-regression study by 
Dimos and Pugh (2016) has covered and included various international empirical studies (52 
papers for 28 countries). The interested reader can easily access to the details of these studies based 
on sample period, observations, type of data, estimation method, type of R&D outcome (input or 
output), measure of treatment and the results. At the same time, Caloffi et al. (2016) are working 
on a paper applying a similar methodology on a taxonomy regarded the Italian context (43 different 
articles).  
Empirical research has mainly been focused on evaluating the effect of R&D incentive on 
input additionality. One main reason is that measuring R&D spending is more straightforward in 
comparison with innovation performance. The first step in evaluation studies is to investigate if 
the public policy has a substitution or a complementarity effect on R&D input, using cross 
sectional data, time series or panel data. The analysis is performed at country (aggregate), industry 
or private firm levels. However, the effect measured for private firms is less homogenous because 
of applying different estimators or approaches in different specific contexts where the policy is 
adopted.  
The methodologies used, as discussed in the previous sub-section, mainly follow a quasi-
experimental approach. Multiple regression equations, matching methods and instrumental 
variable (IV) method being discussed in the previous  section can be used dependent to the type of 
available data and bias the study deals with. The econometric results are ambivalent and there are 
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various studies concluding the impact to be either additionality or crowding out as well as studies 
which do not yield any significant result (Garcia-Quevedo, 2004).  
As an empirical analysis of this thesis relates to the effect of R&D program on productivity 
change, in the following and partially in the next chapter, the review is also extended to studies 
with different targeted variables than additionalities, specifically TFP change. In the next sub-
sections, we review some literature related to the effect of the R&D policy (in particular R&D 
subsidies) on additionality measures. Afterwards and also in the related chapter, the studies 
explaining a dependent outcome variable different from additionalities will be addressed. The 
review will point out different aspects of these policy evaluation studies, such as treatment, target 
and control variables used, methodologies implemented, data applied and the effect of the policy 
on targeted outcome.  
5.2.1 Studies related to R&D policy impact evaluation on R&D input 
additionality  
In the following some evaluation studies, related to our study, which have measured the 
effect of the R&D policy on input additionality will be briefly reviewed. In addition, table (1) will 
then provide a review of some other related studies. Atzeni and Carboni (2008) have used the 
nearest neighbor matching estimation to measure the average treatment effect of public grants on 
ICT adoption in terms of ICT investment in Italy considering the regional disparities between the 
south and the north in technological indicators. The non-parametric estimation is carried out for 
two waves of data for the periods 1998-2000 and 2001-2003. The difference of their methodology 
with the propensity score matching is that there is no need for covariates to determine the 
probability of being treated and the estimator takes into account only the characteristics influencing 
ICT investment. 
Bronzini et al. (2014) assess the impact of a unique local R&D program in Emiglia-
Romagna region in northern Italy using a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) method well suited 
with the mechanism of direct R&D subsidies allocation. The policy’s local dimension allows for 
the removal of unobserved heterogeneity among private firms in comparison with the R&D 
programs nationwide in which the recipients and non-recipients are less similar. 
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Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) review and discuss the effect of different various technological 
policies upon firm’s innovative behavior proxied by the change of spending on all the firm’s 
innovative activity. They discuss the effect and interaction of R&D subsidies and R&D tax credits 
as supply-side innovation policies and the public procurement as demand-side R&D policy. They 
find out that public procurement can be even more effective on innovative behavior. They use 
different matching methods to estimate the impact of all different possible combinations of 
treatments (3 main treatments i.e. 10 different treatment indicators) on R&D spending increase as 
the outcome indicator. They choose age, size and the market which firm operates in as control 
variables. 
Marino et al. (2016) have measured the impact of R&D subsidies and R&D tax credits on 
private R&D expenditures for a sample of French firms during the period 1993_2009. They 
investigate the impact on input additionality (crowding-in) or substitution (crowding-out) of the 
subsidies using difference-in-difference and propensity score matching combined. The effect of 
R&D support has been assessed between differently treated firms as well, based on a dose-response 
(continuous treatment variable) matching method to identify the optimality of the R&D support 
provision.  
Czarnitzki and Delanote (2017) have integrated the R&D subsidy into the famous structural 
model of CDM40 to link the policy to both innovation input and output. They investigate the 
classical questions of input and output additionalities, but this time in an integrated model in which 
the R&D subsidies is given in a selective mechanisms to admitted applicants. They use simple 
dummy variable approach for the subsidy variable and separate R&D input from subsidized 
amount in regression equations. They find out input additionality for public funds and positive 
output effect for both privately and public subsidy-induced R&D investment. However, the study 
lacks the assumptions for R&D spillovers. The main focus of the literature has been evaluation of 
input additionality, however, some studies have also dealt with the output additionality. This 
output additionality is the factor leading to productivity growth. 
 
                                                          
40 Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998) proposed a model of R&D, innovation and productivity known as CDM model 
identifying how R&D effort explains innovation and how innovation determines productivity. CDM model will be 
defined more in the following chapter.  
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5.2.2 Studies related to R&D policy impact evaluation on R&D output additionality 
This sub section  reviews some evaluation studies related to our study, which have 
measured the effect of the R&D policy on output additionality. As the last paper of Czarnitzki and 
Delanote (2017) pointed out in previous section, which deals with output side of R&D process 
(together with input additionality effect); some other studies put their concentration on impacts of 
R&D incentive on innovation output. However, the proportion of these studies is still lower than 
those measuring effect on input additionality for the reasons mentioned in the last section. The 
most common proxy for innovation output is number of patents. However, as discussed previously, 
not all inventions turn to be registered patents and not all innovation activities carried out lead to 
patents. In the following we point out some studies related to measurement of output effect. 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Czarnitzki and Licht(2006), Hussinger (2008) and 
Czarnitzki and Delanote (2015) for example, use the estimated private and treatment effect 
obtained from a matching estimator or selection model in an output equation, in order to measure 
the effect of private and public R&D on innovation output. However, these studies use more 
reduced-form-type models rather than incorporating R&D subsidy variables into a more structural 
approach. Furthermore, Bronzini and Piselli (2016) evaluate the effect of a placed based R&D 
subsidies program on innovation output proxied by patent application and the probability of patent 
application by subsidized firms using regression discontinuity design. They realize that the 
program has been positively affecting the number of patent applications especially for the smaller 
firms. In addition, they find out that the R&D subsidies influence positively the likelihood of 
application for patents only for small firms. This happens mainly because SMEs suffer  more from 
financial friction (Hall & Lerner, 2009).  
In most empirical studies the effect of R&D incentives has been evaluated on R&D input (R&D 
expenditure) rather than innovation itself. However, there are some countable studies managing 
with the impact evaluation of R&D incentives on innovation output (output additionality) as some 
were reviewed just above. In the following, table (1) reviews some studies related to the 
measurement of the effect of R&D policy on mainly input and also output additionalities in a 
chronological order . 
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Table 1. Studies related to impact of public policy on private R&D expenditure (input additionality) and R&D output (patent)  
Study Dataset Level of 
Aggregation 
Period Observations R&D Policy Variable The Target 
Variable 
Control Variables Evaluation 
Methodology 
The Effect Notes 
Levin and Reiss 
(1984) 
Panel Industry Level 1963,1967 
1972 
60 Government R&D Private R&D Technological 
dummies, basic 
research share, 
Industry age, Market 
concentration index 
2SLS Significant 
(+) 
Complementarity 
Lichtenberg 
(1987) 
Time 
series 
Aggregate 
(Country) Level 
1956-1983 28 Public contracts  
with industries 
Private R&D 
Expenditure 
Sales to government OLS Insignificant __ 
Klette and 
Moen (1998) 
Panel 
Data 
Industry Level 1982-1995 192 Subsidy Log Private R&D Log Sales, Sales sq., Cash 
flow, time dummies 
Fixed Effect OLS Significant 
(+) 
The case of Norway, 
Complementarity with 
elasticity 0.06 
Busom 
(1999) 
Cross 
Section 
Firms across 
Industry 
1988 147 Participation in  
Subsidy Loan Program 
Private R&D 
Expenditure 
Size, Patent, Export 
share, Industry 
Dummy 
OLS with selection 
correction 
Significant  
(+) 
Complementarity 
(0.2) 
Wallsten (1999) Cross 
Section 
Firms across 
Industry 
1990-1992 81 Number of SBIR award, 
Total value of SBIR awards 
Private R&D in 
1992 
Age, Size, Patents, 
R&D exp. (1990), 
Industry and 
Geography Dummy 
OLS, 3SLS Significant  
(-) 
Substitutability 
Lach 
(2002) 
Panel  Firm Level 1991-1995 325 Subsidy (t and t-1) R&D Expenditure Employment industry 
dummies time 
dummies 
Difference-In-
Difference (DID) 
Significant 
(-) 
The mixed effect 
dependent to subsidy 
time and the size of the 
firm 
Gonza´lez and 
Pazo (2008) 
Panel Cross country at 
firm level 
1990-1999 9455 
observations of 
2214 firms 
Public R&D Subsidies Private R&D Size, capital growth, 
age, indicator for 
using advanced 
technology  
Matching approach 
(propensity score 
matching) 
Significant for small 
low-tech industries 
No crowding out effect 
either partial or full 
Clausen41 
(2009) 
Panel Firm Level 1999-2001 1074 ‘Research’ and ‘Development’ 
 (R&D) Subsidies  
Private R&D Size, Age, Group, 
Foreign Ownership, 
Export Intensity, 
Patent, Industry 
2SLS Regression Significant  
(+/-) 
R subsidies +, D 
subsidies - 
                                                          
41 Clausen (2009) distinguishes between subsidies allocated for “research” and “development”  in his study that examine the positive impact of subsidies on 
innovation activity in Norway. The results of this study show that “research” subsidies stimulate R&D expenditures, while “development” subsidies substitute 
such spending. These results are consistent with the argument that the gap between social and private rates of return is higher for basic research than for 
development projects (Nelson, 1959). This difference in research projects versus development projects is worth to pay attention as the authority in our context 
sets subsidies amount with respect to the nature of the projects which are categorized in two sorts of industrial research or experimental research. 
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Cerulli and 
Poti` (2012) 
Panel Firm Level 1998-2000, 
2002-2004 
5923 for both 
period 
Public R&D Subsidies Business R&D _ Robustness Check 
(Heckman selection 
model), Control 
function, Difference-
In-Difference(DID), 
Matching Methods) 
Significant Absence of full 
crowding out effect, 
Robust results for the 
effect on R&D 
intensity and R&D per 
employee but variable 
results for R&D 
expenditure between 
different approaches 
Takalo et al. 
(2011) 
Panel Firm (project) 
Level 
1999-2002 14,657 firm data, 
914 Applications 
for subsidies 
Public R&D 
 Subsidies 
R&D expenditure, 
Expected Spillover 
(Social welfare 
variable: social 
rate of return) 
Age, Size, 
Sales/Employee, 
Parent company, 
Number of previous 
applications, 
Exporter dummy, 
Board size 
Structural Model 
(Econometric 
estimation of a game-
theoretic structural 
model) 
Significant 
(Heterogenous) 
Subsidized firms 
internalize on average 
60% of the total effect 
Klette and 
Moen (2012) 
 
Panel Business Unit 
Level 
1982-1995, 
2001-2007 
697 R&D subsidies Private R&D 
(Additionality) 
Sales, Technological 
opportunity, 
Appropriability 
degree 
Fixed Effect OLS Insignificant for first 
period, Significant 
(+) for the second 
period 
A pre-2000 post-2000 
comparison of the 
effectiveness of the 
policy for Norwegian 
firms 
Bronzini and 
Iachini (2014) 
Panel Firm level 2004-2005 254 treated vs. 
103 untreated  
Regional program L 7/2002 in 
 Emilia-Romagna region in Italy 
Total investment, 
labour cost and 
service cost / pre-
treatment sales 
Size, Sector 
(manufacturing or 
service), Age, 
financial 
vulnerability 
Sharp regression 
discontinuity design 
Positive (+) impact 
for the whole 
sample but 
heterogenous 
impact for different 
categorizations 
The paper has been 
published in American 
Economic Journal, 
2014; Critical choice 
for proxies related to 
R&D investment  
Czarnitzki et al. 
(2007) 
Panel Firm level 1994-1996 
1998-2000 
1,464 (1,520) 
German 
(Finnish) 
companies 
R&D subsidies and collaboration (as treatment) Patent activity and 
R&D expenditure 
Size, Export, Group, 
Appropriability 
conditions 
nearest-neighbor 
matching and 
difference-in-
difference 
No effect for 
Germany/ Positive 
effect for Finland  
The context of the 
"Action Plan 2010" by 
the European Council 
Bronzini and 
Piselli (2016) 
Panel Firm level 2004-2005 379 treated vs. 
178 non-treated 
Regional program L 7/2002 in 
 Emilia-Romagna region in Italy 
Patent 
applications & 
likelihood of 
submissions 
Size, Sector, some 
financial statement 
sheet items 
Regression 
discontinuity design 
and difference-in-
difference 
Positive(+) impact 
on patent 
applications mainly 
for smaller firms 
The additional patent 
application demands 
grants between 
€206,000 to €310,000 
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5.2.3 Studies related to R&D policy impact evaluation on R&D behavioral additionality 
The literature related to empirical evaluation of R&D subsidies effect on behavioral 
additionality is scant.42 However, a part of the attention has been recently tended to the aspects 
related to the effect of R&D subsidies on behavioral additionality. Hsu et al. (2009) have evaluated 
the effect of R&D programs on behavioral additionality, beside input and output additionality. 
Their empirical investigation demonstrates that behavioral additionality of recipient firms could 
be classified into project enlargement, strategy formulation, cost-effectiveness, and 
commercialization behavior. Their results show that firms in different industry sectors and 
innovation categories emphasize different additionality, respectively. 
Wanzenböck et al. (2013) have focused on three different forms of behavioral 
additionality-project additionality, scale additionality and cooperation additionality and found out 
R&D related firm characteristics significantly affect the realization of behavioral additionality. 
They studied 155 firms supported by the Austrian R&D funding scheme in the field of intelligent 
transport systems in 2006. Autio et al. (2008) in terms of second-order additionality and Busom 
and Fernandez-Ribas (2008) in terms of R&D partnership have also dealt with this type of 
additionality in their studies.  
5.2.4 Studies related to R&D policy impact evaluation on target outcomes different from 
additionality  
The targeted dependent variable in empirical evaluation studies can differ from 
additionality. A diverse strand of the literature refers to measurement of the effect of R&D policy 
on other outcome indices different from different types of additionality. These indices mainly 
regard economic growth and proxy the endogenous growth at micro and macro levels. One main 
target variable representing a relatively comprehensive measure for economic growth is TFP and 
TFP change. Next chapter will review and discuss the studies dealing with total factor productivity 
or other related measures as the outcome variable. 
However, beside productivity, there are also other various dependent targeted variables 
different from R&D additionality such as technology adoption (Atzeni & Carboni, 2008); 
                                                          
42 A search in papers published after 2007 with R&D behavioural (behavioral) additionality in title, abstract or 
keywords, provides only 5 related articles. 
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spillovers (Takalo et al., 2013); innovative productivity and follow-on funding (Howell, 2014; 
Zhao & Ziedonis, 2014); employment, capital investment and turn over (Cerqua & Pellegrini, 
2014); internationalization (FDI) and performance in terms of turnover (Banno՝ et al., 2014); 
survival (Howell, 2014; Zhao & Ziedonis, 2014; Wang et al., 2015) and patenting and new 
investment(s) (Wang et al., 2015). Table (2) in the following will review some other related papers 
which have measured the impact of R&D policy on these outcome measures. 
6. Remarks 
Hereby, the chapter has comprehensively addressed the theoretical and empirical issues 
concerned with R&D policy specifically R&D public subsidies. The relationship between R&D 
activities and the economic growth, beside the neoclassical market failure leading to  
underinvestment in private business R&D, oblige the policy maker to act as a benevolent social 
planner in maximization of social welfare by an optimum (or sufficiently good in a different 
approach) design of mechanisms to incentivize private R&D activities. This mechanism or 
program theoretically focuses on maximizing spillover effect in terms of positive externalities of 
R&D projects carried out by enterprises. All these elements of an R&D policy have been discussed 
and defined in previous sections, beside a practical review of R&D expenditure measures at 
different levels of analysis. In addition, the theoretical and empirical aspects of R&D subsidies 
and a detailed literature review have been provided. Now at this point, the substantial concerns 
and challenges to be addressed in empirical evaluation of a specific R&D program (at national, 
regional or local level) have been determined. 
Through next chapters we apply materials provided and issues covered in this chapter 
beside other related topics and the topics linked to each chapter, in order to empirically measure 
the effects of a placed-base R&D subsidy policy using constructed datasets. However, before 
continuing with the applied and empirical estimations regarding the R&D subsidization policy 
evaluation, in the next chapter we provide an introduction and develop the literature about the  
effect of R&D policy specifically public R&D subsidies on TFP change. Applying that new 
literature beside current chapter’s literature review about the effect of R&D subsidies on additional 
R&D expenditure and the discussions related to main challenges R&D policy evaluation face, we 
frame our research hypotheses to be empirically investigated. 
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Table 2. Studies related to the measurement of the effect of R&D policy on target variables different from R&D additionality 
 
 In order to investigate the hypotheses, we use the data related to a local-based R&D program in Province of Trento in Italy. 
Therefore, in the chapters related to empirical evaluation, we describe and discuss the reference R&D program (policy) evaluated in the 
following essays. A clear understanding of the R&D support program helps the researcher for a more efficient and effective design of 
the evaluation framework, data provision, evaluation model(s) modifications and a better choice of instruments to measure the effect of 
the policy. The related chapter discusses about the place-based R&D program related to the provincial law LP 6/99 and the context and 
institutional setting of our study.
Study Dataset Level of 
Aggregation 
Period Observations R&D Policy Variable The Target Variable Control Variables Evaluation 
Methodology 
The Effect Notes 
Czarnitzki et al. 
(2011) 
Cross 
Sectional 
Firm Level 1997-1999 3562 R&D tax credits Doing R&D Decision Size, Firm’s 
innovation behavior, 
Industry 
Non-parametric 
Matching 
Significant 
 (+) 
Canadian firms 
Takalo et al. 
(2011) 
Panel Firm (project) 
Level 
1999-2002 14,657 firm data, 
914 Applications 
for subsidies 
Public R&D 
 Subsidies 
, Expected Spillover 
(Social welfare variable: 
social rate of return) 
Age, Size, 
Sales/Employee, 
Parent company, 
Number of previous 
applications, 
Exporter dummy, 
Board size 
Structural Model 
(Econometric 
estimation of a game-
theoretic structural 
model) 
Significant 
(Heterogenous) 
Subsidized firms 
internalize on average 
60% of the total effect 
Bann՝o et al.  
(2014) 
Panel Firm Level 1994-2008 308 supported 
vs.508 non 
supported 
Public financial support  
(Italian Law 100/90) 
Internationalization 
(FDI), Performance 
(turnover and 
productivity) 
SME, Age, Region, 
Industry, 
International 
Experience, etc.  
Two-step treatment 
effect analysis 
(Selection and 
Evaluation Equations) 
Significant (+) The moderating effect 
of variables such as 
size, age and 
international 
experience is 
investigated and 
discussed in detail.  
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Chapter 2 
R&D subsidies effect evaluation and subsidy mechanism analysis: 
Research hypotheses  
Abstract 
Chapter two, following the previous chapter, primarily discusses about the effect of R&D 
subsidies on TFP change. The discussion addresses the relationship between R&D and total factor 
productivity (TFP) as a channel which subsidies may influence TFP, beside other channels and 
interactions explaining the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP change and the components of TFP 
change. Moreover, the empirical literature of studies dealing with evaluation of R&D subsidies 
effect on TFP will be reviewed. 
This theoretical background beside the topics discussed in the previous chapter, help us to 
shape the R&D policy evaluation framework, to investigate the direct casual impact of R&D 
subsidization policy on target outcomes related to TFP change (Chapter 3). The framework also 
links to the investigation of the effect of firm characteristics in different stages of the mechanism 
which R&D support program affect R&D expenditure (Chapter 4).  
Finally, taking into account the evaluation framework, we hypothesize the research 
questions based on the theoretical concepts and literature review discussed through the previous 
and current chapters.  
1.Introduction: The effect of R&D subsidies on total factor productivity (TFP) 
Previous chapter discussed about the reasons why public authorities design and implement 
private R&D incentive programs. Beside spillover and network effect,43 one main justification was 
to encourage private enterprise to invest additionally on research and development activities to 
compensate for the usual underinvestment in innovation. Different R&D policies and different 
types of additionality were defined. Moreover, a literature review of studies which empirically 
measure the effect of R&D subsidies on additional R&D (input and output R&D activities) has 
been addressed as well.  
                                                          
43 Last chapter takes into account spillovers effect in order to model the subsidies effect on R&D input additionality. 
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 On the other hand, increasing economic growth has also been pointed out as one main 
logic behind R&D policy. Although, public R&D subsidization policy implemented by 
governments are particularly designed to stimulate private additional R&D activity (input, output 
and behavioral additionalities), however, one ultimate goal of an R&D policy is the increase of 
economic growth. Total factor productivity can be considered as a measure and determinant for 
economic growth. The literature investigating investment policies contribution to growth and 
competitiveness of subsidized firms has gotten large and is still expanding (Bernini et al., 2017).  
R&D subsidies may influence TFP growth indirectly through the effect on R&D 
additionality. If R&D subsidies additionally affect R&D input (R&D expenditure) and R&D input 
additionality can lead to additional R&D output (such as invention or acquisition of new 
technology) and subsequently R&D output can influence total factor  productivity, then it can be 
implied that one channel which R&D subsidies may influence TFP change is through additional 
R&D activity. Sections 1.3 of Chapter 1 explained how R&D subsidies have an impact on R&D 
additionality, while sub-sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of Chapter 1 reviewed studies investigating the 
effect of R&D subsidies on input and output additionality. Consequently, this section first focuses 
on the relationship between R&D activity and economic growth (in terms of TFP productivity). 
Afterwards, the mechanisms and channels which subsidies may influence TFP will be also 
discussed. Moreover, we provide a literature review of studies empirically evaluating the net effect 
of R&D subsidies on productivity mainly total factor productivity (TFP) change. In the following 
we discuss the former effect by explaining the relationship between R&D and productivity.  
1.1. The relationship between R&D activity and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
growth 
One indirect channel which R&D subsidies may influence TFP is through additional 
innovative activity. However, the relationship between R&D and productivity growth has been 
always a debate. Therefore, prior to reviewing the literature related to evaluation of the effect of 
R&D subsidies on TFP change, we address the relationship between R&D and productivity (and 
subsequently TFP). Admitting the positive relationship between R&D and productivity growth in 
the 50s, 60s and 70s studies, Griliches (2007) refers back to the study by Clark and Griliches 
(1984), in which they found a significant relationship between R&D and total factor productivity 
growth using data at business unit level in the 70s and 80s. Czarnitzki and O'Byrnes (1999) also 
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find positive elasticity and private and social rates of return to output with respect to R&D 
investment in many different studies at firm, industry or aggregate levels. A recent meta-data 
regression analysis by Ugur et al. (2016) investigates the relationship between R&D and 
productivity for OECD firms and industries. The study finds out a positive average elasticity and 
rate of return for R&D using 1253 estimates out of 65 primary studies. 
Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998) propose their highly cited model of R&D, innovation 
and productivity known as CDM model, identifying how R&D effort explains innovation and how 
innovation determines productivity. In the model’s structure, market share diversification leads to 
research and development activity and knowledge capital and patents as innovation output. This 
innovation output may affect the productivity. There are other exogenous factors such as demand 
pull, technology push, size and sectoral effects, beside capital intensity and labor quality which 
affect the model components. CDM model has been modified and extended in different aspects by 
Griffith et al. (2006), Hall et al. (2013) and Acosta et al. (2015).44  
Hall et al. (2013) entered R&D and ICT investments into CDM model as input variables 
for innovation and productivity. Using unbalanced panel data of Italian manufacturing firms for 
four consecutive waves of surveys, they found out both factors are associated with innovation and 
productivity, with R&D being more important for innovation and ICT for productivity.  
The study by Acosta et al. (2015) modifies and empirically estimates the model, using the 
data of 541 Spanish firms in food and beverage industry over the years 2008 to 2011. They simply 
link R&D subsidies to R&D activity as the innovation input and link R&D activity to innovation 
outputs including product, process and also organizational innovation45. The research primarily 
measures the effect of the public R&D support on R&D decision and R&D intensity and 
subsequently relates these variables to productivity. The model also includes an equation that 
determines the relationship between different types of innovation output and labor productivity. 
This equation estimates the effect of control variables, and it also includes the public R&D support 
at local, national and EU levels besides many other firms’ characteristics.  
The contribution of R&D to productivity has typically been measured using the production 
function including production factors (capital and labor) beside R&D or knowledge stock factor. 
                                                          
44 Later we also review the paper by Czarnitski et al. (2016) in which R&D subsidies is derived into CDM model. 
45 This is their extension made to the model of Griffith et al. (2006). 
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This function can be formed at firm, industry or aggregate levels. The interesting determinants to 
be statistically and empirically estimated are the elasticity of output with respect to R&D or R&D 
rate of return (Czarnitzki, D. & O'Byrnes, 1999).  
A common functional form to measure elasticity of R&D is Cobb-Douglas production 
function as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑒
µ𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛼  𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝛽
 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝛾  𝑒𝜀𝑖𝑡           (1) 
where 𝑌 = 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝐴 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝐾 = 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘, 𝐿 =
𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟, 𝑅 = 𝑅&𝐷 and 𝑒 = 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 which captures the residual between what is produced in 
real and what is predicted by the function. This error demonstrates the effect of unobservable 
factors on production. 𝑖 denotes firm, industry or country and 𝑡 stands for the time. Using cross 
sectional or time series data 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝛾 are the parameters to be estimated to show the elasticities 
of output regarded to capital, labour and R&D, respectively. Taking log from both sides of equation 
(1) yields a more straightforward to figure out the coefficients: 
log(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = log(𝐴) + µ𝑡 = 𝛼 log(𝐾𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽 log(𝐿𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾 log(𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (2) 
Griliches and Mairesse (1984) derive the following equation from equation (2) [by taking 
derivative from both sides] to measure the R&D rate of return:  
𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
= µ + 𝛼
𝛥𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽
𝛥𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾
𝛥𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛥𝜀𝑖𝑡       (3) 
where  𝛥𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the net additional R&D investment (expenditure) and 𝛾 represents the rate of return 
for R&D which means an increase in the output for another Euro (or Dollar) being spent on R&D. 
However, estimating the parameters of production function because of problems related to the 
omitted variable46, simultaneity47 and multicollinearity48 would be exposed to biases in the results.  
Production function approach as defined, provides us with the average measures of total 
factor productivity (TFP). From a methodological point of view, there is a distinction between 
                                                          
46 Making unobserved factors to be correlated with R&D. 
47 Simultaneity bias happens when dependent variables are correlated with the error term. For instance if increase 
in R&D expenditure is dependent on past productivity growth while at the same time productivity depends on R&D 
spending. IV method is a standard solution to overcome this bias.   
48 Multicollinearity takes place when right hand side variables are linearly related, which would lead to difficulty to 
disentangle the impact of each regressor (explanatory variable) on explained (dependent) variable. This results in 
high variance for estimated coefficients.  
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total (partial) factor productivity which is the ratio between output(s) to input(s), and efficiency, 
which is the distance from the frontier formed by best performers (Daraio & Simar, 2007). The 
impact evaluation considering the production function, measures the impact on the average 
performance while the evaluation dealing with the frontier deals with the best performers 
(Bonaccorsi & Daraio, 2004). This study follows the latter approach and measures the impact on 
the firms’ relative efficiency change and the technical frontier change carried out by best 
performers. 
Technological progress determines the economic growth in studies which productivity is 
measured as a residual after controlling for input changes. This approach assumes firms are 
technically efficient and are operating on the efficiency frontiers. This means the technology is 
exploited at its full potential. However, firms do not usually operate on their frontiers, hence, TFP 
calculated in this way does not represent both technological innovation and changes in efficiency. 
In other words, technological frontier change may not be the only source of TFP change, and 
technical efficiency change can also play a role in changing TFP (Battese & Coelli, 1995; Jin et 
al., 2010). In the next chapter, we introduce the approach used to disentangle these sources of 
change in TFP change.  
Understanding R&D-productivity relationship  provides insights into the direct mechanism 
which R&D subsidies may influence total factor productivity through additional R&D activity by 
the private firm. The firm spending on R&D (innovation input) aims to improve productivity by 
increasing the proportion of the output(s) produced to the input(s) consumed. This goal can be 
fulfilled through R&D output (neither sufficiently nor necessarily), including the introduction of a 
new product or service to the market (product innovation), producing in a more efficient way 
(process innovation), or even through organizational or marketing innovation.  
The best performing firms (firms on technological frontier) are the frontier leaders who 
may change the production frontier (due to TFP growth) applying R&D subsidies in R&D 
activities. Firms behind the frontier may increase technical efficiency either by their own 
additional R&D activity or exploiting the R&D output of technology leaders. At the same time, 
the firms on technological frontier can also benefit from other frontier firms’ R&D output.  
If the relationship between R&D and average total factor productivity is positive it does 
not necessarily show the effect of R&D on the technical frontier but on the average productivity 
54 
 
measures. However, if we measure the impact on the best performing firms as decision making 
units (DMUs), then the impact of R&D input (or output) on the frontier move is measured. The 
impact of R&D on firm’s relative efficiency is estimated by measuring the distance of the firms 
lying down the frontier determined by the leaders on the frontier. 
Empirical research mainly concern the long-run effect of R&D on TFP assuming a Cobb–
Douglas type of production function relating output to the traditional factor inputs such as labour  
and capital, augmented by a TFP term which reflects technological knowledge progress. This 
technological knowledge is dependent to the level of R&D capital, as  measured by cumulated past  
and present R&D expenditures. This view to the relation between R&D and TFP takes a long run-
supply type of interpretation assuming a causality from R&D to productivity. However, in 
principle, There could be assumed a reverse long-run linkage from productivity to R&D through 
demand as well (Frantzen, 2003).  
Therefore, one important issue to notice, is that the relationship between R&D and TFP 
can take also an in-directional form. In other words, TFP may also affect the amount of R&D by 
a reverse causal effect (Baumol & Wolff, 1983). However, Frantzen (2003) investigates The 
causality between R&D and productivity in manufacturing sector finding out that in at least 16 out 
of the 22 sectors, the long-run causation of TFP by the R&D variables is significantly stronger 
than the reverse from TFP to R&D. 
The current section addressed the relationship between R&D activity and TFP change. 
However, R&D subsidies may affect TFP change through other mechanisms and channels. Next 
sub-section deals with these interactions which links R&D subsidies to TFP change. 
1.2 The mechanisms and channels between R&D subsidies and TFP  
The empirical literature has not provided explanations about the determinants of the 
changes in TFP caused by the subsidies. Nevertheless, the theoretical studies have also discussed 
only about the industrial organization and market structural aspects of the impact of subsidies on 
TFP growth. TFP change is a productivity measure that identifies the decrease or increase in total 
output which is not explained only by the increase in capital and labor. The public R&D subsidies 
can affect labor productivity in case the fund is assigned by the firm to reallocate or update the 
labor input or also because of the capital deepening (the increase in capital per efficiency unit of 
labor) induced by the subsidies, however, the technical efficiency (measured by TFP) realized by 
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all inputs, may not change (Bernini et al., 2017). Hence, TFP represents the most relevant 
productivity measure for the efficiency of a subsidized firm (especially an R&D supported firm) 
to analyze the effects of the subsidies.  
TFP growth can capture the dynamics and the mechanisms which link R&D subsidies to 
performance of the firm. Techniques capable to disentangle TFP growth into decomposed elements 
such as technical efficiency and technological frontier change, enable us to isolate the effects of 
the policy into different channels and sources of impact. One which defines the influence of the 
R&D policy on the firms’ relative performance and catching up effort and one which explains the 
effect of the subsidies on the leading firms’ technological improvement.  
TFP may be positively influenced by R&D support. Public R&D incentives increase the 
firms’ investment into more know-how labor or in new and higher technological machineries and 
up-to-dated capital which augments the rate of technological progress of the firm. Moreover, R&D 
subsidies can provide economies of scope for the firm leading to higher economic performance 
(Howell, 2017). 
On the other hand, the same outcome of R&D subsidies can also negatively affect TFP 
change. R&D subsidies can stimulate innovative activities and provide new technologies for some 
firms that do not have skilled technical know-how, which this miss-match can cause reduced total 
factor productivity (Howell, 2017). In this line, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2006) and Acemoglu et 
al. (2007) have argued that the mismatch between skills and new technology can explain TFP 
difference between less developed & developed countries.49 This can also be implied for firm level 
interactions.  
Moreover, the firm may deviate from decisions in line with improving allocative and scale 
efficiency due to the regulation’s selection criteria for subsidies assignment. This can lead to a 
decrease in the technical efficiency change. Another channel for negative effects of subsidies on 
TFP change can be caused by substitution of labour by capital as a result of the investment 
subsidies (Harris & Robinson, 2004) and subsidy-induced factor augmentation (Obeng , 2002; 
Skuras et al., 2006). 
                                                          
49 Acemoglu (2006: in European Econ. R. 41) discusses that because of this mismatch, in cases, "firms do not invest 
in new technology and skills,  because they expect the future workers to be unskilled." 
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Furthermore, negative effect can also be explained regarded to the financial flexibility of 
the firms. as the subsidized loans assignment to financially unconstrained private firms can lead to 
a productivity slow down due to substantial misallocation of credits and output loss (Zia, 2008). 
In case of R&D direct subsidies the impact can be even higher. The private firm without financial 
restrictions receives the direct R&D incentives in form of direct monetary fund to spend on R&D 
activities which it would not have done without the allocation of the subsidies.  
However, the firm without financial barriers most probably could have done the R&D 
project(s) for which she had received incentives without the public R&D support. However, after 
receiving the R&D grant, the firm may substitute the credit gained, as the output in terms of the 
revenue, instead of obtaining the revenue by the same or an increased total factor productivity level 
derived by innovation activity. Furthermore, the firm can also (mis)allocate the grant in other 
different activities (either more or less profitable: positive or negative effect) than research and 
development. The allocation decision influences the productivity change because of different 
marginal effects R&D activity and other firms’ activities can generate on efficiency and TFP 
changes.  
The stream of discussions above dealt with the possible mechanisms and channels which 
public R&D subsidies may affect TFP change, however, measuring the overall effect of different 
channels of  impact on TFP is ambiguous and can be solely investigated by empirical analysis.  
Referred back to the relationship between R&D activity and economic growth (interpreted 
in terms of TFP growth)50, public R&D policy in order to tackle the market failure caused by 
private underinvestment in R&D51, encourages private firms to put more effort in innovative 
activity and to increase R&D expenditure. This additional R&D expenditure can result in 
additional R&D output which finally may increase TFP growth.   
Although the literature widely agrees on the positive influence of R&D on productivity, 
the dynamics happening between firms in the market with imperfect competition and asymmetric 
information complicate the analysis. The idea raised by Griffith et al. (2004) for productivity 
change dynamics for different sectors in different countries, can be extended to firms. Firms lying 
                                                          
50 This relationship has just been discussed in the previous sub-section. 
51 The traditional market failure and the reasons behind it as a logic for the design of R&D public policy are discussed 
in detail in the previous chapter.  
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down the frontier may increase their productivity with a higher rate or return for R&D in 
comparison to the frontier firms. One main reason for the fast catch up of the frontier can be related 
to capturing the innovation spillover of the firms on the frontier using their absorptive capacity. 
This means a lower imitation cost for the followers. R&D investment generates knowledge and 
knowledge, as an intangible asset can spill out and diffuse across the network to benefit other firms 
from the positive externality (Arrow, 1962). At the same time, there is a social rate of return for 
R&D besides the private rate of return.  
On the other hand, the firms on the frontier using IPR and patent protection increase their 
market share and monopolistic strength which may result in higher appropriation and consequently 
higher revenue. These mechanisms would bring up the question in what direction and to what 
extent public R&D policy (which encourages additional R&D investment) affects the productivity 
frontier change and relative productivity measures for firms below the frontier. Later we discuss 
how the methodology used in this study to disentangle the TFP change into technical efficiency 
change and technological frontier change components can help us measure these effects.  
One main reason to allocate public R&D subsidies to private firms is to increase 
competitiveness in different industries and sectors by improving relative performance (technical 
efficiency) of the firm and consequently the technological frontier in the related sectors (OECD, 
Oslo manual, 2005). Empirical investigation can identify the causal impact of R&D subsidies on 
TFP growth. However, this black-box systemic approach is in contrary and at the same time 
complementary to the approach considering the micro effects, mechanisms and the channels, 
discussed previously. The latter approach explains the link between R&D subsidies to TFP change, 
clearing up the box. Nevertheless, empirical analysis of the mechanisms connecting the policy in 
general and R&D policy in specific to changes in productivity and growth have always been 
challenging and ambiguous (Bernini et al., 2017) and is beyond the scope of this study. 
2. Literature review of R&D policy effect evaluation on TFP change  
Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 in Chapter 1, reviewed the literature related to the impact 
evaluation of R&D subsidies on input, output and behavioral additionality. However, the targeted 
dependent variable in empirical evaluation studies can differ from additionality. Next chapter aims 
to measure the impact of R&D subsidies on firms’ efficiency change and technological frontier 
change as the decomposed elements of TFP change. However, R&D expenditure and R&D 
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intensity are the most common outcome variables investigated in studies related to public R&D 
subsidies evaluation. In this essay, TFP change has been studied as the target variable different 
from R&D expenditure or R&D output. There have been studies considering various variables as 
the target outcome such as  technology adoption (Atzeni & Carboni, 2008), doing R&D decision 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2011), spillovers effect (Takalo et al., 2013), internationalization (FDI) and 
performance in terms of turnover (Banno՝ et al., 2014), innovative productivity and follow-on 
funding (Howell, 2014; Zhao & Ziedonis, 2014), employment, capital investment and turn over 
(Cerqua & Pellegrini, 2014), survival (Howell, 2014; Zhao & Ziedonis, 2014; Wang et al., 2015) 
and patenting and new investment(s) (Wang et al., 2015). 
A diverse strand of the literature refers to measurement of the effect of R&D policy on 
other outcome indices different from types of additionality. These indices mainly represent 
economic growth and proxy the endogenous growth at micro and macro levels. One main target 
variable representing a relatively comprehensive determinant for economic growth is TFP and TFP 
change. Total factor productivity represents a suitable outcome variable as it concerns both input 
and output sides of the production or service system. Consequently, it captures a complete picture 
of growth both at firm level and aggregate level. Table (1) reviews some of the papers which have 
taken into account productivity measures as the target outcome variable.  
Again, the literature of the effect analysis of different industrial policies on TFP is 
relatively large, however when it comes to investment policies impact, it radically shrinks. There 
are few studies which have measured the effect of public capital subsidies on total factor 
productivity (TFP) change (Harris & Trainor, 2005; Bernini & Pellegrini, 2011; Moffat, 2014; 
Crisculo et al., 2016, Bernini et al., 2017). Furthermore, the number of papers gets even more 
scarce when the research focuses on the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP change. There are only 
few numbers of studies dealing with the effect of R&D policy on TFP dynamics (Colombo et al., 
2011; De Jorge & Suarze, 2011; Howell, 2017) and among those to the best of our knowledge, 
only the one in italic resembles the effect measured in this thesis, i.e. the effect on technical 
efficiency and technological frontier change as a non-parametric decomposition of TFP. The other 
few studies, use a functional form to investigate the effect of R&D incentives on TFP by simply 
linking TFP change as the dependent variable to a function of R&D activity and R&D support 
variables.  
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Table 1. Studies related to the evaluation of the effect of policies on efficiency and TFP 
 
In the following, we review few works related to the effect of capital subsidies on TFP change to address the general idea of 
investment incentives on TFP change. Next, the studies regarding the impact of R&D incentives on TFP change and the paper related 
to the impact evaluation of R&D subsidies on TFP decomposed elements will be discussed.  
Bernini et al. (2017) investigate the effect of capital subsidies on total factor productivity (TFP) growth in short and long terms. 
They found out the capital subsidies negatively impact the TFP growth in short run, while their effect in medium-long run is significantly 
positive. This positive effect is mainly influencing through technology changes rather than scale changes. They admit that the policy’s 
aim is to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness as the main factors of endogenous growth and long-term catch up by the laggard  
Study Dataset Level of 
Aggregation 
Period Observations R&D Policy Variable The Target Variable Control Variables Evaluation 
Methodology 
The Effect Notes 
Bernini 
 and Pellegrini 
(2011) 
Panel Firm Level 1995-1998, 
2000-2003 
665 subsidized, 
1228 non-
subsidized 
Capital Investment Subsidies 
(Italian Law 488/1992) 
Growth, Productivity Size, Sector, Project 
type 
Difference-In-
Difference Matching 
(MDID) 
Significant 
 (+/-) 
Positive influence in 
short-run/ Negative 
effect on long run 
Colombo et al. 
(2011) 
Panel Firm level 1994-2003 247 Italian-
owner-managed 
R&D subsidies to high-tech  
start-ups 
TFP measured from semi-
parametric Olley and 
Pakes (1996) 
Age, the ratio of debt 
to total assets, cash 
flow to sales ratio, 
the regional 
infrastructure 
development, TFP of 
the last period, 
Industry 
Simple GMM 
regression 
Positive(+) impact 
for subsidies based 
on competition 
(selective 
procedure)/ 
Negative (-) impact 
for subsidies 
allocated by 
automatic procedure 
The subsidy variable 
in one year lagged due 
to the effect of 
subsidies on TFP 
De Jorge & 
Suarze (2011) 
Panel Firm Level 1993-2002 5349 R&D Subsidies Firms’ technical 
efficiency 
Capital, Employment, 
Industry, trend 
Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) 
Significant  
(-) 
Sample of Spanish 
manufacturing firms 
Bernini et al. 
(2017) 
5 year panel 
data 
Firm level 1995–2003 255 treated vs. 
281 control group 
Capital subsidies  
(Italian Law L488) 
TFP decomposition 
(Technological change, 
technical change, Scale 
and allocative efficiency)  
Tangible capital, 
Employees, ROE, Net 
Liabilities, Cash flow 
Regression 
Discontinuity Design 
(RDD), SFA to 
decompose TFP 
Negative (-) impact 
on TFP in short 
term/ Positive 
impact on TFP in 
long run 
The positive impact for 
medium-long term 
happens through 
technological change 
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firms. However, they emphasize that the relationship between public subsidies and efficiency and 
productivity is ‘complex and not unique’. 
Bernini and Pellegrini (2011) evaluate the impact of capital investment subsidies through 
the Italian regional policy under the law 488/1992, using difference-in-difference matching 
estimator (MDID) on employment, fixed assets and TFP growth. Surprisingly, the impact is 
negative on TFP growth in contrary to other two target variables.  
Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000) show Norwegian IT-related manufacturing firms which 
have used aids from public R&D programs, performed significantly worse than non-supported 
firms in terms of total factor productivity growth. However, because the government tried to 
support some high-tech firms which have had a poor performance because of late 80s IT industry 
restructuring, they do not necessarily conceive a causal relationship between public R&D support 
and poor performance in terms of total factor productivity. Moreover, they expect this relationship 
to be in the other way and positive.  
In a broader macro perspective, Grossman (2007) compares the impact of R&D subsidies 
with the public education expenditures on scientists and engineers (S&E) on growth measures such 
as productivity and welfare. He finds that R&D subsidies can lead to earnings inequality while 
investing on S&E education will act neutral. The education programs show an unambiguous effect 
on growth promotion.  
Similar to our study in terms of targeted variables and the method used, De Jorge and 
Suàrez (2011) have studied the effect of subsidies for R&D on technical efficiency as a component 
of TFP in a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period from 1993 to 2002. They take 
technical efficiency as the output additionality factor (which is questionable), and use a resource-
based view of the firm together with stochastic frontier analysis to measure the effect of the 
subsidies. They concluded that the firms which receive subsidies for R&D are less efficient. The 
study analyzes the estimation results by firm size and also by sector (20 sectors). They mention a 
lack of other works in relating efficiency and subsidies as a reason for no possible comparison 
between the results.  
Zhang et al. (2011) analyze the technological and efficiency changes for 59 research 
institutes in Chinese Academy of Sciences after the implementation of the Knowledge Innovation 
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Program (KIP) using the panel data from 1997 to 2005. Moreover, they carried out a regional 
analysis to find out the institutes in Beijing and Shanghai which performed better than those in the 
other regions at the same period. They use Malmquist productivity index to decompose 
productivity change into technological change and efficiency change.  
Colombo et al. (2011) measure the impact of R&D subsidies provided to high-tech start-
ups on their performance in terms of TFP growth. The logic behind selection of TFP growth as the 
target variable is that it reflects the influence both on output performance and the efficiency of the 
use of inputs. The subsidy programs influence both input and output sides. Moreover, they presume 
that the (opportunity) cost of application for the support especially in selective procedure is high, 
that if only innovation output measures are considered, the net effect of the policy will be biased. 
They measure the TFP change by using a GMM method considering the TFP and subsidies 
provided of the last period as independent variable. The subsidies allocated through selective 
scheme has a significant positive effect of 31% on TFP change. 
Howell (2014)  and Zhao and Ziedonis (2014) have estimated the impact of the subsidy 
program in Michigan and Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. Both studies using 
documentations for the projects, found out that the causal relationship between being subsidized 
and the performance remains low. Hud and Hussinger (2015) have measured the effect of R&D 
subsidy on R&D investment and productivity for SMEs in Germany during the most recent 
economic crises for the period of 2006-2010. The results estimated using the nearest neighbor 
propensity score matching, do not show a significant difference between labor productivity for the 
firms receiving R&D support before and after the crisis. Wang et al. (2015) have also studied the 
effect of Chinese State Innovation Funding, labeled as Innofund Program, on firm performance. 
Baum et al. (2017) show sectoral heterogeneity on the relationship between R&D-Innovation-
Productivity (RIP) applying a structural model on Community Innovation Survey data related to 
Swedish manufacturing firms. 
Finally, Howell (2017) finds out pubic R&D subsidies reduce firm’s economic 
performance (TFP change) in both lower and higher technological industries despite promoting 
innovation in higher technology sectors. He investigates the impact on TFP using the structural 
innovation approach of CDM. The approach links the firm performance to innovation output in an 
equation which the dependent variable is TFP of time 𝑡 while the latent innovative activity of the 
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firm is included in explanatory independent variables vector together with other firms’ 
characteristics (determinants) for productivity growth such as size, age and industry 
characteristics. Subsidy receiving status is also considered as an independent variable.  
The research arises the question that why policy makers have insisted on allocating R&D 
subsidies to firms if the support ultimately reduced their average TFP. A rationale can be that 
public authorities are willing to tolerate lower average TFP gains hoping that the firms which have 
already received the funds will finally become successful innovators and generate large TFP gains 
in the long run and add more to social welfare. Therefore, state supported ‘winners’ will finally 
compensate the average efficiency loss of average firms by positive market and technological 
spillovers out of their successful innovations in a relatively longer term. However, the empirical 
analysis shows while the ‘picked up winners’ capture some TFP gains; these gains are smaller than 
the TFP gains of successful innovators which do not benefit from public support.  
In slow growing economies, such as Italy, the allocation of scarce resources to increase 
productivity is always challenging. This gets more important when the economy experiences a 
productivity slowdown due to the economic crisis. Therefore, evaluation of the public economic 
policies can audit and monitor the policy makers’ financial allocation decisions. R&D public 
policy is of no exception (Barbieri et al. ; 2012). 
So far, chapter 1 offered a comprehensive overview on theoretical and practical aspects of 
public R&D subsidies and public R&D policy evaluation, beside the challenges evaluation studies 
may face in implementation. Moreover, it provided a literature on the impact of innovation policies 
on targeted outcomes important for the policy maker. Afterwards and in the current chapter, the 
relationship between R&D and productivity and the channels and mechanisms which may connect 
R&D subsidies to TFP growth were discussed. The scant literature of the measurement of the net 
effect of R&D subsidies on TFP change have also been reviewed. As long as the main focus of 
this study is on the evaluation of the effect of R&D subsidies on target outcomes of  TFP change 
and R&D expenditure, we mainly concentrate on the theoretical background of the direct effect of 
R&D subsidies on these outcome measures to frame our research hypotheses explained in the 
following. All other relevant issues discussed in the previous chapter, together with the theoretical 
concepts and empirical literature related in this chapter are also addressed while constructing the 
research hypotheses to be empirically investigated.  
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3. Research hypotheses: conceptual and empirical framework  
This section after all discussions related to diverse aspects (discussed in previous and 
current chapters) of R&D subsidies effect on outcome variables, hypothesize the study’s research 
questions followed by a discussion on how to answer to the question. The framed hypotheses will 
be investigated through the following chapters of 3 and 4. 
-Chapter 3: Research hypotheses  
Endogenous growth theories in line with Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction,  
assume innovative activity as a determinant for economic growth. The effect of R&D and 
innovation activity on economic growth at the aggregate level has been discussed according to 
endogenous, semi-endogenous and fully-endogenous growth theories in the first chapter 
(Schumpeter, 1942; Romer, 1986, 1990; Jones, 1995; Peretto, 1998; Howitt, 2007, Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998, 2008). Technical efficiency and technological frontier changes as decompositions 
of total factor productivity (TFP) change can be represented as measures for economic productivity 
change. Moreover, section 1.1 in this chapter discussed the relationship between R&D activity and 
TFP. 
Empirically, the relationship between public subsidies and in specific public R&D 
subsidies and efficiency and productivity of subsidized and non-subsidized firms, is heterogenous 
and complex. The impact evaluation of subsidy policies on the productivity growth answers the 
question whether, and to what extent, the public R&D policy has influenced the productivity 
frontier in the economy or specific sector(s).  
Measurement of the effect of R&D subsidization program on firms’ relative performance, 
beside additional R&D activity at the firm level, is an essential practice for policy makers due to 
efficient optimal-oriented allocation of public grants (OECD, Oslo manual, 2005). The 
measurement helps policy makers and other beneficiary players in the economy to have an ex-post 
analysis of the policy and its impact to make further decisions on possible policy modifications 
and changes. However, the literature on evaluation of the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP change 
is quite scant which were reviewed in section 2 of this chapter. Even if we generalize the policy to 
all other types of investment subsidies rather than only focusing on R&D subsidies, there are still 
few works dealing with TFP decomposed measures as the target dependent variables (such as: 
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Bernini & Pellegrini, 2011; Criscuolo et al., 2016; Bernini et al., 2017). This study contributes to 
the scarce literature of R&D subsidies impact evaluation on TFP.   
The mechanisms and channels which R&D subsidies may influence TFP has been 
explained in Section 2. One main channel of effect is through R&D additionality. Subsidies can 
affect R&D additionality which may contribute to TFP growth. There are other mechanisms which  
can also explain the positive or negative effects of R&D subsidies on TFP. Measuring the overall 
effect of different channels of impact on TFP is ambiguous and can be solely investigated by 
empirical analysis. This research empirically measures the net effect of R&D subsides on TFP 
changes. The factors and channels mediating this effect already reviewed will be applied in the 
interpretation of the estimated effect of R&D policy on TFP. In other words, we take into account 
the mechanisms explaining the relationship between R&D subsidies and TFP, but only to support 
the interpretation of the results obtained from our policy impact evaluation framework.  
Moreover, linked to the methodology applied (PSM matching) to measure the policy effect, 
we can extract some information and discuss about the way, firm’s characteristics and agency’s 
selection criteria may influence the impact of R&D subsidies on TFP change. It is worth to state 
that there is a part of literature which explains the effect of subsidies on TFP change or other target 
outcomes through the effect on market structure and industrial dynamics of the firms, concerning 
entry/exit and survival processes (Laincz, 2005). However, this analysis approach is beyond the 
scope of this study.  
All in all, we should restate that this study carries out a direct casual measurement of the 
impact of R&D subsidies on TFP growth components. However, to discuss and investigate the 
channels through which the policy affects TFP change in a policy evaluation approach, the research 
can benefit from the methods which provide the decomposition of the TFP change into technical 
and technological (in)efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies measuring the 
impact of R&D subsidies on the productivity change decomposed elements using matching 
method in a quasi-experimental setting. 
Hereby, based on the discussions we had about different aspects of the impact of R&D 
subsidies on TFP change, we can suggest a scheme (Figure 1) which illuminates the effect of 
public R&D subsidies on TFP growth measures. The scheme can help to build the hypotheses 
regarding R&D subsidies impact evaluation to be further investigated. 
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The main goal of this chapter is to scrutinize the impact of R&D subsidies on technological 
improvement and technical efficiency change applying a decomposition of TFP for a sample of 
subsidized and non-subsidized firms in a relevant period of time. This provides us the determinants 
of funded firms’ short and long-term growth. Therefore the first hypothesis of this study is formed 
as the following: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The framework to evaluate the impact of R&D public policy on productivity measures   
 
H.1: Public R&D subsidies affect (positively/negatively) total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth.  
H1.1: Public R&D subsidies affect (positively/ negatively) technical efficiency change 
(EFFCH). 
H1.2: Public R&D subsidies affect (positively/ negatively) technological frontier progress 
(technological efficiency (TECHCH). 
Spillovers 
Non-supported Firms   
R&D 
Subsidies 
Firms doing  
R&D  
Firm’s 
Efficiency 
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Additional 
R&D 
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Technical 
Frontier 
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Firm and Agency  
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industry effect 
Direct Causal Effect  
66 
 
We measure and decompose TFP using Malmquist DEA non-parametric method. Besides 
DEA there is parametric approach of Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) which has also been 
widely used in estimating TFP. The advantage of DEA is making no pre-assumption for production 
function of the firms which is a critical point in case when the impact evaluation has been carried 
out using a non-parametric method as well. Moreover, DEA only requires input and output data to 
calculate the efficiency measures. The drawback of DEA method in comparison to SFA is that it 
cannot assume the presence of stochastic noise term in the production function, which is not 
expected and assumed in our framework. Nevertheless, Malmquist method is capable to capture 
technical inefficiency dynamics over time, which enables productivity changes to be decomposed 
into the change in technical efficiency (i.e. measuring the movement of an economy toward or 
away from the production frontier) and technological improvement (i.e., measuring shifts in the 
frontier over time).  
This paper, unlike De Jorge and Suàrez (2011) who have used a resource-based view,  
evaluates the impact of R&D incentives on different components of TFP by a quasi-experimental 
method. In order to evaluate the policy effect, a counterfactual setting for subsidies (treated) and 
non-subsidized (non-treated) firms can be framed thank to the characteristics and mechanism of 
the place-based R&D program in Trento Province in Italy. The average treatment effect of the 
policy on TFP change measures previously calculated is measured for subsidized units (Average 
treatment effect on treated: ATET) and whole firms (Average treatment effect on the population: 
ATE) using different matching techniques capable of tackling the problems of endogeneity and 
selection bias52 which arise in empirical evaluation studies.53  
The approach is non-parametric and it does not have to assume any parametric relationship 
between covariates and the selection (Heckman et al., 1998). Matching takes advantage of no pre-
defined structure assumption, however, it has to assume all factors influencing subsidies allocation 
(control variables) are observable. The unobserved potential outcome of a treated is substituted 
                                                          
52 Explained in section 5.1.1 in Chapter 1. 
53 Another challenge faced in subsidies empirical evaluation discussed in section 5.1.2 is multiple treatment or co-
presence of incentives which must be concerned. However,  in our place-base R&D policy context and referred to LP 
6/99, the issue of multiple treatment does not bring up much problem as there are restrictions for private firms in 
the province due to taking advantage and  benefiting only from a single source of public support. Although, Since 
2015, projects worth up to EUR 100,000.00 can be subsidized together with tax compensation, however, this also 
does not interfere our analysis as the dataset applied in investigating the research questions does not include the 
subsidies allocated after 2015.   
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with the one of a non-treated observation whose characteristics are as close as possible to the 
treated one. Therefore, the treated group and the control group are formed and we can compare 
their performance to evaluate the impact of the treatment. However, the more dimensions are 
included, the more difficult it becomes to find a good match for each treated firm. Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) method allows to consider various control variables as matching arguments 
without suffering the curse of dimensionality. The propensity score is defined as the probability to 
receive a subsidy and represents a valid methodology to reduce all the dimensions considered to a 
single index (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). A discussion on the 
processes PSM scores get generated and different types of PSM techniques will be made in next 
chapter. 
Consequently, a feature of the paper is analysis of the causal effect of R&D subsidies on 
firm productivity by transforming a local non-random place-based R&D policy into a random 
experiment created by provincial Law 6/99 (LP 6/99), which has been implemented as a place-
based instrument to encourage private R&D in Trento Province. LP 6/99 has been introduced to 
support applied research projects carried out by private firms active in Trento Province. There are 
studies in Italian context which focus and discuss about the effect of different selection procedures. 
Gabriele, Zamarian and Zaninotto (2007), Barbieri, Iori and Lubrano-Lavadera (2012), Bronzini 
and Iachini (2014), Bronzini and Piselli (2016) have focused on place-based incentives and the 
different selection schemes to assign the incentives. In our context, subsidies are allocated to R&D 
projects through screening firms’ applications.  
There are mainly three procedures to allocate subsidies, namely automatic, evaluative 
(selective) and negotiating procedures. An automatic scheme gives financial assistant (for 
expenses up to € 500,000.00), to applicants satisfying the requirements specified in the law and 
regulations. The selective scheme selects the firms to be subsidized based on the selection criteria 
(for expenses up to € 1.500,000,00). The applicants compete for receiving a subsidy while their 
R&D projects are judged financially and technically by committees formed by experts.54 The 
negotiating procedure is similar to selective procedure but it supports higher expenses up to € 
1,500,000.00. A detailed review of the subsidies program LP 6/99 will be provided in next chapter. 
                                                          
54 One of the most famous selective programs repeatedly studied (such as the papers by: David et al., 2000; Wallsten, 
2000; Howell, 2014; Zhao & Ziedonis, 2014;) in the literature is Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR) 
program in U.S. 
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The selective and negotiating procedures can provide indirect effects for the selected applicants in 
terms of a certification and confirmation by the government to the firm. Being eligible to get a 
subsidy signals a higher quality of the firm’s project. According to different criteria and settings 
of subsidies allocation schemes, subsidies allocation schemes can differ in their impact on targeted 
variables such as TFP change.  
Furthermore, in our context, the funds are allocated to applied research projects which 
presumably represent more development rather than basic research. Public R&D programs have 
been generally designed to support commercial R&D projects which generate a larger gap between 
the social and private rates of return (Klette et al., 2000).55 However, R&D projects are different 
in their degree of innovativeness, spillover and social welfare effect. Projects tending more towards 
fundamental research projects may require higher support because of higher uncertainty and lower 
appropriability in their results.56 At the same time, the impact and spillover generated by a 
successful basic (radical) research project will be much higher than other more commercial 
development projects which are closer to the market.57  
Although we only deal with applied research projects in law LP 6/99 related to R&D 
incentive program, however, the expected long term impact of an R&D project can change the 
subsidy rate. In addition, it is expected that a firm applying for a project with higher technical 
complications and less skewed to the development side in opposite of fundamental research, 
probably ask for higher amount of funding. Consequently, the public agency (APIAE) processes 
this type of  application in a scheme different (selective or negotiating) from it would have done 
in case of lower complexity and technicality (automatic). Therefore, this may result in different 
                                                          
55 The support for R&D can take two forms of uncertain “far from the market” (e.g. basic research) or “close to 
market” incentives. Clausen (2009) shows the amount  R&D subsidies impact an innovation project is heterogenous 
dependent to the type of the project. He distinguishes between the effect of the public subsidies to research (R) and 
development (D) projects. He proclaims that incentives stimulate additional expenditure on research projects while 
subsidies allocate to development projects close to market substitute. 
56 Private investors would support less the basic research projects which can potentially have high spillover effect. 
Consequently, the public government must also allocate grants for this type of projects due to hedge a part of 
uncertainty. 
57 The gap between social and private rate of return for  basic research R&D projects is supposed to be higher than 
development R&D projects. The underinvestment by private entities will be greater for basic research.  This stylized 
fact has been widely agreed in traditional market failure literature. However, the question on how R&D subsidies 
may differently impact expenditure in research projects in contrary to development projects by private firms, 
remains unanswered (Clausen, 2009). 
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subsidies rate which may influence the additional R&D expenditure and total factor productivity 
change.  
After all, the next hypothesis of this study can be declared as: 
H.2: R&D subsidies allocation schemes influence on the impact of  the R&D subsidies on 
TFP and its components (technical efficiency and technological change).  
In order to investigate the effect of the selection scheme on the impact of the subsidies on 
TFP growth, impact evaluation using PSM will be carried out for different treatment (subsidies) 
variable categorized by subsidies allocated by automatic and non-automatic (selective (evaluative) 
and negotiating scheme). The results will be measured and can be compared with the case when 
treatment variable includes all types of schemes, to distinguish the effect of the selection method 
on the impact of policy. 
Sector or industry in which the firm operates is an important factor affecting evaluation 
and selection process. Law LP 6/99 provokes the province to invest more in IT-related industries 
based on the ICT development horizon emphasized in European Union strategy design and the 
regional priorities. Industry and sector in which the firm is active have an impact on the 
technological opportunities and the appropriation condition the firm exposes. Therefore, the R&D 
investment and activity and consequently the probability the firm applies or receive an R&D 
subsidy differ between industries (Clausen, 2009). 
The different characteristics of the market structure, industrial dynamics (Scherer, 1982; 
Spence, 1984) and subsequently spillovers (diffusion) in different sectors (Tirole, 1988) can lead 
to differences in the way a support program affects outcome variables such as TFP change. There 
is also large literature on the relationship between market size and endogenous growth in industrial 
organization58 (Laincz, 2005). this fact can be linked to determining the influence of R&D subsidy 
program on productivity and technological change through industry characteristics. However, 
getting more into details of the dynamics of how R&D incentives and subsequently R&D activities 
                                                          
58 To review the dynamics of R&D activities leading to creative destruction and market dynamics see studies by 
Jovanovic (1982), Pakes and Ericson (1998). To review the studies related to the micro-market structure 
characteristics relevant to the incentives for conducting R&D see Klette and Griliches (2000) and Klette and Kortum 
(2004). To review the studies related to the productivity growth with market dynamic structure see Pakes and 
McGuire (2001) and Ericson and Pakes (1995). 
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influence the market structure and growth can be approached by studies related to industrial 
dynamics focusing on entry/exit and survival effects in the industry which is beyond the scope of 
this study.  
At the same time, the industry effect can be related also to the problem and challenge of 
heterogenous and mixed findings pointed out in section 5.1.4. Although, a positive relationship 
between the R&D  and firm productivity across all sectors has been found, but Antonelli and Crespi 
(2013) in their research notify that this positive relationship is much stronger in high-tech firms 
than in low-tech firms. High-tech firms show "virtuous" Matthew effects while low-tech firms 
experienced "vicious" Matthew effects, meaning that high-tech firms were awarded subsidies on 
merit while low-tech firms most often were given subsidies based on reputation and ‘name 
recognition’, even in case of misallocation of the funds. While the strength of the relationship 
between R&D spending and productivity in low-tech industries is less than in high-tech industries, 
studies have been done showing non-trivial carryover effects to other parts of the marketplace by 
low-tech R&D (Mendonca, 2009).  
Almost all evaluation studies have considered the effect of industries on the impact of 
subsidies on targeted variables, either by taking into account the industry factor as a control 
variable (Wallsten, 1999; Busom, 1999; Lerner, 1999; Lach, 2002; González, Jaumandreu, & 
Pazo, 2005; Clausen, 2009; Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Bronzini & Iachini, 2014; Bronzini & Piselli, 
2016) or by direct execution of the impact evaluation for particular industries (Klette, Møen & 
Griliches, 2000; Heshmati & Lööf, 2005; Atzeni & Carboni, 2008; De Jorge and Suàrez, 2011; 
Acosta et al., 2015; Criscuolo et al., 2016;  Marino et al., 2016). 
For instance, Barbieri et al. (2012), in addition to the analysis for the whole firms sample, 
estimate the impacts for sub groups of the firms based on Pavitt classification. Pavitt categorizes 
firms into four distinct groups including supplier dominated, scale intensive, specialized and 
science-based. This empirical strategy considers the heterogenous behavior of the firms in 
response to receiving subsidies for R&D. The authors report that the effect of the R&D policy on 
target variables strongly changes when they analyze firms in these homogenous sub groups. The 
authors offer categorization of the firms in sub groups to tackle the heterogenous response problem 
to be as a common practice in policy evaluation. Moreover, Sissoko (2011) suggests to categorize 
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firms based on the distance to technology frontier. He believes firms far from the frontier are more 
likely to benefit from R&D support.  
A summarization of our data on R&D subsidies, shows funds allocated to firms in five 
specific industries, are mainly concentrated in manufacturing and ICT sectors. Therefore, the 
hypothesis of the influence of the industry on the impact of subsidies on TFP change will be as the 
following:  
H.3: The industry and sector the firm performs in, has an effect on the impact of R&D 
subsidies on TFP change and its components. 
In order to investigate the effect of the industry, firms are classified into five main 
industries59 in which subsidies allocation takes place. The elaborated classification is carried out 
using ATECO 200760 economic activities coding system (6-digit industry codes). Other industries 
have not been considered into the analysis as no treatment (subsidies allocation) occurs inside 
them. The impact evaluation is implemented for each industry (mainly for manufacturing and ICT 
industries) and for a pool of firms in all industries. The impacts will be compared to check if 
industry make a difference in the impact’s magnitude and direction.  
Finally, another main feature of the work is the time interval used for the evaluation. A 
limitation in many related studies is that they analyse mainly the short-term effect of the subsidies. 
Hence, using a panel data analysis like the one in our study provides the effects over a long run 
which can show if the effects of the support through a longer time span is the same as short run 
effects. The effects measured are likely to be heterogenous, ambiguous and mixed according to 
the literature. The direction and magnitude of short-run or static effect is almost evaluated without 
consideration of long-run or dynamic effect stemming from knowledge spillovers and training new 
scientist and engineers in the long run (David et al., 2000). 
                                                          
59 MANUFACTURING- CONSTRUCTION, WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE- REPAIR OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND 
MOTORCYCLES- INFORMATION AND TERLECOMMUNICATION- PROFESSIONAL- SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL 
ACTIVITY. 
60 The classification of economic activities (ATECO) is a type of classification adopted by the Italian National Institute 
of Statistics (ISTAT). It is the Italian translation of the Nomenclature of Economic Activities (NACE) created by 
Eurostat while being adopted to the Italian economic system. This classification represents the national version of 
the European coding system called Nace Rev. 2. [See Appendix (3.d)] 
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Moreover, there can be differences between short term effects (expectedly negative) and 
long term effects which can be explained by the time to learn, time to stay in a larger market, time 
to adjust factors proportion and the sluggishness embedded in the impacts of technological 
improvement (Bernini et al, 2017). This is an important fact particularly for measuring the impact 
of an R&D policy as the outcome of innovation investment usually takes longer to get realized in 
comparison with other types of investments. Consequently the next final hypothesis will be 
explained as the following: 
H.4: The impact of public R&D subsidies on TFP change is time invariant. (Or: The effect 
of the R&D subsidies on TFP growth is different in the short term and long run.) 
We scrutinize the impact of the subsidy for each five year of the analysis period thanks to 
the relatively long time period our elaborated dataset covers. The outcome variable of TFP change 
together with control variables are lagged to satisfy the setting needed for the impact evaluation. 
-Chapter 4: Research hypotheses 
Up to here, the hypotheses related to the impact evaluation of R&D subsidies on the target 
outcome have been framed. The empirical investigation of all these hypotheses as also pointed out 
thorough current section, bears some restrictions both theoretically and empirically. The first main 
assumption made to empirically test the previous hypotheses is the lack of spillovers in the network 
because of the empirical approach. Another strong assumption is that all the factors influencing 
the decision of the firm to participate in the program and the public agency to allocate subsidies 
are observable. In other words, the selection criteria is totally observable and no unobservable 
factors may intervene the R&D subsidies assignment.  
Consequently, in order to measure the R&D subsidies effect on target variables relaxing 
these assumptions, this study further estimates a structural model in which spillovers effect may 
occur and unobservable characteristics can also influence the subsidies allocation and R&D 
investment behaviour. This can be complementary to the empirical investigation of all previous 
hypotheses (though on a different target outcome). 
Notwithstanding the interactions between different players of the subsidies program and 
the mechanisms and firm characteristics which may affect different stages of the subsidy program, 
investigation of the previous framed hypotheses will provide estimations of the causal effect of the 
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R&D program. However, providing a more detailed model tracing the impact of R&D subsidies 
on outcome (though different) can shed light on the channels (firm characteristics) influencing the 
policy features and stages. The firm characteristics are chosen based on literature and the context. 
For instance, size and age are the main characteristics addressed almost in all related empirical 
studies (refer to literature review of previous and current chapter). Another important factor is 
exporting status used in many theoretical empirical studies (Zhao, 1997; Yang et al., 2012; 
Dzhumashev et al., 2016; and refer to the literature of the previous and current chapter).  
The R&D incentive program in our context consists of different stages of participation and 
application decision(self-selection stage), evaluation and subsidy rate decision (selection stage) 
and private firm R&D expenditure (investment decision). Therefore, the next hypotheses are 
framed as the following:  
H.5: R&D subsidies affect additional R&D expenditure.  
H.6:[Which] Firm characteristics influence on R&D investment.  
H.7:[Which] Firm characteristics influence on R&D subsidies rate.  
H.8:[Which] Firm characteristics influence on R&D application decision.  
In order to assess the mechanisms related to policy effect in different stages of public 
(place-based) R&D program, the program is modelled using a benchmark structural model linked 
to a program including the same stages as our context. However, the empirical estimation of the 
modified model is adapted based on the main variables related to the contextual setting. Estimation 
of the structural model including application decision, subsidies rate (spillovers rate) and R&D 
investment equations, provide us with the marginal effect of firms’ characteristics on R&D 
subsidies and R&D additional expenditure. 
4. Remarks 
The discussions about the relationship between R&D and economic growth (in macroeconomic 
terms), R&D and productivity (as a main determinant for economic growth) and the effect of R&D 
subsidies on R&D activity and total factor productivity (TFP) through previous and current 
chapters, led us to build a conceptual framework and consequently different research hypotheses.  
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In order to check empirically the hypotheses, we take advantage of data and information 
provided by a place-based R&D subsidies program. In the part related to hypotheses on measuring 
the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP growth, we apply a quasi-experimental setting based on public 
subsidies allocation and we will use a methodology to compare the outcome between subsidized 
and non-subsidized private firms. However, measuring the effect of R&D subsidies on the target 
outcome in this setting ignores the probable spillovers effect and also the influence of unobservable 
factors on selection and allocation procedures. Therefore, in another part of the research, we 
concern about spillovers and also unobservables and will apply a structural model to model and 
estimate the R&D policy.  
The rest of the research is organized as follows: Next Chapter 3, before empirical analysis, 
describes the law LP 6/99 and the place-based R&D subsidization policy regarding the provincial 
law, besides provision of statistical description of data and variables involved into the essay in 
favor of the investigation of research hypotheses. The chapter defines extensively the approach 
applied to carry out TFP decomposition and explains the methodology used to measure the effect 
of the R&D program on TFP change measures. Moreover, the methodology to measure the effect 
of R&D subsidies on TFP change will be determined and discussed in detail.  
Finally the chapter investigates H.1 through H.4 applying these methodologies. The results will be 
shown, discussed and concluded.  
Chapter 4 put empirical and applied effort to scrutinize and answer the research questions 
H.5 through H.8. The data and variables related to the estimation of the model will be provided. 
The chapter deals with the effect of firm characteristics on application decision (self-selection), 
subsidies allocation (selection) and R&D investment equations.  
Finally, and after the investigation of the hypotheses, we discuss the implications of the 
implementation of local place-based R&D program using the topics discussed within the previous 
chapters and the results obtained.
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Chapter 3 
Do public R&D subsidies influence Total Factor Productivity (TFP) change? 
An empirical evaluation of treatment effect 
Abstract: Research Framework 
The main focus of this chapter is to evaluate the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP growth 
and the decomposing elements of TFP growth, namely technical (in)efficiency and technological 
(in)efficiency changes as the determinants of supported firms’ growth for a relevant period of time. 
This evaluation is carried out for the main sectors in which R&D subsidies occur including 
manufacturing and ICT sectors. The measurement has been implemented for two groups of low-
medium tech and high-tech sectors as well. The short-term and long-run effects of R&D subsidies, 
beside the different treatment effects for two types of selection procedures have also been 
measured. 
This investigation leads to the evaluation of the effectiveness of a public place-based R&D 
policy. The previous chapter discussed about the channels and interactions explaining the effect of 
R&D subsidies on TFP change and the components of TFP growth. Previously, a literature on the 
relationship between R&D and TFP and the studies regarding subsidies impact evaluation on TFP 
were provided as well. Nevertheless, the policy evaluation framework investigates the casual 
impact of the policy on TFP change. The theoretical concepts further supports the interpretation 
of the evaluation estimations results.  
We measure and decompose TFP using Malmquist Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
method. The decomposition can also be carried out using other approaches such as growth 
accounting and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). DEA method uses the firm-level data on inputs 
and outputs  (in our setting, 3 inputs and one output for private firms) without any assumption of 
production function to build the productivity frontier. The relative (in)efficiency of each firm can 
be calculated based on the distance of the firm to the productivity frontier. Malmquist DEA 
approach allows for measurement of the inefficiency change over time and has the advantage to 
disentangle the productivity change into changes in technical efficiency change (i.e. the movement 
of the firms’ production towards or away to the production frontier) or technological change (i.e. 
shifts in the frontier over time). This provides economic interpretation for the changes in the 
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growth. The TFP measures are statistically described based on industry and over time in data 
description section.  
The impact of R&D subsidies on technical and technological changes can be measured 
using a quasi-experimental method. The subsidies allocation mechanism, based on provincial law 
LP 6/99 related to the assignment of direct subsidies to applied research projects in Trento province 
in Italy, allows us to form a counterfactual setting in which there are treated and non-treated 
observations within a time span. We use matching techniques to measure the impact of the public 
R&D grants on productivity.  
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a non-parametric estimator capable of controlling the 
selection and self-selection biases which occur in evaluation studies. The method measures the 
average treatment effect on the whole population (ATE) and the average treatment effect on treated 
(ATET) by comparing the average of the target variables for treated (subsidized) and non-treated 
units. Whilst a unit cannot be treated and untreated simultaneously, the method matches the treated 
units with their best matches based on firms’ characteristics which influence both the selection and 
the output variables (known as observables). These observable factors are selected based on the 
subsidies allocation criteria and other related factors influencing the subsidy decision and the 
targeted outcome.  
The propensity scores are generated due to the balancing of pre-treatment variables (age 
and size in our setting), in a way which leads to the uncorrelatedness of the subsidies allocation 
(treatment) to the firms’ characteristics (observables). The propensity score distributions are 
illustrated in the related section. Given the propensity scores, output (target) variables must be 
uncorrelated with the subsidies allocation as well (unconfoundedness). After these hypotheses are 
satisfied the average treatment effect is the comparison between the outputs (TFP and firms’ 
productivity components changes) of the treated and control units. Due to check the robustness of 
the estimations, we measure the effect of R&D subsidies on all TFP measures for the whole 
population and treated units (in different sectors, different selection procedures and for short-term 
and long-run time span) using PSM nearest neighbor estimator (with two different estimation 
process) and PSM kernel estimator.  
Other features of the study as discussed in the previous chapter, is to capture the effect of 
the public subsidies allocation schemes (procedures), industry structure or time (short term and 
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long run effects) on the policy implementation, to shed light on different aspects of R&D policy 
evaluation. The estimations are possible due the construction of a detailed dataset which is the 
elaboration and combination of datasets related to firms’ financial statement and balance sheet 
dataset extracted from AIDA dataset and the dataset provided by ISPAT and APIAE on the public 
R&D subsidies allocated to the firms in Trento. The whole procedure leading to construction of 
the final dataset is discussed as well.  
The main findings about the direction of the policy effects on TFP measures reconfirms 
the part of the literature declaring the mixed and heterogenous results for the effect of R&D 
subsidies on outcome targeted variables. However, it can be implied that the R&D place-based 
program affect negatively on technological frontier progress (growth) of subsidized firms and 
positively on efficiency change of subsidized firms (in ICT sector) in the long run. The R&D 
subsidies have no effect on growth (in terms of TFP change) in steady state, while they show some 
positive impact in transient state. This observation is more in line with semi-endogenous growth 
theory discussed in chapter one. On the other hand, for the whole firms regardless of being treated 
or not, the program affect positively on efficiency change in the long run (manufacturing sector). 
R&D subsidies affect negatively on technological progress in long run for all sectors. 
All in all, R&D subsidies affect negatively on TFP change in manufacturing and low-
medium tech industry. This negative effect mainly holds for the grants allocated automatically to 
R&D projects rather than allocation based on pre-evaluation or negotiation for selection. 
Investigation of the effects of a local place-based public R&D subsidies program for private 
firms is crucial to assess the effectiveness of innovation public policy designed to stimulate the 
productivity and thus the competitiveness in a specific context. Literature on investigation of 
investment policy contributed to growth and competitiveness of subsidized firms has gotten large 
attention and is still growing. However, the empirical evidence has provided mixed and 
heterogenous results sometimes even opposite to each other. Empirical evaluation besides the 
theoretical concepts related to the impact of public R&D subsidies on TFP change, measures and 
explains the effect of R&D policy and the interactions of the features within a policy model.  
In the following before investigating the hypotheses H.1 through H.4 explained in section 
5 of Chapter 2, the place-based R&D subsidization program will be discussed to provide us with 
a more detailed picture of the R&D policy to recognize the important factors influencing the effect 
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of R&D subsidies on total factor productivity. In addition, data and variables applied to measure 
the policy impact will be also described. Afterwards, the methodologies to measure this effect will 
be explained and applied. Finally, we analyze and conclude the results. 
1. R&D subsidy program related to law LP 6/99 and institutional context 
In order to investigate the hypotheses, we use the data related to a local-based R&D 
program in Province of Trento in Italy. Therefore, in the chapters related to empirical evaluation, 
we describe and discuss the reference R&D program (policy) evaluated in the following essays. A 
clear understanding of the R&D support program helps the researcher for a more efficient and 
effective design of the evaluation framework, data provision, evaluation model(s) modifications 
and a better choice of instruments to measure the effect of the policy. 
This section is about the research context and the provincial law LP 6/99 regarding subsidy 
allocation program. Data related to the program used for policy impact analysis and model 
estimation will be described and summarized in each related chapter. Previous sections broadly 
explained the theoretical and empirical reasons and importance for R&D policy at different levels 
of aggregation. Different types of R&D policies and their features were discussed, while the focus 
tended to public R&D subsidies as the main policy being evaluated in this study. Studies dealing 
with impact analysis of public R&D subsidies were reviewed to highlight different aspects of 
policy evaluation which research have taken into account. 
The current and next chapters will empirically estimate models in which the effect of public 
R&D subsidies on target variables of productivity growth and R&D expenditure, are measured at 
firm level. Datasets related to the regional public R&D policy and firms in the region are used to 
carry out the estimation of the R&D policy model and evaluation of the place-based R&D policy. 
The data on R&D grants allocated by autonomous province of Trento in northern east of Italy to 
active firms in the region with R&D projects (in the form of applied research projects) is provided 
by the responsible provincial agency (the provincial agency for the promotion of economic 
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activities (APIAE61), while the data on firms’ characteristics in Trento province is provided by 
other different datasets. 
This section defines and discusses about the context and institutional context of the study, 
focusing on the provincial law and regulations which make the public authority to allocate R&D 
subsidies to the firms in the region. It also describes the mechanism and the process in which 
APIAE assigns R&D subsidies to firms. The mechanism includes application decision and 
different evaluation procedures before providing firms the R&D funds.  
In order to answer the research questions, we apply datasets related to a local placed-base 
innovation policy, i.e. the provincial R&D subsidies program. We call the policy, placed-base and 
not a regional policy because regional policy is handled by the state mainly to fill the gap for the 
disadvantaged regions which are less developed (See e.g. Accetturo & De Blasio, 2012), while the 
local instrument particularly targets the private firms inside a specific region (Barbieri, Iorio & 
Lubrano-Lavadera, 2012). A placed-base incentive program is implemented by the local 
government. Place-based policies have received scant attention despite their relative large share of 
public transfer to private sector. In Italy, Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007), Gabriele, Zamarian 
and Zaninotto (2007), Barbieri, Iorio & Lubrano-Lavadera (2012), Bronzini and Iachini (2014) 
and Bronzini and Piselli (2016) have focused on place-based incentives.  
In the following we describe and discuss about the local provincial law LP 6/99 which regulates 
the public R&D subsidies application and allocation to the private firms in Trento Province in 
Italy. However, before that it is worth to briefly review the regulations regarding a more aggregate 
level. The next section explains some details about R&D subsidies in Italy.  
1.1 R&D subsidies in Italy 
The Italian economy, as one of the largest economies in the world, is characterized by low 
private level of investment in R&D. The private expenditure in R&D is only %40, while the share 
is around %70 for other European countries such as Finland, Germany, Ireland or Spain. R&D 
                                                          
61 Provincial Agency for the promotion of economic activities [Agenzia Provinciale per l’Incentivazione delle Attività 
Economiche (APIAE)]: A detailed script of laws and regulations of provincial law in March 28, 2009 which led to 
creation of APIAE is provided in the official documentations. 
 http://www.apiae.provincia.tn.it/index.html 
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incentives represents %13 of public governmental incentives. This amount is around %15 for 
Germany, %16 for Spain and %23 for France (Barbieri et al, 2012).  
Law 46/82 has been the most highlighted public R&D policy which has lasted the longest 
among other government R&D policies. The law consists of two main parts: the first part (art. 1-
13) which introduces the funds to facilitate applied research (FAR) and the second part (art. 14-
21) which supports experimentation, development and pre-industrialization of R&D projects 
carried out by private firms (FIT). The Italian firms in cases can take advantage of receiving local 
grants in addition to the funds allocated by the law. This could have happened particularly in the 
case of the firms in more disadvantaged regions due to introduction of legislations to fill the 
technological gap between the regions in recent last decades.  
The Legislative Decree n. 297/1999, which being reinforced in 2001 has unified many 
public programs related to support for research and development. The law aggregates programs 
namely, Law 46/82, Law 488/1992 (the part linked to research), Law 346/1988, Law 196/1997 
(art. 14), Law 499/1997 (art. 5) under the title of Fund to Facilitate Research (FAR). Moreover, 
there have been other laws offering subsidies to innovative activities such as Law 140/1997 (for 
fiscal grants to R&D expenditures), Law 357/1994 that reduces taxes for reinvestment in 
instrumental goods and Law 598/1994 that offers low interest rate loans to SMEs spending on 
innovation (Barbieri et al., 2012).  
Merito et al. (2007) have applied a matching method to measure the effects of Fund for 
Applied Research (FAR) program regulated by art 1-13 within law 46/82 on target variables such 
as sales, employment, labour productivity and patents. Poti` and Cerulli (2010) have also 
investigated the effects of this program on additional investment and patents using a combination 
of a system of equations and matching method. The second part of the law 46/82 (art 14-19) dealing 
with Funds for Technological Innovation (FIT) has also been analyzed by De Blasio et al. (2009). 
They found no significant effect on firms’ investment using a regression discontinuity approach. 
At the same time, the Ministry of Economic Development (2008) claims that the FIT has 
stimulated the R&D investment following a qualitative approach and direct interviews.  
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1.2 Trento Province, Law LP/699 and APIAE  
A systematic approach to entrepreneurship and innovation in Province of Trento, Italy, 
dates back to 1999, when the provincial law LP 6/9962 was introduced to support applied research 
projects at the firm level. According to Law 6/99, incentives can be given to firms operating in 
Province of Trento for research and development expenditures. Articles 5 and 19 of the law 6/99 
address policies regarding R&D investment incentives in the name of support for the promotion 
of research and development and the dissemination or diffusion of scientific research, 
respectively63. Law 6/99 supports R&D cooperation which develops the relation between science 
and industry by facilitating knowledge transfer. Additionally, law 6/99 encourages  the recruitment 
of skilled personnel and the mobility of researchers in and between enterprises.  
Law 6/99 has been modified under the provincial law of 2 August 200564. Law LP 
14/200565 reorganized the Trento research system by introducing a new selection and evaluation 
procedure to  support scientific and industrial research financed by the firms in line with law 6/99. 
Article 57 of the provincial law, regulated in March 2009, establishes the provincial agency for 
the promotion of economic activities (APIAE) as an administrative body.66 The APIAE works to 
strengthen the effective lending and disbursement of aid, contributions, and financial incentives in 
favor of entrepreneurs and other stakeholders in all economic sectors except agriculture. The 
APIAE is the public agency responsible for project screening, evaluation, grant allocation and 
monitoring in the province of Trento. The agency is expected to increase business efficiency and 
effectiveness through “granting aids and credit facilities to firms, in all sectors apart from 
agriculture.”  
                                                          
62 LEGGE PROVINCIALE 13 DICEMBRE 1999, N. 6, ART. 5, ART. 19 E ART. 19:  BISCRITERI E MODALITÀ 
PER L’APPLICAZIONE DELLA LEGGE 
63 The detailed description of actual law and the acts can be provided. 
64 Our impact evaluation framework applies data after this period, hence there is no mismatch due to the change in 
selection schemes which can interfere or deteriorate the analysis results. 
65 The year 2010 is another important milestone in the development of the regional innovation system by setting the 
new multi-annual research program (or PPR 2010-2013).  
66 We assume that introduction of APIAE as the reinforcing body of the province to allocate R&D grants does not 
generate noise or distortion in the data,  as the selection criteria to assign the subsidies remain the same. However, 
investigation of the effect of establishment of APIAE on the mechanisms subsidies impact targeted outcomes can be 
an interesting future empirical research issue. 
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APIAE aims to increase competitiveness in the region by providing grants or guidance to 
entities conducting applied research projects or diffusing knowledge. Since July 2011, it is also 
responsible for verification and control of the research projects in addition to managing relations 
with consortia, providing financial guarantees and assigning scientific and financial experts to 
evaluate/select eligible projects. Applications to access the contributions include: support for 
industrial research projects, support for experimental development, the temporary assignment of 
researchers and technical research institutes operating in the province, hiring researchers and 
research technicians from research organizations and academic institutions. The agency deals with 
the management of grants and financial incentives provided by the provincial laws, as well as the 
activities related to monitoring and control. The management of relations with the guarantee 
consortia present in the province of Trento and other credit institutions is also among the 
responsibilities APIAE is in charge. 
The Provincial Agency for Promotion of Economic Activity (APIAE) is divided into two 
departments; first, the Department of Investment Promotion which carries out the allocation and 
disbursement of financial aids to support fixed investments of business and other stakeholders 
operating in all economic sectors (except agriculture). The department also monitors external 
bodies in charge to manage the operations of supporting fixed investments, runs inspections and 
checks on the facilitated initiatives, and is responsible of managing the information concerning the 
activities. 
Second, the Finance, Research and Development Department which ensures the allocation 
and disbursement of financial aids to support business services, research and equity loans in 
relation to all economic sectors (except agriculture). It also monitors external bodies in charge to 
manage the operations in supporting business services, research and equity loans and provides 
analysis, studies and research related to incentive policies, while doing inspections on the 
facilitated initiatives. The link between research and industry and creation of a motivating 
environment for innovation is managed by the province through law 6/99. However, the outcomes 
and impacts of the initiatives of the law have not been evaluated in a systematic way. An evaluation 
of effectiveness of the law has been launched by APIAE for the period of 2001-2010 and a first 
report was completed in 2011.  
83 
 
This study deals with subsidies for industrial research projects and experimental 
development projects. The expenditures eligible for the support consist of a) expenses for 
employees including the expenses of the owner and partners, b) spending for research contracts, 
skilled technicians and patents, d) additional expenses for market search, e) other operating costs, 
and f) costs of tools and equipment. In this study the focus is on support for industrial research 
projects from now called alternatively as R&D projects or just projects.67 One can categorize all 
these expenses under the total R&D expenditure category. 
As long as the subsidies are allocated for one of the above five expenditures categorized in 
the list, studying the impact of the program on TFP change can be focused and linked to these 
sources of input additionalities. However, the framework of this research investigates a casual 
effect regardless of the micro-channels which may lead to TFP change. Nevertheless, we will use 
these eligibility conditions to interpret the results of the impact estimation. It is worth to say that 
in our study the focus is on the support assigned for industrial research projects from now called 
alternatively as R&D projects or just projects. 
 Here we review some other empirical concerns linked to LP 6/99 which could have arisen 
challenges for the evaluation. Since 2015, projects worth up to EUR 100,000.00 can be subsidized 
together with tax compensation. However, this does not interfere and distort our analysis as the 
dataset applied in investigating the research questions does not include the subsidies allocated after 
2015. In addition, the assumption that firms applying for LP 6/99 R&D subsidies must renounce 
the receipt of any other public support relax the problem of multiple treatment or hidden treatment. 
Furthermore, the probable existence of spillover violates the stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA: discussed in previous chapter), which can cast doubt on the impact estimation results. 
However, in this chapter we assume of no spillover effect of R&D subsidies on TFP change for 
non-treated units. Finally, it is worth to notice that the policy’s local dimension allows for the 
removal of unobserved heterogeneity among private firms in comparison with the R&D programs 
nationwide in which the recipients and non-recipients are less similar. 
 
                                                          
67 Theoretically, public R&D subsidization policy implemented by governments are particularly designed to stimulate 
private additional R&D activity (input, output and behavioral additionalities), however, one ultimate goal of an R&D 
policy is the increase of economic growth. 
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1.3 Grants for Applied Research Projects: Application and allocation of grants 
Applications for subsidies, on the basis of the elements that characterize them, are 
examined in accordance with the procedures of automatic type (for expenses up to € 500,000.00), 
evaluative (for expenses up to EUR 1.500,000,00) or negotiating (for higher expenses to EUR 
1,500,000.00). All eligible firms can apply for subsidies for their projects and then the submitted 
projects are technically and financially evaluated by APIAE. Since 2015, projects worth up to EUR 
100,000.00 can be subsidized together with tax compensation. 
Although there are common requirements in all three project evaluation methods, but the 
evaluative method includes some more criteria and stages of evaluation and requirements for 
application in respect to automatic procedure. The same holds for negotiating procedure in 
comparison with evaluative and consequently automatic procedures. The detailed description of 
the procedures and the requirements for application through one of these evaluation methods can 
be accessed from related documents for law 6/99 available online in province’s or APIAE’s 
websites. Evaluation turns out which projects get accepted or rejected to receive subsidies. Those 
accepted are assigned a contribution of the total R&D investment (subsidy rate) by APIAE. 
Subsequently, the contribution is awarded and injected to the projects in different stages while the 
firms are running the R&D projects. All the firms operating in the province of Trento are eligible 
to apply for the subsidies by submission of a project to the province. The grants can be applied at 
any time and there is no deadline to submit a project. However, the projects are evaluated by time 
order they have been submitted. 
The law LP6/99 objectives include stimulating additional private R&D and stabilizing the 
employment rate which leads to a higher productivity and competitiveness of the firms active in 
the region. The agency is responsible for assignment of subsidies to different types of R&D in two 
categories of industrial research and experimental development. Industrial research is defined as a 
planned activity aiming at acquiring new knowledge that is used to introduce new products, new 
processes and services and those activities which concern improvement of the quality of existing 
products, processes and services. Experimental development is defined as the acquisition, 
recombination and utilization of existing scientific, technological and commercial knowledge in 
order to produce projects, products, processes new to the firm or enhanced projects. The creation, 
construction and development of prototypes are in the latter category (Corsino et al., 2012).  
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In automatic procedure of project evaluation the subsidy depends to the PRP68 or NO PRP 
status of the project. The automatic procedure is assumed to be just for projects related to SMEs. 
A firm will get a 20 percent of contribution from the public agency if  R&D project is determined 
as PRP, otherwise the contribution for the R&D project will be 15 percent in case the application 
get accepted by the APIAE. In evaluative procedure, the projects are examined at a first stage of 
evaluation procedure by a technical committee. If the application is admitted, then at the second 
stage the project’s economic viability and financial sustainability get estimated. If a project gets a 
positive evaluation at both stages, it can be subsidized by the local government according to the 
scheme reported in Table 1. Firms are divided into three size classes of small, medium and large 
defined according to the OECD classification. The contribution is supposed to be higher as the 
firm is smaller. Small and medium sized firms represent the most important share of the industry 
in this region, as well as the whole Italy. Projects involving industrial research are awarded a higher 
share of financial support than programs focusing on pre-commercial development.  
Table 1. Scheme for rates of subsidies for different types of R&D projects assigned by APIAE for 
the firms operating within the province of Trento. 
R&D Project Type 
 
 
Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
PRP No-PRP PRP No-PRP PRP No-PRP 
Industrial Research 70 60 60 55 50 45 
%Maximum 80 70 75 65 65 65 
Experimental Development 45 40 35 30 25 20 
%Maximum 60 50 50 40 40 30 
All numbers are in percentage (%)    
Source: APIAE (Provincial Agency for the promotion of economic activities) 
The contribution to R&D project may be raised more than the amount predefined for some 
specific conditions69. The percentage of the contribution is 15 percent more in the case of 
collaboration with other companies, 15 percent by collaborating with search bodies inside the 
                                                          
68 PRP is the R&D activity with long term effect in the Provincial Research Program defined by the Law 6/99. Projects 
in the districts of ICT, sustainable buildings , renewable energy and land management, and spin offs or start-ups doing 
research are amongst cases to be considered as PRP. 
69 This extra contribution is called as MAGGIORAZIONI. 
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province, 5 percent to projects collaborating with research bodies out of the province, or a 15 
percent to only industrial research projects which their results are disclosed or available in free 
accessed databases or disclosed by a free software or open source70.  
The range of gross spending for projects is between 25,000 to 3 million Euros. Expenses 
usually fall in the following categories: (1) employment costs: additional high skilled workforce 
employed to work on the project, (2) patenting costs and contractual costs of licenses acquisition, 
(3) general additional costs related to the project (overhead up to 60% of costs declared at point 
1), (4) part of costs related to the use of the tools and machines employed within the project. It is 
worth to restate that these categories which the subsidies are allocated can be applied in 
interpretation of the estimations regarding the causal effect of subsidies on targeted variables.  
Once a firm is awarded a grant, it must obey to some constraints in order to actually get 
financed: (a) the results of the research have to be used/exploited in the province of Trento, (b) in 
case the subsidy is bigger than 500,000 Euro or if the firm ask for an additional percentage to the 
amount of investment financed, it must guarantee, for at least two years since the grant is awarded, 
the level of employment declared in the projects. Projects can entail expenses referred to a period 
going from the date of concession to the following three years.  
A firm doing R&D has to apply in order to receive subsidy for a planned project. We expect 
a firm to apply if the R&D project has a net profit higher than zero considering the application 
cost and fixed cost for the R&D project into account. As long as the subsidy rate for R&D 
investment is not revealed before the authority’s grading, the firm decides to apply supposing an 
expected subsidy rate for the project. Expected subsidy rate is the amount assumed to be allocated 
for the project based on the common knowledge and information for the agency’s grading process. 
As described, the evaluation process is carried out in two stages; technical and economic or 
financial assessments.  
The section has explained the national (Italian) public R&D subsidization policies and 
focuses on the R&D grant policy in Province of Trento as a placed-base R&D subsidy program 
linked with Law LP 6/99. The application for funds and the selection and allocation mechanisms 
                                                          
70 A logic model of the table which describes the firm expected rate of subsidy before applying for the projects will 
be provided in the appendix of next chapter. However, the equation related to table is not used in our econometric 
estimations within the next chapters. 
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are discussed as well. All these topics reviewed in this section are the foundation for carrying out 
the empirical evaluation of R&D subsidies and measuring the effect of the R&D program on TFP 
change and R&D input additionality in the following chapters.  
At this point and after a review of the place-based R&D subsidies program, the hypotheses 
H.1 through H.4 explained and framed in the previous chapter will be investigated. In a theoretical 
perspective (as the main foundation for the research questions), we have extensively discussed the 
relationship between R&D subsidies and total factor productivity (TFP). In addition and on a more 
practical perspective, the law LP6/99 objectives include stimulating additional private R&D 
leading to a higher productivity and competitiveness of the firms active in the region. Therefore, 
measuring the effect of R&D subsidies on productivity change and the related peripheral research 
questions (H.1_H.4) are the main focus of the essay in this chapter. We repeat the hypotheses for 
easier reference in the following: 
 
H.1: Public R&D subsidies affect (positively/negatively) total factor productivity (TFP) growth.   
H1.1: Public R&D subsidies affect (positively/ negatively) technical efficiency (EFFCH) change. 
H1.2: Public R&D subsidies affect (positively/ negatively) technological frontier progress 
(technological efficiency (TECHCH). 
H.2: R&D subsidies allocation schemes influence on the impact of  the R&D subsidies on TFP and its 
components (technical efficiency and technological change). 
H.3: The industry and sector the firm performs in, has an effect on the impact of R&D subsidies on 
TFP change and its components. 
H.4: The impact of public R&D subsidies on TFP change is time invariant. (Or: The effect of the 
R&D subsidies on TFP growth is different in the short term and long run. 
In order to investigate H.1, total factor productivity (TFP) and the decomposition of TFP 
change must be defined. Hence, in the following we explain the approaches and the methodology 
used to measure the TFP change and the components of TFP change. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Models and methodologies to measure changes in TFP and TFP components  
The targeted outcome variable this study focus on is total factor productivity change. Firm 
technical (in)efficiency and technical frontier (technological) efficiency changes are the measures 
determining total factor productivity change. Technological progress determines the growth in 
production, in studies which productivity is measured as a residual after controlling for input 
changes. This approach assumes firms are technically efficient and  are operating on the efficiency 
frontiers. This means the technology is exploited at its full potential. However, firms do not usually 
operate on their frontiers, hence, TFP calculated in this way represents both technological 
innovation and changes in efficiency. Consequently, technological frontier change may not be the 
only source of TFP change, and  technical efficiency can also play a role in changing TFP (Battese 
& Coelli, 1995; Jin et al., 2010). 
Malmquist Data Envelopment Analysis (Malmquist DEA) is widely used to study 
production efficiency dynamics. The technique provides us with estimation of both technical 
efficiency and  technological change over time. Before, explaining the method which is applied in 
this study to isolate the effects of policy on TFP components, we follow a brief  description of how 
the model is constructed.  
Farrell (1957) introduced technical efficiency as the ability of the firm to obtain the 
maximum set of output(s) from a given set of input(s) and price efficiency (allocative efficiency) 
as the ability to allocate optimal proportions of input(s) to produce a given amount of output 
according to their respective prices. The overall (economic) efficiency is measured by combination 
(multiplication) of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency as 𝐸𝐸𝑖 = 𝑇𝐸𝑖 × 𝐴𝐸𝑖 , where 𝑇𝐸𝑖= 
technical efficiency, 𝐴𝐸𝑖= allocative efficiency and 𝐸𝐸𝑖= overall economic efficiency. 
Farrell using agricultural data for 48 states in United States and following Debreu (1951) 
and Koopmans (1951), determines the above measures in input and output oriented forms using 
simple examples of two inputs-one output and one input-two outputs production system under the 
assumption of constant return to scale. The former takes the input reducing approach and answers 
the question that “how much can input quantities be proportionally reduced without any change in 
the output produced”, while the latter deals with output maximization orientation and answers the 
question “how much can output quantities be expanded without any change in the inputs 
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consumed”. The illustration and discussion about graphical representations of isoquants can be 
found as a primary topic in the books related to efficiency and productivity analysis.  
A strong assumption in Farrell’s paper is that fully efficient firms’ production function (a 
unit isoquant in this case) as discussed above is known. However, the frontier of all efficient firms 
is unknown in practice. Thus, he suggests for future studies to form the frontier by using either a 
piece-wise-linear convex isoquant using sample data or shaping a stochastic parametric function 
such that any points lies to the left (right) or below (up) the efficient frontier in input(output) 
orientation.  
Two principal methods used to estimate the frontier and consequently relative inefficiency 
of firms lying down the frontier are non-parametric mathematical programming Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and econometric parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The former is 
introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) while the latter is introduced by Aigner, Lovell 
and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van denk Broeck (1977).  
The frontier in DEA is formed using information about inputs and outputs, while SFA 
estimates the frontier assuming a specific production function per se. SFA assigns a non-negative 
random variable (one-sided normal distribution) to technical efficiency term in the production 
function and a stochastic error term which is independent identically distributed (i.i.d) normal 
distribution with mean zero, capturing the measurement error and environmental shocks 
influencing the output production. Although SFA solves the problems of deterministic efficiency 
measurement models like Maximum-Likelihood models which ignore the ‘noise’ in measurement, 
however, one main drawback of SFA method is a priori assumptions for stochastic components 
of the stochastic production function.  
Assuming a production function like for instance Cobb-Douglas production function to 
measure realized output, yields the average amount of output. However, as discussed the 
hypotheses aim to estimate the frontier either to measure technological change carried out by the 
best performers or to capture the relative (in)efficiency of the firms with respect to that frontier. 
Therefore, we need a methodology to let us relax the assumption for the production function form.  
DEA-based Malmquist Productivity Index is a widely used approach which solely uses 
input(s) and output(s) distance functions to measure total factor productivity (TFP) change and its 
components including relative efficiency change and the technological frontier shift (Färe et al., 
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1989 and 1998). Caves, Christensen and Diewert (CCD:1982) introduced the geometric measure 
of MPI referring to the definition introduced by Sten Malmquist (1953) for input quantity index. 
In the following and before explaining Malmquist Productivity Index, DEA approach and distance 
function definition are defined as the basis for MPI measurement.  
2.1.1 Data Envelopment Analysis 
The DEA approach is based on a non-parametric linear programming model introduced by 
Charnes et al. (1978) known as CCR (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes) model following the study of 
Färrel (1957). The model measures the production frontier for homogenous entities71 only by using 
the data on inputs and outputs of decision making units (DMUs) without concerning the production 
function. The relative (in)efficiency of each DMU is measured calculating the distance of the DMU 
with the enveloped frontier shaped by best practice DMUs. This frontier can be formed under 
either Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) or Variable Return to Scale (VRS) assumptions. The DEA 
model under VRS technology is known as BCC model being introduced by Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (1984). The measure for efficiency is as the following: 
 
 𝐸𝑗 =  
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑠)
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑠)
=  
𝑢1𝑦1𝑗+𝑢2𝑦2𝑗+⋯+𝑢𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑗
𝑣1𝑥1𝑗+𝑣2𝑥2𝑗+⋯+𝑣𝑚𝑥𝑚𝑗
      (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑟𝑗 denotes the amount of output 𝑟 for firm 𝑗, 𝑢𝑟 is the weight (price) for output 𝑟, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is the 
amount of input 𝑖 for the firm 𝑗 and 𝑣𝑖 is the weight (price) of input 𝑖. The notations are chosen as 
in the seminal work by Charnes et al. (1978). The ratio can be measured straightforward for entities 
or in general decision making units (DMUs) when there are one input and one output involved in 
the production (service). Even if there are cases for two input/one output or one input/two outputs, 
one can measure the proportions of output/input and map the efficiency frontier due to calculate 
relative efficiency. In case there are multiple inputs/ multiple outputs (MIMO) estimating the ratio 
would face challenges because the weights for each input/output must be realized. DEA 
methodology is capable of calculating the relative efficiency measures when there is MIMO 
                                                          
71 Decision making units which have a similar process of transferring inputs to outputs. 
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condition. DEA models have been extensively developed to address many challenges and gaps 
related to specifications and applications of the model.  
The model has different representations based on primary or dual forms and input or output 
orientations taken towards maximization of the efficiency ratio. While the algorithm empirically 
used to estimate the distance to the frontier applies a dual form of DEA and constant return to scale 
(CRS) output orientation, we explain CRS Output-Oriented DEA dual model. A discussion of 
other basic types of DEA models and how the mentioned model is formed can be found in the 
appendix (3.a).72 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃 
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑
  
𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑖 ≤ 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝑖
 ∀ 𝑗 
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑖
𝑖
 ≥ 𝜃𝑦𝑘𝑛∀ 𝑘 
𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0  ∀𝑖      DEA CRS Output-Oriented dual model (2) 
 
DEA model using input and output data of DMUs shapes the efficiency frontier and 
measures the distance of each DMU from the frontier due to measurement the technical 
(in)efficiency. The frontier and the distance to frontier can be captured through time intervals to 
estimate efficiency change and technical frontier change. The method used to make this possible 
is Malmquist Productivity Index approach based on calculation of distance measures. The 
following section discusses distance function and MPI.  
2.1.2 Distance function and Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI)73 
Index number theory is the most widely used approach to measure changes in levels of 
economic variables. Quantity and price index numbers are widely used in measuring output and 
                                                          
72 The basic DEA model primarily proposed by CCR (1978) and the linear form and after dual form, as well as the 
BCC extension (1984) to the model are explained.  
73 The models and definitions are a combination and adaptation of formulations in (Caves et al., 1982; Bjurek, 1996; 
Lovell, 2003; Camanho & Dyson, 2006)  
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input changes to measure productivity change over time. Total factor productivity (TFP) is one of 
the index numbers used as a base to measure the related productivity measures in empirical 
productivity analysis studies. In case of one input and one output, measuring this index number 
will be straightforward, however when there are multiple inputs and outputs, the need to aggregate 
the TFP index number emerges.  
The index number introduced by Tornqvist (1936) is a seminal effort to measure total factor 
productivity index. Malmquist productivity index was first theoretically introduced by Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert (1982) and empirically applied by Färe et al. (1994). The index is actually 
the proportion of Tornqvist output index to input index used to measure the productivity change 
over time regardless of price information in contrast with Fisher Index.  
The Malmquist Index can take input or output oriented definitions. Input or output 
orientated technical efficiency measures explained in the previous section are equivalents to the 
input and output distance functions (Shepherd, 1970; Coelli et al., 1998). As long as this essay 
takes an output maximization orientation, the index will be expressed in an output oriented 
approach. Therefore, in order to measure output oriented Malmquist Productivity Index, output 
distance function must be determined. The definition of the output distance function for each time 
period 𝑡 is as the following:  
 
𝑑𝑜(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝜃{𝜃 > 0: (𝑥, 𝑦  / 𝑡, 𝜃) ∈ 𝑇}  or     (3)  
 )()(:),( xPyMinyxd tttt  
          
 
where 𝑥 ∈  𝑅𝑁
+ is the input vector; 𝑦 ∈  𝑅𝑀
+  is the output vector. 𝑡 is the time and 𝑇 =
{(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡)∃𝑥 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡74}. 
The distance function set the smallest factor, 𝜃 by which output vector 𝑦 can be produced 
with a given input vector 𝑥 under period t’s technology.  
Färe et al. (1994) proposed the output-oriented Malmquist Index using distant functions in 
the following form: 
 
                                                          
74 Technology frontier condition 
93 
 
𝑀0(𝑥
𝑡, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) = [
𝑑𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)
𝑑𝑡(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)
𝑑𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)
𝑑𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)
]
1
2⁄
      (4) 
 
This defines the productivity of the production point (𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) in respect to the 
production point (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡). A value greater than one will indicate positive TFP growth from period 
𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1. This index represents the geometric mean of two output orientated Malmquist TFP 
indices. The Malmquist index can be decomposed into two components: technical efficiency 
change (EFFCH) and technological frontier change (TECHCH), defined as: 
 
𝑀0(𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡) =
𝑑0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)
. [
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)
𝑑0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)
]
1
2⁄
   (5) 
 
where the first ratio measures the change in relative efficiency between time 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1. The 
geometric mean of the two ratios inside the bracket defines the shift in technology frontier between 
the two periods. These may be given as: 
 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐻 =
𝑑0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)
         (6) 
 
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐶𝐻 = [
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)
𝑑0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)
]
1
2⁄
       (7) 
  
MPI is not time transitive and does not hold for circularity assumption; that is: 
𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡1,𝑡3 ≠ 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡1,𝑡2𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡2,𝑡3          (8) 
 
In order to measure Malmquist Index in equation (5), we measure the distance function using 
DEA. The input thus employs distance functions from two different periods or technologies, 
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) and 𝑑0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) and two pairs of input-output vectors, (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) and. (𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1). 
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2.2 Models and methods to measure the treatment (R&D subsidy) effect75 
The term ‘treatment effect’ refers to the causal effect of a binary (0–1) variable on an 
outcome variable of scientific research or policy interest. Treatment evaluation is the estimation 
of the average effect of a treatment or program on the outcome of interest. That means the 
comparison of outcomes between treated and control observations to investigate the effect of the 
program on the treated group. The term has been primarily stemmed from medical literature due 
to measurement of the causal effect for a drug experiment or a new surgical method. However, it 
has been widely used in other fields of study and specifically in economics literature by pioneering 
work of Ashenfelter (1978).76 There would typically be a program or treatment implemented to 
some group and another group would not receive that treatment.  
Government programs and policies like subsidization, employee training programs and 
many other examples can follow treatment pattern. Inherently, there are two types of evaluation 
studies. The first one is control experiments such as lab experiments where the assignment into 
treated and control group is random. The second one is observational studies where the assignment 
is not random. This means certain individuals have decided to participate in the program while the 
others have decided not to participate. The characteristics of the participants and non-participants 
can be different which makes it difficult to directly compare the outcomes for those two groups. 
Therefore, to measure the effect of the program and comparison of the outcomes, the participants 
and non-participants (control) must be matched as much as possible. Selection bias also discussed 
in the introduction of the first chapter is the main challenge faced during treatment effect 
measurement, i.e. when the treated and non-treated are different with each other for other reasons 
than treatment status. Matching method helps to remove the selection bias before evaluating the 
impact of the program or treatment.  
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology is the approach to match treated 
observations with observations in non-treated control group. The first step in using PSM is to 
assign the observations into treated and control (non-treated) groups. Treatment 𝐷 is a binary that 
determines whether the observation has been treated or not (𝐷 = 1 for treated units and 𝐷 = 0 for 
                                                          
75 The definitions and explanations are based on tutorial on treatment effect provided by MIT department of 
economics and the paper on ‘Estimation of average treatment effects based on propensity scores’ by Becker and 
Ichino (2002) in the Stata Journal. 
76 A first related survey has also been carried out by Heckman and Robb (1985). 
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control observations). The next step is to estimate a binary outcome model which is a probit or 
logit model for the propensity of observations to be treated based on their characteristic(s) (𝑋).  
As long as 𝑋 may consist of different variables (discrete or continuous) with different 
dimensions, there would be a problem to match the units (dimensionality problem). This problem 
can be solved by introducing a single measure which is the propensity score. Propensity scores 
determines the probability of being treated conditional on 𝑋. The score is calculated by running a 
probit (or logit) regression of selection status variable 𝐷, on variables containing 𝑋. The treated 
and non-treated observations with closest propensity scores are matched with each other to form a 
counterfactual setting due to the comparison of the effect of the policy.  
Propensity score matching (PSM) generates a scalar which demonstrates how good a 
control observation can be matched to the non-treated observation. PSM method allows to consider 
various control variables as matching arguments without suffering the curse of dimensionality; the 
more dimensions are included, the more difficult it becomes to find a good match for each treated 
firm. The propensity score is defined as the probability to receive a subsidy and represent a valid 
methodology to reduce all the dimensions considered to a single index (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Matching method lumps up pre-treatment characteristics (𝑋) 
into a single index variable (propensity score). The propensity score firstly defined by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) is the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment 
(selection) characteristics (factors):  
𝑝(𝑋) ≡ Pr{𝐷 = 1|𝑋} = 𝐸{𝐷|𝑋}        (9) 
where 𝐷 = {0,1} is the treatment indicator (dependent variable) and 𝑋 are the observable pre-
treatment characteristics which influence the likelihood of being treated (independent variables). 
Regarded the choice of control variables selection, variables whose participation into the treatment 
group does not affect them should better be included into the model (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). 
In order to address this concern, all time-variant control variables are lagged one period with 
respect to the year of treatment, thus making them predetermined with respect to the treatment 
(Corsino et al., 2012). It is proved that in case the exposure to treatment is random within the cells 
formed based on dimensional vector of 𝑋, it can be considered as random also for the cells defined 
by mono-dimensional 𝑝(𝑋).  
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Now at this point, it is possible to match the observations from treated and control groups 
based on their propensity scores. The goal here is to find a match for each treated observations and 
not for control observations. Consequently, there can be control observations not used. After 
matching, in order to measure the treatment effect, we compare the outcomes 𝑦 between the treated 
and control observations (𝑦1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷 = 1 & 𝑦0 𝑖𝑓 𝐷 = 0). In treatment effect measurement, we want 
to compare the outcome of the treated observations with the outcome of the same observation had 
not been treated. As long as an observation cannot be treated and not treated at the same time, the 
problem of a counterfactual situation occurs. Therefore, in order to evaluate the impact of the 
treatment we must find a close match from the control group and compare the outcome of the 
treated observation with the matched non-treated observation(s) in the control group. The 
propensity score matching methods help us to find a close good match for treated units. For each 
treated observation 𝑖, PSM finds matches from observation 𝑗 in the control group. Matching can 
be with or without replacement. The former is when each control observation can be used as a 
match to several treated observations, while the latter restricts each control observation not to be 
used more than one time as a match for a treated observation.  
There are several matching methods, namely nearest neighbor (One-to-one or multiple), 
kernel, radius (with different calipers) and stratification. The nearest neighbor matching is the most 
straightforward matching technique used to match a treated observation with the observation from 
control group which represents the closest propensity score to the score of treated observation. In 
one-to-one matching the control observation is only one, while in multiple matching the treated 
can be matched with more than one (usually 3-nearest-neighbors) observations. Once each treated 
unit get matched with the control(s) unit, the average treatment effect on treated (ATT) is measured 
by taking the average of the differences between treated units with their matched non-treated 
counterparts. Not necessarily, but the nearest neighbor method is usually applied with replacement. 
In nearest neighbor matching all treated units will find a match. However, it is possible that these 
matches become fairly poor in case when the nearest neighbor has a very different propensity 
score. The kernel and radius matching suggest solutions to this problem of large differences in 
propensity scores for matched observations.  
Radius matching predefines a neighborhood (equal to the radius of a circle) of propensity 
scores for the treated observations to be matched with an observation in the control group. The 
smaller the size of the radius, the higher the quality of the matches will get. However, if the radius 
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is set to be small, then there is the probability that some treated units are not matched as the 
neighborhood might not contain any control observations. There should be a trade-off in setting 
the radius size in radius matching based on data richness and quality.  
Kernel matching matches all treated observations with a weighted average of all the 
controls. The weights are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of 
treated and non-treated units. As long as kernel technique uses weighting propensity score of all 
related observations, it can suit the estimations related to cases with smaller number of treated in 
sample size.77 Figure (1) displays a simple difference of the matching approach between nearest 
neighbor and kernel matching:  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Kernel and nearest neighbor matching procedures 
Finally, the stratification method makes divisions called as blocks based on different 
intervals of propensity scores such that within each block the average propensity score is the same 
for treated and control observations. Then, within each interval including both treated and control 
                                                          
77 Another method introduced to deal with the odds of treatment and unbalanced design with few treated units and 
many controls is Oaxaca-Blinder estimator developed by Kline (2011). The O-B estimator, despite allowance for 
negative weights carries out straightforward computation of standard errors. The method is based on the works of 
Ronald Oaxaca (1973) and Alan S. Blinder (1973) who proposed a propensity score reweighting estimator based upon 
a linear model for the conditional odds of being treated—a functional form that emerges, for example, from an 
assignment model with a latent log-logistic error. 
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units, the average treatment effect (ATT) is the average of the ATT for each block with weights 
given by the distribution of treated units across the blocks. However, discarding the blocks which 
do not possess any treated and/or controls is one drawback of stratification method. The nearest 
neighbor method already defined, does not expose this problem. In the following, the formal 
descriptions and formulations of the propensity score matching methods discussed previously are 
provided.  
Let T be the set of treated observations and 𝐶 the set of control observations. 𝑌𝑖
𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑗
𝐶  
are the observed outcomes of the treated and control units as well. Nearest neighbor matching is 
defined as the following:  
 
𝐶(𝑖) =  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗‖𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗‖           (10) 
 
where 𝐶(𝑖) is the set of control observations matched to the treated observation 𝑖 with a value of 
propensity score 𝑝𝑖. 𝑝𝑗 is the estimated propensity scores for control observations. 𝐶(𝑖) is a 
singleton set unless there are multiple nearest neighbors which rarely happens particularly when 
the set of characteristics 𝑋 includes continuous variables.  
The radius matching formulation is almost the same except there is a radius 𝑟 which predefines a 
maximum distance for the possibility of treated units to be matched with controls.  
 
𝐶(𝑖) =  ⟨𝑝𝑗|‖𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗‖ < 𝑟⟩        (11) 
 
In radius matching all the control observations with estimated propensity scores falling 
within a specified radius 𝑟 from 𝑝𝑗 are matched to the treated unit 𝑖.  
In kernel matching each treated observation 𝑖 is matched with several control observations (𝑗s) by 
weights inversely proportional to the distance between treated and control observations. The 
weights are defined as the following:  
 
𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝐾(
𝑝𝑗−𝑝𝑖
ℎ
)
∑ 𝐾(
𝑝𝑗−𝑝𝑖
ℎ
)𝑛𝑗=1
         (12) 
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where K(.) is the kernel function78, 𝑝𝑗 is the propensity score for the control observation, 𝑝𝑖 is the 
propensity score for the treated observation and ℎ is the bandwidth parameter for the kernel 
function. In the numerator we have the kernel of the division of the distance between propensity 
scores of the treated unit and the single matched control unit (𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖) and a predefined bandwidth 
(ℎ), while the denominator is the sum of these kernel values for all the control matched units. This 
proportion provides the weights for each control matched unit to be used in measuring the 
treatment effect.  
In stratification matching the outcomes are compared across intervals or blocks used for 
matching treated with controls. The ATT will be measured using the average of the difference of 
propensity scores within each block. 
 
The four PSM methods discussed undermine different tradeoffs between quality and 
quantity of the matches and none of them is ex ante superior than the others. However, applying 
them together will help in carrying out robustness check.  
Another noticeable issue in matching techniques is the term common support which is used 
to restrict the matching based on a common range of propensity scores for the treated and control 
observations. For instance, we can consider a situation in which the maximum propensity score 
measured for treated observations is higher than the one for control group (e.g. 0.9 for treated and 
0.8 for control observations) or a situation in which the minimum propensity score for control 
observations is lower than the one for treated observations (e.g. 0.2 for treated and 0.2 for control 
observations). In case the matching gets limited to be carried out for treated observations with 
propensity scores not higher than a predefined score (e.g. 0.8) or for control observations with 
propensity scores not lower than a predefined score (e.g. 0.2), then the common support ranges 
between 0.2 and 0.8 (%20 and %80 of probabilities) and the PSM matching technique will be 
carried out in this limited range. PSM can restrict the sample to common support region by defining 
a tolerance limit which determines the bandwidth for matching treated and controls as shown in 
the following Figure (2): 
                                                          
78 Kernel function can be in the forms of Gaussian kernel or Epanechnikov kernel.  
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Figure 2. The probit distributions of treated and non-treated observations to identify propensity scores  
The quality of the matches can improve by imposing common support restriction. 
However, as long as some high quality matches can be ignored in the common support boundaries 
and the sample shrinks as well, this improvement of the matching quality using common support 
option is not per se (Lechner, 2001). 
At this point after the matches are found for the treated observations, we can measure the 
average treatment effect (𝐴𝑇𝐸). Average treatment causal effect is simply evaluated by the 
measuring the difference between the outcomes of treated and control observations. 𝐴𝑇𝐸 is defined 
as the following: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖] = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖| 𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑋] − 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 0, 𝑋]    (13) 
 
where 𝑌1𝑖 is the outcome of treated unit, 𝑌0𝑖 is the outcome of non-treated unit, 𝐷𝑖 is the binary 
treatment variable and 𝑋 is the vector of characteristics of the observation. If the treatment happens 
randomly, then 𝐴𝑇𝐸 simply compares the average outcomes between treated and control 
observations to measure the treatment effect. However, for the situations in which the unit or 
observation can self-select to participate in treatment or the case in which there is selection 
between participants to be treated, the experiment is not random and treated and control 
observations are not similar. This leads to a bias in measuring the 𝐴𝑇𝐸.  
In order to tackle this bias, we use average treatment effect on treated (𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇) as the following 
equation, which is the difference between outcomes of the treated observations and the same 
treated observation had not been treated.  
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𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖| 𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑋] = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖| 𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑋] − 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑋]    (14) 
 
The second term cannot practically happen in real world as a unit cannot be treated and not 
treated at the same time. Therefore, the second term is counterfactual and needs to be estimated. 
In order to estimate the second term in 𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇, we can substitute a non-treated control observation 
matched with the treated observation. The match is carried out based on the observable 
characteristics of the observations. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) explained previously, finds 
this match by using a singleton propensity score for treated and control observations. 
Consequently, after matching on propensity scores 𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 can be defined as: 
𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑝(𝑋)] = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖| 𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑝(𝑋)] − 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖| 𝐷𝑖 = 0, 𝑝(𝑋)] 
 
where 𝑝(𝑋) is the propensity score of the treated and control observations measured using one of 
the four methods already defined. Finally, after that each treated observation 𝑖 is matched with 𝑗 
control observations the 𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 is empirically measured as the following:  
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 =
1
𝑛
∑ [𝑦1𝑖 − ∑ 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑦0𝑗𝑗 ]𝑖∀𝐷𝑖=1         (15) 
 
where 𝑤 are the weights calculated and given to each match (in case of one-to-one nearest neighbor  
(𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1). In case of kernel matching we will use all the 𝑦0 for all of the control observations 
with the corresponding weights (𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗)). It is worth to consider that the average treatment effect 
on treated (𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇) is being measured only for treated observations (𝐷𝑖 = 1).  
 
However, like many other econometric methods, treatment effect measurement using PSM 
binds to some assumptions. The first assumption is the independence of outcomes and treatment. 
For random experiments, the outcomes are assumed to be independent of the treatment (𝑦0, 𝑦1 ⊥
𝐷). This means treatment is not decided based on the outcome we are measuring. For observational 
studies, the outcomes are independent of treatment conditional on 𝑋(𝑦0, 𝑦1 ⊥ 𝐷|𝑋). In the other 
words, the key assumption in PSM is  that treatment is independent of the outcomes conditional 
on 𝑋𝑖 which means unobserved variables do not affect the treatment status: 
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𝐸(𝑌𝑖| 𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑋) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 0, 𝑋)         (16) 
 
This means the treatment variable is exogenous. Matching suits when conditional 
independence assumption holds and the study has a detailed information on the selection process. 
The assumption considers 𝑌 and 𝐷 are stochastically independent conditional on treatment 
decision observables (𝑋).  
 
A weaker assumption than the conditional independence known as unconfoundedness 
assumption assumes the treatment and control group outcome are independent conditional on  𝑋 
(𝑦0 ⊥ 𝐷|𝑋). The identification of the treatment effect is conditioned on unconfoundedness 
assumption according to which the treatment 𝐷𝑖 is independent of the potential outcomes 𝑌0𝑖 and 
𝑌1𝑖, conditional on a set of  variables X.
 79  
The next assumption to be hold in order to carry out the PSM method, is balancing  pre-
treatment variables given the propensity score 𝑝(𝑋) [𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠: 𝐷 ⊥ 𝑋| 𝑝(𝑋)].  If 
E[Di|Xi] is a function of 𝑋𝑖, matching estimator would be the option to measure the effect of the 
treatment. The next computational challenge is how to find good matches for each values of 
covariates vector to form a reliable sample for non-treated. As proved by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), in case conditioning on 𝑋𝑖, eliminates selection bias, thus conditioning on P[Di= 1|Xi] 
would do the same. If balancing hypothesis is satisfied, observations with the same propensity 
scores must have the same distribution of observable (and unobservable) characteristic 
independent of the treatment status. This means for a given propensity score, exposure to treatment 
is random, consequently the treated and control units are on average identical.80 Propensity score 
can be estimated using any standard probability function in Pr{𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖} = 𝜙(ℎ(𝑋𝑖)), where 
𝜙(. ) is the normal (or logistic) cumulative distribution and ℎ(𝑋𝑖) is a function of covariates. ℎ(𝑋𝑖) 
is specified due to satisfying the balancing hypothesis.  
The final main assumption to be noted in treatment effect analysis is the Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin, 1973). It assumes that the outcome of one 
observation (firm in our case) is not affected by treatment assignment to any other observation, i.e. 
                                                          
79 The assumption that probability of being included into the treatment is greater than zero given any set of 
covariates (overlapping): Prob(D=1|X=x) ϵ (0,1) has to hold as well. (This is one of two identification assumptions)  
80 Or the assignment to the treatment is independent of the X characteristics given the same propensity score. 
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the treatment does not indirectly affect the control observation. This assumption holds when the 
spillover is negligible or can be assumed away. Therefore, there is no general equilibrium effect 
which takes into account spillovers effect. The relaxation of this assumption represents one main 
difference between structural models and matching approach.81 
3. Empirical Strategy and models implications  
Previous section has reviewed the models and approaches to measure total factor 
productivity change in terms of efficiency change and technical frontier change, besides 
methodologies to evaluate the impact of subsidies on TFP measures. This section explains the 
empirical implication of these methods. DEA-based Malmquist Index has been used to measure 
the TFP and the decomposed elements for enterprises. DEA as a non-parametric method applies 
data on input(s)/output(s) for homogenous DMUs to measure the relative efficiency measures 
based on the best performers frontiers. The measures of efficiency will be calculated for each 
different sector, which satisfies DEA’s requirement for homogenous process of productions for 
enterprises. One advantage of DEA is taking no pre-assumption on production function while 
measuring relative efficiency of the firms in a specific sector (such as service, construction or IT-
related sectors) in which the production function contains different parameters than manufacturing 
sector. Moreover, DEA does not require price information and only applies the quantities for inputs 
and outputs.  
STATA software is used in order to empirically estimate the Malmquist Productivity Index 
components. Lee et al. (2011) has proposed a user-written command ‘malmq’ in STATA Chicago 
Conference, which enables STATA to estimate productivity using DEA frontier analysis codes 
proposed by Ji and Li (2010). As long as the command and framework is based on simple input or 
output oriented constant return to scale (CRS) DEA, our empirical strategy keeps up with CRS 
DEA model definition.  
 R&D subsidies are allocated mainly to private firms (and not public provincial entities), 
hence, the output (profit) maximization suits better than a cost minimization approach. 
Consequently, the output-orientated CRS DEA (equation 4) is the model applied to measure the 
relative efficiency and the technological frontier.  
                                                          
81 Next chapter relaxes this assumption and estimates a model in which spillover effect is also considered. 
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In order to implement the Malmquist DEA method, input variables (𝑥𝑖) and output 
variables (𝑦𝑟) for all DMU 𝑗 s are determined as the following. Referred to most important 
production factors in economic theory (labour and capital), the model takes number of employees 
(the proxy for labour), moving average of tangible fixed-assets (the proxy for capital stock and 
capital) and intermediate inputs (the proxy for other factors contributing in production), as the 
input variables. Total revenue is the variable taken into account as the proxy for the output. 
Subsequently, The model is applied for three inputs and one output. As a rule of thumb, the number 
of DMUs (𝑛), should be more than three times of the sum of inputs and outputs (𝑡 + 𝑚 = 1 + 3 =
4) to obtain an effective distinguishing power (Cooper et al., 2007). As will be shown in the section 
related to data description, the number of DMUs for each analysed sector or for all pooled DMUs 
is sufficiently more than 12. 
The Data on inputs and output for each firm (DMU)-year observation is extracted from  the 
data on financial statement and balance sheet of private firms (for each single year from 2007-
2014) provided by AIDA82. AIDA is the Bureau van Dijk’s product on company information 
related to Italy which contains firm-level data about one million companies. The data on 
inputs/output variables will be applied in measuring the Malmquist Index over time for consecutive 
years to realize the relative efficiency and technical frontier changes. time period (7 years) to 
extract the data is based on the data availability and the setting for short-run or long-run effects. 
The Malmquist Index generates measures of TFP change and TFP decomposed elements of 
technical frontier change and efficiency change for each year.  
These measures are used as the outcome variables to measure the impact of the public R&D 
subsidies (treatment binary variable). Data on R&D subsides is extracted from APIAE’s dataset 
provided by ISPAT office for the grants allocated to firms at each year from 2001 to 2013. 
Treatment variable is actually the R&D subsidy instalment, province of Trento has allocated to an 
R&D project in a specific year (Between 2001 to 2013). Therefore, the common time interval of 
data availability for both subsidies and TFP measures will be between 2007-2013. This time 
interval can be extended for subsidies left to 2001 and for TFP measures right to 2014.  
In this section as previously discussed, the criteria and the evaluation procedures to allocate 
R&D subsidies are assumed observable. Therefore, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) which 
                                                          
82 Italian company information and business intelligence: In Italian (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende Italiane) 
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controls for observables can be effectively applied. Our data satisfies the PSM requirement for 
good quality data on control variables and binary treatment variable. Nearest-neighbour (one-to-
one neighbour) and Kernel PSM techniques are applied to measure the effect of R&D subsidies 
on TFP change. PSM generates the propensity scores based on the covariates vector or control 
variables 𝑋𝑖 which matches two (or more) observations, balancing the characteristics of the firms. 
𝑋𝑖s are the observable factors influencing the selection procedure. Size, age of the firm and the 
sector are the factors chosen as the controls. Size of the enterprise usually stands as a  main criteria 
in allocating not only R&D subsidies to an entity but also many other types of treatments as noted 
in the literature. The industrial policies pay much attention to the size as one of the main firm’s 
characteristics. The policy makers usually customize the subsidies decision based on the size of 
the enterprise (if the corporation is micro, an SME or a large firm). Referred to the previous section 
related to matching method description, the control variables must demonstrate their pre-treatment 
values as the decision to support an R&D project is simply taken based on the pre-treatment 
characteristics. Therefore, the observable controls are lagged at least one year preceding to the 
subsidy allocation time.  
Table (1) supports the selection of the size as a control independent variable because 
subsidy rates allocated to different types of R&D projects directly depend to the size of the firm. 
Year of foundation (firm age) is another influential factor in decision on allocation of R&D 
subsidies. The age of an R&D doing firm proxies for the experience in carrying out the innovation 
projects. Despite the policy is focused on supporting younger firms to do R&D, age can represent 
the reputation of a firm which can persuade the policy maker to trust a firm’s proposal to carry out 
R&D. Sector or industry in which the firm operates can be another important factor affecting 
evaluation and selection process, as LP 6/99 provokes the province to invest more in IT-related 
industries based on the ICT development horizon emphasized in European Union strategy design 
and the regional priorities. 
Being affected by other firms’ spillover can be captured in efficiency change and/or 
technical frontier change. However, as previously explained the study deals with the direct 
relationship of R&D subsidies on target variables without opening the black box. In empirical 
estimations we assume SUTVA is not violated.83 Furthermore, matching method assumes there 
                                                          
83 This assumption gets relaxed in the next chapter. 
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are no unobservable factor affecting the selection process84. Theoretically,85 the evaluation process 
has clear straightforward criteria to select firms for R&D subsidies, hence we can assume the 
unobservable factors do not significantly influence the selection process. Therefore, the PSM 
matching technique is capable to provide answers to our H.1_H.4. We have to emphasize that 
empirical implementations are discussed more in detail in each section related to the results  
At this point, we have explained the empirical procedures of the current essay to generate 
results for investigation of the research hypotheses. However, before discussion on the results 
relevant data and variables related to the aim of the research will be described and discussed in the 
following section. 
4. Data and variables 
This section reviews the data and variable used to evaluate the effect of R&D subsidies on 
TFP change. In line with the empirical strategy related to the methodologies used for treatment 
effect analysis (previous section), the steps and procedures to frame the final dataset applied to 
estimate the treatment effect are completely explained in Appendix (3.b). Moreover, the primary 
variables and data extracted by this procedure for all the population of active firms in the region 
will be described in appendix (3.c). 
4.1 Data and variables related to public R&D subsidies  
 R&D subsidies data relates to APIAE’s dataset for the grants allocated to firms at each 
year from 2001 to 2013. This dataset is provided by ISPAT office. There are in total 600 
observations (grant allocations) for each firm(project)-year. As long as the analysis is at 
firm(project)-year level, similar firm being granted in two or more years, is considered as a 
different observation. The original dataset consists of the unique fiscal code of the enterprise86, 
application code, application date, grant installment date, installment code, type of the project, 
total planned expenditure of the project, total evaluated expenditure of the project,  evaluation 
                                                          
84 A method to relax this assumption is conditional difference-in-difference (CDID) discussed in first chapter (See 
Smith and Todd (2005)). 
85 This might not hold in practice, as there are possibilities for unobservable factors influencing the R&D subsidies 
allocation. 
86 Codice Fiscale (In Italian) 
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method of subsidy allocation, the contribution to the project, size of the subsidized firm and  
geographical place in the region.  
Figure (3) illustrates the frequency of the grants allocated to firms for R&D projects at each 
year for the period 2001-2013. The first only one installment happens in 2001, while in 2002  there 
are just three installments in total as well. The number of subsidies experiences two consecutive 
highly increase in 2003 and then in 2004, to 18 and 38 subsidies, respectively. The number of 
subsidies remains around 40 in the next four years except for 2006 which decreases to 24 supported 
projects. Number of subsidies grows rapidly in 2009, 2010 and 2011 reaching to 89 subsidy 
allocations. Year 2012 represents the highest number of subsidy assignments (153 subsidies) 
demonstrating a 71% growth in subsidies frequency in comparison with the previous year. Year 
2013 shows a really low amount of subsidies with 40 installments because the data on all the 
installments have not been completely reported87.  
 
  
Figure 3. Number of subsidies allocated to projects each year (2001-2013) 
In the following, table (2) illustrates some statistics about the total amount of planned R&D 
expenditure, actual R&D expenditure and the public contribution to the projects. The amount for 
estimated accepted actual R&D expenditures are slightly lower than the total planned expenditures. 
                                                          
87 The last registered installment in 2013 dates back to July 2013.  
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The former represents the amount which public agency expects to occur, while the latter is the 
amount which private enterprises have planned and claimed to spend on R&D. This shows that 
public agency has modified the planned expenditure after reviewing the projects. The standard 
deviation shows the amount of R&D private expenditure and R&D subsidies can differ largely 
between various projects.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for R&D expenditures (Investment by firms and public subsidies) 
R&D Expenditure Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Total Planned 1,210,163.59 1,662,327.60 36,744.33 16,260,000.00 
Actual Accepted Amount 1,049,607.50 1,507,223.33 0.00 16,210,000.00 
Public Contribution 583,025.06 966,564.26 0.00 12,035,000.00 
 
Source: Elaboration on APIAE data (All numbers are in Euro €) 
The applications for subsidies are screened by different evaluation procedures known as 
automatic, evaluative and negotiation procedures. These procedures themselves consist of other 
categories. Table (3) shows the distribution of these three general types of evaluation procedures 
together with the procedures each type includes. 
4.2 Data and variables related to outcome TFP measures and firms’ characteristics for 
subsidized and non-subsidized firms 
The data on entities in the province comes from Aida88 dataset which is the Bureau van 
Dijk’s product on company information for Italy. Aida covers firm-level data about one million 
companies. In this study, the basic primary dataset extracted from the Aida database includes 
information for 5,506 enterprises operating in Trento province for 7 years from 2007 to 2014. This 
shapes a balanced dataset with 44,048 observations at firm-year level. Not surprisingly, the dataset 
contains missing values for different variables in which we are interested to carry out our analysis. 
However, it will be polished and cleaned before running the related analysis. As mentioned, the 
whole procedure aiming to the construction the final dataset to estimate the treatment effect is 
provided in appendix(3.b). In the following, table (4) reviews the variables used in order to 
                                                          
88 Italian company information and business intelligence: In Italian (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende Italiane) 
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measure the Malmquist TFP change measures and some extra variables of interest related to the 
our sample of the firms. Our sample as discussed in the appendix, relates to the firms in industries 
in which grant allocation happens at least once in the period of analysis. At the same time, these 
are the firms which the data used to measure TFP measures have been provided for seven 
consecutive years. All non-subsidized firms are the firms which have the capability to ask for R&D 
subsidies and in general those who can do R&D. Referred to section 1.3, all the firms operating in 
the province of Trento are eligible to apply for the subsidies by submission of a project to the 
province. 
 
Table 3. The number of subsidy allocations based on the evaluation method by the public agency 
Type of Evaluation Categories Number of subsidies assigned 
by each evaluation type 
 
Share of total subsidies 
Automatic AUTOMATICA 
BANDO 1/2008 – RIC 
BANDO 5/2009 – RIC 
BANDO 6/2009 – RIC 
BANDO 2/2010 – RIC 
BANDO 2/2011 – RIC 
Total 
127  
44  
32  
22  
37  
15  
277 46% 
Evaluative VALUTATIVA 
RICERC VALUTATIVA 
VALUTATIVA CONGIUNTA 
VALUTATIVA con DEROGA 
Total 
284  
3  
8  
16  
301 50% 
Negotiation NEGOZIALE 
NEGOZIALE CONGIUNTA 
Total 
7  
5  
12 4% 
All Methods Total 600 !00% 
 
Source: Elaboration on APIAE Data  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables used in Malmquist DEA model and other variables of 
interest  
 Subsidized Non-Subsidized 
Variable Mean/Median Std. Dev. Min Max Mean/Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of 
Employees 
149 212.25 3 1212 46 131.4297 1 5342 
Intermediate 
Inputs* 
39338.6 96294.28 77.847 496991.9 12222.58 35752.13 7.068 556953.3 
Average Fixed 
Asset 
8272.05 10841.07 0.5405 47429.5 5434.08 45086.81 0.27 1110105 
Revenue 
(Sales) 
49369.01 110535.7 106.346 598582.7 15124.14 41271.55 2.041 676495.2 
Age 23.90 15.76 2 64 31.7514 31.19961 1 208 
Number of 
Recorded 
Subsidiaries 
5 6.090486 0 19 2 3.14425 0 31 
Number of 
Companies in 
Corporate 
Group 
15 42.10086 0 352 18 117.6021 0 1486 
Number of 
Directors 
9 7.686614 1 39 7 6.615148 1 40 
Total Assets·͌ 46000.51 70968.38 111.322 324900.5 16261.41 62517.23 42.827 1388085 
Total Inventory͌ 8164.2 20499.06 0 153852 2634.295 7077.453  137995 
R&D** 
Expenditure͌ 
427.2358 1053.635 0 4734.744 28.0895 244.7339 0 6343.516 
Expected R&D 
Spending͌ 
1303673 1430202 0 6398674 _ _ _ _ 
Total Subsidies͌ 624093.5 717576.5 0 3000000 
 
0 0 0 0 
Observation 
Freq. 
111 4040*** 
* The intermediate inputs includes the raw material and the service applied for production. 
** Because of lack of precision and not available data for R&D spending, the R&D Expenditures is summarized for 85 treated 
and 2.600 non-treated enterprises. ***Data is summarized for years 2008 to 2014.  ͌ amounts are in thousands Euros € 
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The grants can be applied at any time and there is no deadline to submit a project. However, 
the projects are evaluated by time order they have been submitted. Moreover, it is worth to restate 
that in this chapter the fixed R&D cost is assumed to be zero. All this lead to forming our control 
group. Surprisingly, the average larger firms have received subsidies more frequently for the period 
between 2008 to 2013. However, as expected younger firms has higher rate for subsidies 
contributed (with respect to the amount of the project).  
The dataset of total 4,151 firm-year observations (balanced dataset of 593 firms for 7 
years), contains 4040 non-subsidized and 111 subsidized observations (table (4)). Based on the 
input and output indices, TFP measure is calculated using Malmquist DEA method (Equation 5) 
explained in previous section. Table (5) categorizes these total 4,151 firm-year observations (593 
firms) into subsidized and non-subsidized firms based on the industry sector. In order to classify 
firms in different sectors, we have elaborated to change ateco 2007 economic activity 6-digit 
industry codes into main sectors of activity. As long as ateco 2007 codes based on first digits 
overlap across different sectors, the process related to this transformation is explained in appendix 
(3.d) 
Table 5. The frequency of observations (all, subsidized and non-subsidized) based on industry 
Sector Total Observations No. of Firms Subsidized Obs. Non-subsidized 
Obs. 
MANUFACTURING 1316 188 71 1245 
CONSTRUCTION 700 100 5 695 
WHOLESALE AND 
RETAIL TRADE; 
REPAIR OF 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
AND 
MOTORCYCLES 
1428 204 3 1425 
INFORMATION 
AND 
COMMUNICATION 
364 52 23 341 
PROFESSIONAL, 
SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNICAL 
ACTIVITY 
343 49 9 334 
TOTAL 4151 593 111 4040 
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As previously pointed out, one input applied in calculating the TFP measures, is moving 
average fixed asset as a proxy for capital. In order to measure the input for year 2007, we need the 
data on fixed asset for year 2006 not available in our original dataset. Therefore, we cannot 
measure this input index and consequently Malmquist TFP measures for year 2008. Table (6) 
describes the TFP change and TFP components over the time. This is the reason we see lower 
number of observations in table (6) in comparison with table (5) i.e. the subtraction of 593 
observations from total 4,151 observations which equals 3457 (593 firms for 6 consecutive years). 
Obviously, there are 10 R&D subsidies allocation related to year 2008, which makes the total 
number of treatments 101 (10 less than 111 total allocations). However, we can still take into 
account the treatments occurred in 2008 in effect evaluation as long as there is a minimum lag of 
one year between the time treatment and the outcome are measures.  
The measurement of the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP measures is estimated by comparison 
the outcome variables of treated and non-treated firms within each industry. In other words, we 
match the treated firms and control firms within each industry or inside sectors with similar 
technological intensity. Therefore, the TFP measures are statistically described in table (7) for 
industries which we carry out the treatment effect analysis (The five industries in which at least 
one subsidy allocation occurs).  
The highest subsidies assignment frequencies belong to manufacturing and information 
technology (IT) industries with 65 and 21 treatments, respectively. Manufacturing sector, 
construction sector and wholesale and retail (repair of motor and motor cycles) sector are assumed  
as medium and low technological industries, while IT and professional scientific and technical 
activity sectors are considered as high technological sectors. The subsidies frequencies in low-
medium technologies count up to 72, while the frequency is 32 treatments for high technology 
sector. 
Size is one important main factor, both in the theoretical background regarded the relationship 
between R&D activities and TFP growth and in empirical aspect regarded to the allocation of 
subsidies to R&D projects. Table (8) compares the treated and non-treated TFP outcome measures 
for firms based on different number of employees (if the firm is small medium sized (SME) or 
large) for the sample. The number of larger firms is not surprisingly lower than SMEs (23 vs. 570 
firms).
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics of outcome TFP measures for subsidized and non-subsidized 
enterprises for each year 
 Treated (Subsidized) Non-treated (Control) Total 
Obs.  
Year tfpch† effch†† techch††† Freq. Tfpch effch Techch Freq. Freq. 
2009 0.94* 
(0.27)** 
1.28 
(0.44) 
0.77 
(0.18) 
11 1.44 
(8.86) 
1.37 
(5.33) 
0.96 
(0.24) 
582 593 
2010 1.05 
(0.22) 
0.91 
(0.35) 
1.29 
(0.46) 
19 1.07 
(0.96) 
1.17 
(1.55) 
1.03 
(0.37) 
574 593 
2011 1.09 
(0.35) 
1.10 
(0.34) 
1.02 
(0.18) 
22 1.08 
(0.93) 
1.07 
(0.90) 
1.03 
(0.23) 
571 593 
2012 1.04 
(0.33) 
0.88 
(0.32) 
1.22 
(0.22) 
39 1.26 
(5.31) 
1.19 
(5.06) 
1.10 
(0.21) 
554 593 
2013 1.03 
(0.11) 
1.15 
(0.22) 
0.92 
(0.15) 
10 1.10 
(1.13) 
1.06 
(0.84) 
1.06 
(0.27) 
583 593 
2014 _*** _ _ _ 1.10 
(1.16) 
1.05 
(0.83) 
1.05 
(0.19) 
593 593 
Total 1.04 
(0.29) 
1.00 
(0.36) 
 
1.11 
(0.31) 
101Δ 1.017 
(4.29) 
1.15 
(3.11) 
1.04 
(0.26) 
3,457Δ 3,558 
† Total factor productivity (TFP) change †† Efficiency change ††† Technological change 
* The intermediate inputs includes the raw material and the service applied for production. 
** Because of lack of precision and not available data for R&D spending, the R&D Expenditures is summarized for 85 treated and 
2.600 non-treated enterprises.     ***Data is summarized for years 2008 to 2014. 
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 Table 7. Descriptive statistics of outcome TFP measures for subsidized and non-subsidized 
enterprises based on sector of activity (according to ATECO 2007 classification: See Appendix 
3.d)  
Industry Subsidized Control 
Tfpch Effch Techch Freq. Tfpch Effch Techch Freq. 
MANUFACTURING 
 
1.044 
(0.305) 
1.004 
(0.378) 
1.133 
(0.335) 
65 1.012 
(0.243) 
1.047 
(0.343) 
1.033 
(0.294) 
1063 
CONSTRUCTION 
 
1.214 
(0.395) 
1.287 
(0.651) 
1.004 
(0.166) 
4 1.565 
(5.493) 
1.541 
(5.279) 
1.112 
(0.402) 
596 
WHOLESALE AND 
RETAIL TRADE; 
REPAIR OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES AND 
MOTORCYCLES 
 
1.013 
(0.0522) 
1.029 
(0.100) 
0.987 
(0.059) 
3 1.007 
(0.106) 
1.00 
(0.118) 
1.008 
(0.071) 
1221 
INFORMATION 
AND 
COMMUNICATION 
0.988 
(0.268) 
0.962 
(0.288) 
1.034 
(0.104) 
21 1.033 
(0.282) 
1.012 
(0.269) 
1.027 
(0.123) 
291 
PROFESSIONAL, 
SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNICAL 
ACTIVITY 
1.098 
(0.259) 
0.975 
(0.273) 
1.239 
(0.523) 
8 1.828 
(12.636) 
1.527 
(7.614) 
1.060 
(0.320) 
286 
TOTAL 1.043 
(0.292) 
1.005 
(0.360) 
1.111 
(0.313) 
101 1.175 
(4.298) 
1.153 
(3.111) 
1.040 
(0.259) 
3457 
† Total factor productivity (TFP) change  †† Efficiency change   ††† Technological change 
 
SMEs show a higher frequency in receiving R&D grants in comparison with their larger 
counterparts in the sample. This is not in contrary to table (4) in which the mean of number of 
employees was smaller for subsidized firms with respect to non-subsidized, as long as the means 
there are still lower than the maximum limit of number of employees for being an SME (250 
employees). 
At this point and after descriptive analysis, the estimation of the effect of R&D subsidies on 
TFP measures will be implemented for different diverse possible settings. However, the next 
section focuses only on the main part of our results.  
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics of outcome TFP measures for subsidized and non-subsidized 
enterprises based on the size (SME or Large firm) 
 Subsidized    Non-
Subsidized 
   Total 
Obs. 
No. 
of 
firm 
Size Tfpch† Effch†† Techch††† Freq. Tfpch effch Techch Freq. Freq. Freq. 
SME 1.049 
(0.320) 
1.007 
(0.363) 
1.108 
(0.305) 
82 1.180 
(4.373) 
1.157 
(3.165) 
1.040 
(0.261) 
3338 3420 570 
Large 1.015 
(0.116) 
0.995 
(0.358) 
1.125 
(0.355) 
19 1.035 
(0.249) 
1.042 
(0.255) 
1.022 
(0.205) 
119 138 23 
† Total factor productivity (TFP) change †† Efficiency change ††† Technological change 
 
5. Empirical Analysis and Results 
The previous sections discussed the methodologies and data and variables used by them to 
generate TFP change and its components of efficiency change and technological (technical 
frontier) change in the first step and to measure the impact of R&D subsidies allocation on TFP 
measures as the targeted outcome in the second step. In order to evaluate the effect of subsidies, 
we use propensity score matching (PSM) explained in section 2.2. As discussed in empirical 
strategy section, the PSM in order to estimate the treatment effect on outcome, matches subsidized 
firms with control non-subsidized enterprises which are the most similar based on observable 
characteristics. These characteristics are variables which influence the selection process and the 
outcome. However, this may lead to a bias in capturing the estimated effect. PSM method reduces 
the bias by conditioning the probability of being subsidized on observables. 
In this study, PSM will be carried out for different settings. The effect evaluation is 
implemented for two main industries (manufacturing and IT) in which the frequency of R&D 
subsidies allocation is much higher in comparison with other industries (table (7)). Moreover, the 
technique will be run for two different groups of sectors based on technological intensity (low-
medium tech and high-tech sectors). Finally, the matching process will be executed based on the 
subsidization evaluation methods. Moreover, the effect is measured for the whole observations in 
all five industries with at least one treatment occurrence.  
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In order to proceed the measurement of the effect, balancing property must be satisfied 
before matching the subsidized with control for all estimations. This results in generation of 
propensity scores for each unit to be used for matching procedure. Hence, balancing property 
satisfaction is investigated for each of the analysis setting and propensity score graphs for 
subsidized and control units are generated as well. Propensity scores in each analysis setting will 
be recorded to be used in the propensity score matching. After all, average treatment effect on the 
population (ATE) and average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) are measured using nearest 
neighbor and kernel matching techniques. Standard errors are further reported in all estimations. 
After treatment effect measurement, the balancing of propensity scores for treated and untreated 
based on each observable covariate will be shown as well.  
The outcome dependent variables are total factor productivity change (tfpch), and the 
decomposed elements of TFP; efficiency change (effch) and technological change (techch). The 
observable independent variables discussed previously, are pre-treatment size and pre-treatment 
age of the firms. Industry effect is controlled while measuring the effect through each sector or 
sector classifications.  
Although measuring and reporting all the impact measures will be a long process, we report 
all effect measures and it is just one table in which the significant effects are reported. Moreover, 
balancing properties satisfaction and propensity score (box and kernel density) graphs and 
summaries will be mainly described in the related appendices (3.e through 3.j) except for some 
cases which are mentioned in the main text for exemplification of the results. The impact of R&D 
subsidies on TFP measures (Malmquist DEA productivity indices) is evaluated using PSM method 
applying the balanced panel datasets in user-written algorithm in STATA. New version of 
STATA14 suggests commands to run matching process including PSM method. 89 The PSM 
procedure proposed by Becker and Ichino (2002) and the propensity score graphs by Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003) are applied as well.  
 
 
                                                          
89 Codes and .do files scripted to construct panel dataset and datasets used can be provided abiding to privacy issues. 
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5.1 R&D subsidies impact evaluation based on industry (manufacturing and ICT 
sectors): PSM method 
This section estimates the average treatment effect of public R&D subsidies on outcome TFP 
measures for the whole population (Average treatment effect: ATE) and for subsidized units 
(Average treatment effect on treated: ATET) in manufacturing and ICT sectors. In order to 
estimate the effect of R&D subsidies, treatment effect analysis using propensity score matching 
method based on Abadie & Imbens (2006, 2012), including nearest neighbor (NN) and kernel 
estimators will be implemented.90 It is assumed that matches for each treated unit is searched 
within controls in the same sector. 
However, before estimating the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP change, balancing property 
satisfaction and propensity scores are checked and generated for each industry. The balancing 
property is checked for all five industries with at least one treatment. The balancing is satisfied for 
two main sectors of manufacturing and ICT within which treatment effect analysis is carried out. 
The property is not satisfied for construction and wholesale retail, while it holds for scientific and 
technical activity sector. The detailed procedures of testing balancing property can be found in 
appendices (3.e and 3.f). Moreover, the propensity graphs for manufacturing and ICT are also 
illustrated (appendix 3.g). The following table (9) shows the average of propensity scores for each 
sector which at least one grant allocation happens after balancing property satisfaction is 
investigated. As long as balancing  of observations for treated and untreated takes pre-treatment 
observables, year 2008 is excluded and the number of subsidized and non-subsidized observations 
include the observations after 2008.  
In table (9), not surprisingly, the average probability of receiving a grant is higher for 
subsidized firms in comparison to control units in all industries. As long as the number of R&D 
subsidies are scant in three out of five sectors, to increase the estimation precision and 
effectiveness, treatment effect evaluation is carried out first for two main industries (manufacturing 
and ICT) with the highest frequencies of subsidies assignments and second for groups of industries 
shaping low-medium tech and high tech industries.  
                                                          
90 teffects psmatch (PSM treatment effect estimator), attnd (Nearest neighbor (one-to-one) estimator) and attk 
(Kernel estimator) are all used for our analysis to check for robustness.  
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Table 9. descriptive statistics for propensity scores by sector of activity 
 
 
INDUSTRIES 
Subsidized  
Freq. 
Control  
Freq. Pscore Pscore 
     
L
o
w
-m
ed
iu
m
 T
ec
h
 I
n
d
u
st
ri
es
 
MANUFACTURING 
 
0.087* 
(0.092)** 
65 0.0554 
(0.042) 
1063 
CONSTRUCTION 
 
0.0078  
(0.0005) 
4 0.006 
(0.005) 
596 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL 
TRADE; REPAIR OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES AND 
MOTORCYCLES 
 
 
0.002 
(0.0003) 
3  
0.002 
(0.001) 
1221 
    
H
ig
h
 T
ec
h
 
In
d
u
st
ri
es
 
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
(0.147) 
(0.183) 
21 0.060 
(0.056) 
291 
PROFESSIONAL, 
SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNICAL ACTIVITY 
0.029 
(0.006) 
8 0.027 
(0.007) 
286 
 TOTAL 0.041 
(0.031) 
101 0.027 
(0.022) 
3457 
 * mean **median 
 
5.1.1 Manufacturing sector: balancing property and propensity scores 
The balancing property is satisfied for manufacturing sector (appendix 3.e). The propensity scores 
are generated as well. The mean for propensity scores is 0.087 for 65 treated units and 0.055 for 
1063 controls. The standard deviations are 0.092 and 0.042 respectively. Expectedly, the average 
probability of being subsidized is higher for treated than control units. Moreover, The propensity 
score graphs for treated and non-treated can be illustrated relaxing or considering common support 
option. Figures (4) and (5) illustrate the propensity score graphs for the former and the latter cases, 
respectively. The figures can be depicted using other settings for the bin and interval used for 
propensity score (appendix 3.g). 
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Figure 4. propensity score distribution for treated and untreated in manufacturing sector  
 
Figure 5. propensity score distribution for treated and untreated in manufacturing sector 
considering common support option91  
                                                          
91 psgraph, bin(100) treated(treatment) support(comsup) pscore( myscore_manufacturing) 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated: Off support Untreated: On support
Treated
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5.1.2 ICT sector: balancing property and propensity scores 
The balancing property is satisfied for ICT sector (appendix 3.f). The propensity scores are 
generated as well. The mean for propensity scores is 0.147 for 21 treated units and 0.060 for 291 
controls. The standard deviations are 0.183 and 0.056 respectively. Expectedly, the average 
probability of being subsidized is higher for treated than control units. Moreover, The propensity 
score graphs for treated and non-treated can be illustrated relaxing or considering common support 
option. Figures (6) and (7) illustrate the propensity score graphs for the former and the latter cases, 
respectively. The figures can be depicted using other settings for the bin and interval used for 
propensity score (appendix 3.g).  
5.1.3 The effect of R&D subsidies on TFP outcome measures: Manufacturing and ICT sectors 
Table (10) shows the ATET and ATE related to the effect of R&D subsidies on targeted 
outcome variables measured by treatment effect PSM method (default nearest neighbor), nearest 
neighbor estimator (made by attnd command only for ATET and kernel estimator). Outcome 
variables consist of total factor productivity change and two decomposed measures of efficiency 
change and technological (technical frontier) change between two points in time (two consecutive 
years) measured for manufacturing and ICT sectors. The significant coefficients are shown bold 
and the number of treated observations versus control observations are reported. 
During the process of measuring treatment effects, the subsidized and control units are 
getting matched based on their propensity scores generated by balancing on observable factors. 
Therefore, after average treatment effect measures are produced, it is possible to check the 
summary of balancing propensity scores and balancing graphs on observables. In the following 
and before discussing the results, some treatment effect balancing summary and graphs are 
displayed for specific treatment effect on outcomes.92 For instance, using PSM technique (teffects   
                                                          
92 There are 3 outcome measures being used by 5 different estimators for 5 consecutive years within two main 
industries, hence, 150 effect measures are possible. As long as balancing check can be carried out after each 
treatment effect measurement, we only choose the effect of treatment for some cases with a specific outcome for 
a specific year-lag using a specific method within a specific industry. 
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Figure 6. propensity score distribution for treated and untreated in ICT sector93 
 
Figure 7.  propensity score distribution for treated and untreated in ICT sector considering 
common support option
                                                          
93 psgraph, bin(100) treated(treatment) pscore( pscores2_ICT) 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated: Off support Untreated: On support
Treated
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Table 10. Results for Average treatment effect on treated (ATET) and average treatment effect on the population (ATE) 
(a) Results for average effect of R&D subsidies on TFP change for subsidized firms (Average treatment effect: ATET): Manufacturing and ICT 
sectors  
Manufacturing 
 TFPCHΔ EFFCHΔΔ TECHCHΔΔΔ 
PSM: 
ATET† 
NN 
ATET†† 
(method 1) 
NN 
ATET††† 
(method 2) 
Kernel: 
ATET†††† 
PSM: 
ATET 
NN 
ATET 
(method 1) 
NN 
ATET 
(method 2) 
Kernel: 
ATET 
PSM: 
ATET 
NN 
ATET 
(method 1) 
NN 
ATET 
(method 2) 
Kernel: 
ATET 
1-year lag 0.022 
(0.037) 
-0.032 
(0.036) 
0.001 
(0.042) 
-0.009 
(0.035)▼ 
0.078 
(0.049) 
0.068 
(0.054) 
0.040 
(0.067) 
0.024 
(0.046) 
-0.048 
(0.049) 
-0.103** 
(0.054) 
-0.027 
(0.039) 
-0.027 
(0.043) 
Treated/Control˄˄ 65/940 65/940 71/241 71/1245 65/940 65/940 71/241 71/1245 65/940 65/940 71/241 71/1245 
2-year lag 0.051* 
(0.032) 
0.023 
(0.070) 
0.025 
(0.050) 
0.009 
(0.035) 
0.039 
(0.046) 
-0.054 
(0.069) 
0.040 
(0.067) 
-0.024 
(0.039) 
0.005 
(0.049) 
0.083 
(0.063) 
0.030 
(0.064) 
0.033 
(0.036) 
Treated/Control 59/752 59/752 71/225 71/1245 59/752 59/752 71/225 71/1245 59/753 59/752 71/225 71/1245 
3-year lag -0.009 
(0.038) 
-0.045 
(0.074) 
-0.042 
(0.042) 
-0.008 
(0.033) 
0.032 
(0.053) 
0.006 
(0.074) 
-0.087 
(0.053) 
-0.014 
(0.041) 
-0.055 
(0.055) 
-0.055 
(0.076) 
0.019 
(0.045)) 
0.000 
(0.041) 
Treated/Control 36/564 36/564 71/217 71/1245 36/564 36/564 71/217 71/1245 36/564 36/564 71/217 71/1245 
4-year lag 0.018 
(0.043) 
0.012 
(0.037) 
0.033 
(0.044) 
0.010 
(0.034) 
-0.044 
(0.068) 
-0.100 
(0.065) 
0.047 
(0.043) 
-0.020 
(0.042) 
0.028 
(0.059) 
0.080 
(0.061) 
-0.049 
(0.041) 
0.014 
(0.030) 
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Treated/Control 23/376 23/376 71/202 71/1245 23/376 23/376 71/202 71/1245 23/376 23/376 71/202 71/1245 
5-year lag 0.028 
(0.062) 
0.075 
(0.073) 
0.046 
(0.040) 
0.052 
(0.080) 
0.031 
(0.069) 
0.088* 
(0.047) 
-0.022 
(0.053) 
0.056 
(0.045) 
-0.018 
(0.072) 
-0.044 
(0.069) 
0.042 
(0.040) 
-0.017 
(0.058) 
Treated/Control 9/188 9/188 71/191 71/1245 9/188 9/188 71/191 71/1245 9/188 9/188 71/191 71/1245 
ICT 
 TFPCHΔ EFFCHΔΔ TECHCHΔΔΔ 
PSM: 
ATET 
NN 
ATET 
(method 1) 
NN 
ATET 
(method 2) 
Kernel: 
ATET 
PSM: 
ATET 
NN 
ATET 
(method 1) 
NN 
ATET 
(method 2) 
Kernel: 
ATET 
PSM: 
ATET 
NN 
ATET 
(method 1) 
NN 
ATET 
(method 2) 
Kernel: 
ATET 
1-year lag -0.059 
(0.079) 
0.038 
(0.054) 
-0.013 
(0.085) 
-0.008 
(0.044) 
-0.064 
(0.097) 
0.026 
(0.059) 
0.015 
(0.088) 
-0.009 
(0.053) 
0.006 
(0.035) 
0.016 
(0.026) 
-0.022 
(0.046) 
0.008 
(0.026) 
Treated/Control 21/260 21/260 23/66 23/341 21/260 21/260 23/66 23/341 21/260 21/260 23/66 23/341 
2-year lag 0.120 
(0.090) 
0.049 
(0.071) 
0.075 
(0.074) 
0.031 
(0.069) 
0.139 
(0.110) 
0.058 
(0.082) 
0.073 
(0.087) 
0.054 
(0.081) 
-0.018 
(0.046) 
0.000 
(0.037) 
0.012 
(0.032) 
-0.011 
(0.034) 
Treated/Control 19/208 19/208 23/66 23/341 19/208 19/208 23/66 23/341 19/208 19/208 23/66 23/341 
3-year lag 0.042 
(0.107) 
0.121 
(0.130) 
0.128* 
(0.083) 
0.059 
(0.129) 
0.103 
(0.131) 
0.126 
(0.164) 
0.136 
(0.107) 
0.105 
(0.143) 
-0.034 
(0.046) 
0.015 
(0.057) 
0.007 
(0.035) 
-0.021 
(0.042) 
Treated/Control 9/156 9/156 23/66 23/341 9/156 9/156 23/66 23/341 9/156 9/156 23/66 23/341 
4-year lag 0.176 0.179 0.069 0.107 0.121 0.149 0.112 0.144 0.095 0.0670* -0.017 0.002** 
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(0.157) (0.220) (0.126) (0.019) (0.213) (0.226) (0.143) (0.258) (0.058) (0.037) (0.038) (0.063) 
Treated/Control 9/156 9/156 23/62 23/341 9/156 9/156 23/62 23/341 9/156 9/156 23/62 23/341 
5-year lag __▼▼ __ 0.470*** 
(0.154) 
0.410* 
(0.292) 
__ __ 0.577*** 
(0.192) 
0.544 
(0.471) 
__ __ -0.030 
(0.039) 
-0.056 
(0.062) 
Treated/Control 2/104 2/104 23/59 23/341 2/104 2/104 23/59 23/341 2/104 2/104 23/59 23/341 
 
(b) Results for average effect of subsidies on TFP change for all the firms (Average treatment effect: ATE): Manufacturing and ICT sectors 
Manufacturing  
 TFPCHΔ EFFCHΔΔ TECHCHΔΔΔ 
PSM: 
ATE† 
NN: 
ATE†† 
PSM: 
ATE 
NN: 
ATE 
PSM: 
ATE 
NN: 
ATE 
1-year lag -0.0266 
(0.032) 
-0.039 
(0.051) 
-0.0126 
(0.048) 
0.008 
(0.059) 
-0.011* 
(0.053) 
-0.047 
(0.055) 
Treated/Control 65/940 71/241˄˄ 65/940 71/241 65/940 71/241 
2-year lag 0.000 
(0.019) 
-0.039 
(0.051) 
-0.013 
(0.046) 
0.008 
(0.059) 
-0.014 
(0.049) 
-0.047 
(0.055) 
Treated/Control 59/752 71/225 59/752 71/225 59/752 71/225 
3-year lag -0.050* 
(0.028) 
-0.027 
(0.034) 
-0.022 
(0.043) 
-0.006 
(0.054) 
-0.041 
(0.38) 
-0.042 
(0.059) 
Treated/Control 36/564 71/217 36/564 71/217 36/564 71/217 
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4-year lag 0.004 
(0.038) 
0.000 
(0.034) 
-0.011 
(0.48) 
-0.037 
(0.041) 
-0.010 
(0.024) 
0.009 
(0.029) 
Treated/Control 23/376 71/202 23/376 71/202 23/376 71/202 
5-year lag 0.107 
(0.076) 
0.028 
(0.042) 
0.132** 
(0.066) 
0.087** 
(0.041) 
-0.056** 
(0.027) 
-0.076** 
(0.030) 
Treated/Control 9/188 71/191 9/188 71/191 9/188 71/191 
 
ICT 
 TFPCHΔ EFFCHΔΔ TECHCHΔΔΔ 
PSM: 
ATE 
NN: 
ATE 
PSM: 
ATE 
NN: 
ATE 
PSM: 
ATE 
NN: 
ATE 
1-year lag -0.0491 
(0.074) 
-0.006 
(0.055) 
-0.046 
(0.68) 
-0.016 
(0.057) 
0.0027 
(0.013) 
0.018 
(0.020) 
Treated/Control 21/260 21/260 21/260 21/260 21/260 21/260 
2-year lag 0.104 
(0.087) 
0.109 
(0.120) 
0.116 
(0.096) 
0.108 
(0.159) 
-0.005 
(0.35) 
0.004 
(0.031) 
Treated/Control 19/208 19/208 19/208 19/208 19/208 19/208 
3-year lag 0.068 
(0.10) 
0.142 
(0.203) 
0.162 
(0.15) 
0.225 
(0.276) 
-0.085** 
(0.36) 
-0.075 
(0.058) 
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Treated/Control 9/156 9/156 9/156 9/156 9/156 9/156 
4-year lag 0.157 
(0.46) 
0.346 
(0.254) 
0.219 
(0.63) 
0.477 
(0.355) 
-0.024 
(0.092) 
-0.063 
(0.068) 
Treated/Control 5/104 5/104 5/104 5/104 5/104 5/104 
5-year lag __ __ __ __ __ __ 
Treated/Control       
 
Δ TFPCH: TFP Change   † [Command: teffects psmatch (outcome  observables) (treatment)], The default setting is nearest neighbor (NN) estimator. 
ΔΔ EFFCH: Efficiency Change  †† NN Method 1: [Command: teffects nnmatch (outcome  observables) (treatment)]. 
ΔΔΔ TECHCH: Technological Change  ††† NN Method 2: ATET NN with attnd command: Nearest neighbor matching estimator (random draw version). 
* %90 level of confidence    †††† Kernel estimator (Epanechnikov): Default bandwidth(0.6). Standard errors are generated using bootstrap. 
** %95 level of confidence   †, ††&††† All  methods apply the same nearest neighbor estimators but with different algorithms in STATA. 
*** %99 level of confidence   ▼ Analytical standard errors cannot be computed. Bootstrapped standard errors are generated. 
˄˄ The number of treated and controls in (NN (att) and kernel (attk) ) refer to the actual number of nearest neighbor and kernel matches regardless of the missing values generated. 
This is the reason why we observe different number of treated and controls with respect to the other command of PSM treatment effect (teffect). For instance, the actual number is 
71, while there are 6 missing values generated after running the command, hence, making the treated the same 65 observations. The same holds for all the different numbers. The 
standard errors in NN (att command) are the analytical, while for Kernel the standard errors are corrected by bootstrap. 
▼▼ Not sufficient  number of nearest-neighbor matches for observation. Therefore, the analysis cannot be carried out.
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psmatch), the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP change ( tfpch_lagged3 ) in manufacturing sector 
and after 3 years (3-year lag) is measured significantly negative (-0.050). The balancing process 
on observables (size and age) for treated and controls can be shown after treatment effect analysis 
as well after each effect measurement. In the following figures (Fig. (8)_Fig (11)), some examples 
of balancing based on basic covariates have been illustrated.94 Some other balancing illustrations 
beside summarization of the effect measurement mainly for significant effects are displayed in 
appendix (3.h ). The results will be explained in the section related to discussion. 
  
 
Figure 8. Balancing box-plot graphs for size variable after treatment effect measurement  
                                                          
94 Command: tebalance [box or density]  
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Figure 9. Balancing kernel density graphs for size variable after treatment effect measurement  
 
Figure 10.  Balancing box-plot graphs for age variable after treatment effect measurement 
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Figure 11. Balancing kernel density graphs for age variable after treatment effect measurement 
5.1.4 R&D subsidies effect on TFP measures : Low-medium and high-tech industries 
In previous section we have focused on two main industries in which R&D subsidies 
possess the highest frequencies significantly different with other sectors. The treatments are not 
sufficiently high in other sectors to measure the effect individually for them. At the same time as 
shown in appendix(3.i), the balancing property for two other sectors is not satisfied.  
On the other hand, as stated in the literature review and consequently research hypotheses 
sections, industry dynamics may certainly influence the channels which lead the effect of the 
subsidies on outcome measures. Almost all evaluation studies have considered the effect of 
industries on the impact of subsidies on targeted variables, either by taking into account the 
industry factor as a control variable (Wallsten, 1999; Busom, 1999; Lerner, 1999; Lach, 2002; 
González, Jaumandreu, & Pazo, 2005; Clausen, 2009; Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Bronzini & Iachini, 
2014; Bronzini & Piselli, 2016) or by direct execution of the impact evaluation for particular 
industries (Klette, Møen & Griliches, 2000; Heshmati & Lööf, 2005; Atzeni & Carboni, 2008; De 
Jorge and Suàrez, 2011; Acosta et al., 2015; Criscuolo et al., 2016;  Marino et al., 2016). Moreover, 
Sissoko (2011) suggests to categorize firms based on the distance to technology frontier. He 
believes firms far from the frontier are more likely to benefit from R&D support. Finally, Bernini 
et al. (2017) believes the classification of firms into the industries they are operating must become 
a standard in treatment effect evaluation studies.  
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
0 50 100 0 50 100
Raw Matched
 control  treated
D
en
si
ty
age_lagged
 
Balancing on pretreatment age: manufactruing sector
130 
 
Concentrating on the technological intensity of industries which subsidies allocations 
happen in our context (table 9) and based on the literature and studies reviewed in chapter two, the 
sectors are divided into two main categories; a) Low-medium technological industries including 
manufacturing, construction and wholesale retail sectors; and b) High-tech industries including 
ICT and scientific and technical activity sectors. The empirical advantage of this classification is 
the retrieval of other treatments being missed due to evaluation the effect only for two main 
industries. In other words, The treatment and control frequencies for each of these classifications 
is the sum of their counterparts in each sector. Consequently, the matches are searched not 
separately inside each class but within all related industries. The following section measures the 
effect of R&D subsidies on TFP measures considering these two types of industries.  
5.1.4.a Low-medium tech industries 
The total treatments frequency is 79, the sum of subsidies allocations in  manufacturing, 
construction and wholesale retail sectors (table 9). The total number of controls equals 3365 units. 
The same as matching procedures used previously for the evaluation, the first step is checking the 
balancing property. Balancing property is satisfied and the propensity distribution for subsidized 
and controls are as the following figure (12). 
 
Figure 12. Propensity scores distribution for treated and untreated 
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The measurement of R&D subsidies effect on the outcome variables shows that there are 
no average treatment effect on treated (ATET) at any level of analysis. However, for average 
treatment effect on the population (ATE), the following effects shown in bold in table (11) are 
significant. The balancing for matching on observables can be checked after treatment effect is 
measured in the following figures (13) and (14). The results will be explained in the section related 
to discussion. Moreover, some examples of how the effect is measured for different outcome 
variables is displayed in appendix (3.j). 
5.1.4.b High tech industries  
The total treatments frequency is 32, the sum of subsidies allocations in ICT and technical 
activity sectors (table 9). The total number of controls equals 675 units. The propensity distribution 
for subsidized and controls are as the following figure (15). The measurement of R&D subsidies 
effect on the outcome variables for the population and treated firms are reported in Table 12 (only 
significant effects). The balancing for matching on observables can be checked after treatment 
effect is measured in the following figures (16) and (17). Moreover, some examples of how the 
effect is measured for different outcome variables is displayed in appendix (3.j). 
At this point the R&D subsidies effect analysis have been carried out for subsidized and 
control units for each industry. The measurement results relate to two main industries (in case of 
grants allocation intensity) and two groups of industries; low-medium and high tech industries in 
which R&D subsidies occur. The analysis can be also implemented for all the sample firms in all 
sectors pooled together. This can be done by controlling for industry as another observable factor 
or assuming all firms within all industries can be matched and compared. However, investigation 
of balancing property satisfaction shows that the balancing assumption is not satisfied when all 
firms are pooled together (Appendix 3.k)  
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Table 11. ATE estimations using PSM for low-medium tech industries  
ATE for low-medium Tech industries 
 TFPCHΔ Treated vs. 
Controls. 
EFFCHΔΔ Treated vs. 
Controls. 
TECHCHΔΔΔ Treated vs. 
Controls. 
1-year lag -0.115 
(0.073) 
72/2338 -0.071 
(0.092) 
72/2388 -0.038 
(0.062) 
72/2338 
2-year lag -0.152** 
(0.74) 
65/1903 -0.182** 
(0.87) 
65/1903 0.063 
(0.063) 
65/1903 
3-year lag -0.173* 
(0.94) 
39/1437 -0.175* 
(0.10) 
39/1437 0.018 
(0.071) 
39/1437 
4-year lag -0.032 
(0.055) 
23/961 0.053 
(0.071) 
23/961 -0.085*** 
(0.030) 
23/961 
5-year lag -0.085 
(0.063) 
9/483 -0.082* 
(0.049) 
9/483 0.003 
(0.047) 
9/483 
 Δ TFPCH: TFP Change  ΔΔ EFFCH: Efficiency Change ΔΔΔ TECHCH: Technological Change 
* %90 level of confidence  ** %95 level of confidence  *** %99 level of confidence 
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Figure 13. Balancing on size using propensity scores (kernel density) 
 
Figure 14. Balancing on age using propensity scores (kernel density) 
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Figure 15. Propensity scores distribution for treated and untreated 
Table 12. ATTE and ATE estimations using PSM  for high tech industries  
ATT/ATE for High Tech industries 
 TFPCH Treated vs. 
Controls 
EFFCH Treated vs. 
Controls 
TECHCH Treated vs. 
Controls 
1-year lag       
2-year lag ATET: 0.127* 
(0.69) 
26/378     
3-year lag     ATE:-0.061** 
(0.026) 
13/290 
4-year lag     ATE: -0.111 
(0.064) 
7/195 
5-year lag       
 Δ TFPCH: TFP Change  ΔΔ EFFCH: Efficiency Change ΔΔΔ TECHCH: Technological Change 
* %90 level of confidence  ** %95 level of confidence  *** %99 level of confidence  
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
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Figure 16. Balancing on size using propensity scores (kernel density) 
 
Figure17. Balancing on age using propensity scores (kernel density) 
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5.1.5 effect of R&D subsidies on TFP measures based on selection procedure 
Another important factor which can influence the effect of R&D subsidies on targeted 
outcome is selection process. As explained in table (1), the selection procedure is mainly divided 
into three categories of automatic, evaluative and negotiable mechanisms. However, because the 
two former methods almost resemble each other in selection criteria, we classify the selection 
procedures into two main procedures of automatic and evaluative. Therefore we run PSM ATE 
and ATET measurements for all pooled firms. Out of 111 treatments, 53 are automatic and 58 are 
evaluative. These treatments are dispersed through different industries. Therefore, as long as most 
of the subsidies happen in manufacturing industry and to keep the homogenous sector condition 
for matching we compare the effect of different evaluation method within manufacturing sector. 
In the sector 40 subsidies are allocated through evaluative method and 31 through automatic 
procedure (in total 71 treated observations). Balancing property holds for both types of evaluation 
methods. Table(13) in the following shows the results for estimations based on selection 
procedures. 
Furthermore, we have additionally analyzed the average R&D subsidies effect based on 
the first industry digit of ateco 2007 firm activity coding system (table (3.l.1) in appendix (3.l)). 
The results and a brief discussion is provided in appendix. However, as long as the first digit 
classification may include different industries into one industry category, this beside violation of 
homogenous operating process assumption for DMUs in order to measure relative (in)efficiency 
and frontier measures, may provide not a proper control group due to estimating propensity scores.  
Next sections discuss and conclude the different results related to PSM estimation of R&D 
subsidies effect on TFP measures, produced in previous sections. The discussion points out to the 
research hypotheses and deals with the explanations and answers for the related hypotheses arisen 
in the previous chapter. 
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Table 13. The effect of Automatic and Evaluative selection procedures on TFP measures  
Manufacturing  
Industry 
TFPCH EFFCH TECHCH 
Automatic 
Selection 
Evaluative 
Selection 
Automatic 
Selection 
Evaluative 
Selection 
Automatic 
Selection 
Evaluative 
Selection 
1-year 
lag 
PSM:ATE 0.047 
(0.035) 
(29/911) 
-0.035 
(0.084) 
(36/904) 
0.105 
(0.086) 
(29/911) 
-0.009 
(0.096) 
(36/904) 
-0.052 
(0.078) 
(29/911) 
-0.023 
(0.085) 
(36/904) 
PSM:ATET -0.021 
(0.054) 
(29/911) 
-0.034 
(0.067) 
(36/904) 
-0.032 
(0.076) 
(29/911) 
-0.021 
(0.067) 
(36/904) 
0.000 
(0.067) 
(29/911) 
0.000 
(0.067) 
(36/904) 
2-year 
lag 
PSM:ATE 0.104 
(0.065) 
(27/725) 
-0.027 
0.020 
(32/720) 
0.086 
(0.073) 
(27/725) 
-0.090 
0.069 
(32/720) 
-0.004 
(0.080) 
(27/725) 
0.074 
(0.074) 
(27/725) 
PSM:ATET -0.023 
(0.061) 
(27/725) 
-0.005 
(0.069) 
(32/720) 
0.010 
(0.083) 
(27/725) 
0.007 
(0.061) 
(32/720) 
-0.016 
(0.072) 
(27/725) 
-0.016 
(0.053) 
(32/720) 
3-year 
lag 
PSM:ATE -0.068** 
0.030 
(19/545) 
0.036 
(0.086) 
(17/547) 
-0.047 
(0.080) 
(19/545) 
0.041 
0.048 
(17/547) 
-0.007 
(0.078) 
(19/545) 
-0.048 
(0.042) 
(17/547) 
PSM:ATET -0.065** 
(0.034) 
(19/545) 
0.094 
(0.082) 
(17/547) 
-0.075 
(0.087) 
(19/545) 
0.147** 
(0.078) 
(17/547) 
0.031 
(0.086) 
(19/545) 
-0.077 
(0.092) 
(17/547) 
4-year 
lag 
PSM:ATE -0.027 
(0.037) 
(12/364) 
0.069 
(0.081) 
(11/365) 
-0.001 
(0.070) 
(12/364) 
0.054 
(0.073) 
(11/365) 
-0.110* 
0.0589 
(12/364) 
-0.012 
0.029 
(11/365) 
PSM:ATET -0.026 
(0.035) 
(12/364) 
0.061 
(0.061) 
(11/365) 
-0.058 
(0.111) 
(12/364) 
-0.007 
(0.101) 
(11/365) 
0.021 
(0.094) 
(12/364) 
0.033 
(0.091) 
(11/365) 
5-year 
lag 
PSM:ATE -0.007 
(0.034) 
(6/182) 
0.036 
(0.114) 
(3/185) 
0.061 
(0.042) 
(6/182) 
0.027 
(0.066) 
(3/185) 
-0.044 
(0.059) 
(6/182) 
-0.020 
(0.035) 
(3/185) 
PSM:ATET -0.021 
(0.023) 
(6/182) 
0.199 
(0.185) 
(3/185) 
-0.031 
(0.114) 
(6/182) 
0.0246*** 
(0.058) 
(3/185) 
-0.004 
(0.125) 
(6/182) 
-0.134*** 
(0.034) 
(3/185) 
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6. Discussion and policy implications 
Globally, the results show mixed and heterogenous effects of subsidies on TFP measures. 
As discussed in chapter one, many other studies reach to the same idea that the effect measured on 
TFP measures are mixed (David, Hall & Toole, 2000; Pellegrini et al., 2011; Caloffi et al., 2016; 
Dimos and Pugh, 2016). However, by concentrating on the main trends of the effect of public 
R&D support on TFP change, efficiency change and technological frontier change, we can 
characterize the effects of the place-based policy on TFP measures as the following table (14). The 
main findings about the direction of the policy effects on TFP measures reconfirms the part of the 
literature declaring the mixed and heterogenous results for the effect of R&D subsidies on outcome 
targeted variables.  
Average treatment effect (ATE) on the whole population if significant is mainly negative 
except for the positive effect of policy on efficiency change in long run for manufacturing sector 
(13.2% and 8.7%). The ATE long-run effect of subsidies on technological change is negative for 
both manufacturing (-5.6 or -7.6% after five years) and ICT (-8.5% after three years), low-medium 
tech (-8.5% after four years) and high tech sectors (-6.1% after three years and -11.1% after four 
years). This shows the policy has not satisfied the long run effect on technological progress for the 
whole population. This is more significant when the selection procedure to support R&D projects 
are automatic and without pre-evaluation of the project. However, the R&D program positively 
affect the relative efficiency of firms in manufacturing sector in the long run.95 All in all, total 
factor productivity decreases through time for manufacturing (-5%) and low-medium tech sectors 
(-17.3%), while it does not show to have any effect for ICT and high tech sectors. 
On the other hand, The effect of R&D subsidies on subsidized firms (ATET) shows a 
different pattern in comparison with the effect on whole subsidized and non-subsidized firms 
(ATE). The general trend is that subsidies have no effect on TFP measures. Nevertheless, a positive 
short term effect shows up for TFP change (5.1% increase after two years). 
 
                                                          
95 This effect is realized after five year where the treated and control observations shrink due to lag of the outcome 
variables. 
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Table 14. The effect of R&D subsidies on outcome TFP measures 
 ATE ATET 
Short-term† Long-run†† Short-term Long-run 
TFPCH EFFCH TECHCH TFPCH EFFCH TECHCH TFPCH EFFCH TECHCH TFPCH EFFCH TECHCH 
Manufacturing #* # - - + - + # - # + # 
ICT # # # # # - # # # ++** + ++ 
Low-medium 
Tech 
- - # - -- - # # # # # # 
High Tech # # # # # -- + # # # # # 
Automatic-
selection All 
Obs. 
# # # - # - # # # - # # 
Evaluative 
selection All 
Obs. 
# # # # # # # # # # + -96 
†One/two years †† three to five years 
* #: No effect  ** In case of being positive/negative for two consecutive years or by two different methods we put more than one +/- sig
                                                          
96 This effect (-13.4%) is significant after five years where the number of treated observations is reduced to only three units, making the estimation precision 
quite low. For effects measured in such a restriction we only report the result and do not make our analysis based on them. 
140 
 
However, this effect is significant for manufacturing and high-tech sectors (12.7% after 
two years) which represents some mixed and contradictory directions of the effect. The results 
show positive effect on efficiency change in long run for both manufacturing (8%) and ICT (5.7%) 
sectors.97 However, this positive effect regards to the projects being subsidies by evaluative 
procedure (particularly for manufacturing sector). Moreover, the main finding on ATET measures, 
show the subsidies have negatively impacted technological progress for manufacturing in short-
term (-10.3%) in contrary to the weaker positive effect for ICT industry in long run (6.7%). The 
results show significant positive effect on all TFP measures in ICT industry in long run.98 
Sector or industry in which the firm operates is an important factor affecting evaluation 
and selection process, as law LP 6/99 provokes the province to invest more in IT-related industries 
based on the ICT development horizon emphasized in European Union strategy design and the 
regional priorities. Focusing on ICT industry in long run, the subsidies affect positively on 
efficiency and technological frontier change, leading to a positive effect on total factor productivity 
change. However, these positive measures except for TFP change do not hold using other 
evaluation methods (table 10), making it difficult to generalize the effect analysis. This is the case 
for almost all other estimations. 
In evaluative procedure, the effects on efficiency change and technological change are 
opposite, while the final effect for total factor productivity is insignificant. One interpretation can 
be that the opposite effects of subsidies on decomposing elements of TFP change, i.e. positive 
effect for efficiency change and negative effect for technological change, cancel out the ultimate 
effect for TFP change. 
Generally speaking and referred to our research hypotheses, we can imply that the R&D 
place-based program affect negatively on technological frontier progress (growth) of all firms and 
positively on efficiency change of subsidized firms (in ICT sector) in the long run. One other 
impression of the results show that the effect of the R&D subsidies in case of being significant, is 
more tended to be negative for the whole population of the firms and positive for only subsidized. 
                                                          
97 The effect shows up after five years which the number of treated are low making us to deal doubtfully with the 
results. However, using kernel method can reduce the suspicion  
98 12.8% on TFP change after three years and 4.7% after five years; 5.7% on efficiency change after 5 years and 
6.7% on technological change after four years. 
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This can imply that other non-subsidized firms might have not benefited as subsidized firms from 
subsidies. 
On the other hand, for the whole firms regardless of being treated or not, the program affect 
positively on efficiency change in the long run (manufacturing sector). R&D subsidies affect 
negatively on technological progress in long run for the population of whole firms in all sectors. 
The negative effect of R&D program on technological frontier change shows that innovation 
incentives have not directed technology leading firms in the region towards moving up the 
technical frontier in long run99. However, it seems the laggard firms behind the technological 
frontier have increased their relative efficiency absorbing the effect and outcome of R&D subsidies 
in the related sector particularly manufacturing industry in the long run.  
Antonelli  and Crespi (2013) in their research notify that the positive relationship between 
R&D and productivity is much stronger in high-tech firms than in low-tech firms. However, in our 
analysis the subsidies except showing a positive effect on efficiency change for long run in ICT 
industry, represent negative effect on technological change. At the same time, R&D subsidies 
affect negatively on TFP change in manufacturing and low-medium tech industry. Mendonca 
(2009) explains that high-tech firms are awarded subsidies on merit while low-tech firms most 
often were given subsidies based on reputation and “name recognition”, even in case of 
misallocation of the funds. This negative effect mainly holds for the grants allocated automatically 
to R&D projects rather than allocation based on pre-evaluation or negotiation for selection. This, 
beside the positive effect of evaluative procedure-allocated subsidies effect on TFP change for 
subsidized firms in long run (ATET), can imply that projects being evaluated for the assignment 
of subsidies may avoid better the negative effect of the program on TFP change.  
Moreover, there can be differences between short term effects (expectedly negative) and 
long term effects which can be explained by the time to learn, time to stay in a larger market, time 
to adjust factors proportion and the sluggishness embedded in the impacts of technological 
improvement (Bernini et al, 2017). This is in line with the effect captured for TFP change 
especially in case of average treatment effect for the whole population of the firms. However, the 
effect of support on technological progress change is in contradictory. 
                                                          
99 Except for a slight effect for subsidized firms in ICT sector. 
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Finally, sections 1.2, 2 and 3 of Chapter 2 discuss in detail the possible channels and 
mechanisms leading to different positive/negative effects of R&D subsidies on productivity 
change measures. However, the casual investigation of this chapter can be completed by a micro 
effect approach towards the R&D subsidies impact. This will be partially addressed in the next 
chapter but measuring the effect of R&D policy on a different outcome. Moreover, as long as 
capturing the dynamics of technological frontier has been beyond the scope of this study, future 
research can provide a deep analysis of the origins of these causal effects.  
7. Conclusion  
The chapter has empirically evaluated the effect of R&D subsidies on TFP growth and the 
elements of TFP growth, i.e. technical (in)efficiency and technological (in)efficiency changes as 
the determinants of supported firms’ growth for a relevant period of time. This evaluation is carried 
out for the main sectors in which R&D subsidies occur including manufacturing and ICT sectors. 
The measurement has been implemented for two groups of low-medium tech and high-tech sectors 
as well. The short-term and long-run effects of R&D subsidies, beside the different treatment 
effects for two types of selection procedures have also been measured. 
TFP is measured using Malmquist Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. Malmquist 
TFP Index and the decomposed elements of efficiency and technical frontier change are measured 
using CRS output-orientated DEA-based Malmquist Index methodology applying DMUs’ 
information on three inputs and one output from a balanced dataset. These indices are target 
variables to measure the impact of place-based R&D subsidization policy. Non-parametric 
propensity score matching is used to evaluate the impact of policy on total factor productivity 
change, efficiency change and technical frontier change. The data on policy treatment binary 
variable and control independent variables (including size and age) are provided in the same 
balanced panel dataset. The dataset is the outcome of cleaning and merging provincial datasets on 
R&D subsidies (APIAE) and AIDA financial statement dataset for firms in province of Trento.  
Although the study empirically deals with a place-based R&D support program, however, 
the main goals of this chapter is investigation of the theoretical hypotheses using the contextual 
settings and data related to a place-based policy. Therefore, the detailed objectives of public R&D 
policy may not significantly influence the empirical investigation of the causal effect of R&D 
subsidies on TFP measures. Notwithstanding the theoretical investigation, the by-product of this 
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investigation is the evaluation of the local R&D program leading to place-based policy 
implications. In any case, The law LP6/99 objectives include stimulating additional private R&D 
and stabilizing the employment rate which leads to a higher productivity and competitiveness of 
the firms active in the region. Therefore, even in a practical perspective taking TFP measures as 
the target outcome variable makes sense. 
The impact of R&D subsidies on technical and technological changes can be measured 
using a quasi-experimental method. The subsidies allocation mechanism, based on provincial law 
LP 6/99 related to the assignment of direct subsidies to applied research projects in Trento province 
in Italy, allows us to form a counterfactual setting in which there are treated and non-treated 
observations within a time span. We have used matching techniques to measure the impact of the 
public R&D grants on productivity.  
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a non-parametric estimator capable of controlling the 
selection and self-selection biases which occur in evaluation studies. The method measures the 
average treatment effect on the whole population (ATE) and the average treatment effect on treated 
(ATET) by comparing the average of the target variables for treated (subsidized) and non-treated 
units. Based on the law documentations, all the firms operating in the province of Trento are 
eligible to apply for the subsidies by submission of a project to the province. Hence, assuming zero 
R&D fixed cost, we can take non-subsidized firms potentially doing R&D  and operating in Trento 
as the controls. The propensity scores are generated due to the balancing of pre-treatment variables 
(age and size in our setting). In order to check the robustness of the estimations, we measure the 
effect of R&D subsidies on all TFP measures for the whole population and treated units (in 
different sectors, different selection procedures and for short-term and long-run time intervals) 
using PSM nearest neighbor estimator (with two different estimation process) and PSM kernel 
estimator.  
The results show mixed findings about the effect of policy on productivity measures both 
in terms of the outcome variables and effect time. If the placed-based R&D policy significantly 
affect the measures, then in most cases this impact is positive on efficiency change and negative 
on technical frontier change. However, this is not a fit-to-all results through different 
classifications of the firms, time spans and selection procedure.  
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The main findings about the direction of the policy effects on TFP measures reconfirms 
the part of the literature declaring the mixed and heterogenous results for the effect of R&D 
subsidies on outcome targeted variables. However, it can be implied that the R&D place-based 
program affect negatively on technological frontier progress (growth) of subsidized firms and 
positively on efficiency change of subsidized firms (in ICT sector) in the long run. The R&D 
subsidies have no effect on growth (in terms of TFP change) in steady state, while they show some 
positive impact in transient state. On the other hand, for the whole firms regardless of being treated 
or not, the program affect positively on efficiency change in the long run (manufacturing sector). 
R&D subsidies affect negatively on technological progress in long run for all sectors. 
R&D subsidies affect negatively on TFP change in manufacturing and low-medium tech 
industry. This negative effect mainly holds for the grants allocated automatically to R&D projects 
rather than allocation based on pre-evaluation or negotiation for selection. As a policy implication, 
allocation of subsidies based on evaluation method may cause less negative effects on 
technological frontier change. 
A drawback of this study is caused by the limitation related to the relatively low number 
of R&D subsidies allocations. The place-based policy is restricted to a specific provincial context 
in which the total number of allocations reaches maximum to 600 grant allocations by a time 
interval between 2001 to 2013. Furthermore, the data availability due to calculation of TFP 
measures is restricted for the time interval between 2007 to 2014. This means we can only use the 
common overlap of datasets between 2007 through 2014. Moreover, as long as one of the input 
indices applied for TFP measurement is moving average, hence year 2007 is only used to generate 
this input’s measures for 2008. Consequently, applying Malmquist TFP method would generate 
TFP measures for 2009. Therefore, the final panel dataset we can apply to measure the effect of 
R&D support program covers 2009-2014. Beside all these limitations, lagging outcome TFP 
measures to estimate the effect of R&D subsidies leads to missing observations in the related 
measurement. Future studies can implement the analysis on different contexts and subsequently 
datasets, taking into account the specific institutional considerations. 
One other restriction is the limited information about the selection procedures and the 
technical and financial scores related to applications and R&D projects. Therefore, we could not 
access the ranking of projects for subsidized and non-subsidized (in this case rejected) applicants. 
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If such information was available, the Regression Discontinuity (RD) method (used in studies such 
as De Blasio et al., 2009; Bronzini et al., 2014; Cerqua & Pellegrini, 2014; Wang et al., 2015, 
Bronzini & Piselli, 2016; Dechezlepretre et al., 2016) could have been a better choice instead of 
the PSM methodology. 
Another main limitation of the research similar to many other studies using matching 
techniques, is assuming that the selection procedure and factors are observable. However, this 
limitation becomes less serious as the analysis is carried out in a particular context (Province of 
Trento). The place-based context may reduce the effect of unobservables in comparison with 
nation-wide programs. The policy’s local dimension allows for the removal of unobserved 
heterogeneity among private firms in comparison with the R&D programs nationwide in which 
the recipients and non-recipients are less similar. 
One further main limitation of this essay is relaxing the assumption of R&D spillover 
effects to satisfy SUTVA property in implementation treatment impact evaluation. This restriction 
can get more serious in ICT industry with more dynamics and interactions between firms, as one 
of the main sectors this study has focused on. The context of this study may also reinforce this 
problem as spatial closure can increase network effects. Moreover, technological spillovers inside 
manufacturing and ICT sectors can also affect the analysis. On the other hand, if we can assume 
the new technological opportunities intensity and probability of collaboration in R&D is less 
different for the firms because of the regional vicinity, this can mollify ignoring the spillover effect 
on measuring the effect of R&D subsidies on the targeted outcome. Next chapter’s empirical 
analysis puts effort to overcome the two former limitations; the effect of unobservable factors and 
spillovers effect.  
In a more practical perspective, the presence of mixed findings makes it unfeasible to 
suggest a fit-to-all policy implications. However, the ex-post empirical evaluation provides 
information about the causal effects of R&D subsidies on growth for different sectors in different 
time spans. Finally, focusing on the channels and mechanisms through which R&D subsidies may 
influence R&D effort, R&D output and spillovers and ultimately firms’ relative efficiency and 
technological frontier progress can be a complementary to the empirical policy causal effect 
evaluation.
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Chapter 4: 
Estimation of a Public R&D Policy (Program) Structural Model 
Abstract 
The empirical studies in public R&D subsidies evaluation, using econometric methods usually 
focus to measure only the magnitude and direction of the net causal effects of innovation policies. 
This leads to lack of explanation for the mechanism through which public subsidies allocated by 
the social planner may affect private R&D investment. Previous chapter measured the effect of 
R&D subsidies on a target outcome variable using non-parametric propensity score matching 
estimators, presuming neither effect of unobservable factors on selection and outcome, nor 
spillover effects. However, the method took advantage of not assuming any predefined structure 
for application, selection and investment procedures.  
Modeling the R&D policy stages using a structural model which explains the interactions 
between the private firm as the agent and the public agency can shed light on the influence of 
different factors such as firms’ characteristics on the subsidization process. This study reviews, 
benchmarks and empirically modifies a structural model for evaluation of targeted R&D subsidies.  
The model takes into account the spillover effects as the main criteria for social planner in 
allocating subsidy rates for different R&D projects. Furthermore, the model theoretically and 
econometrically identifies different stages of application decision, R&D subsidies allocation and 
R&D investment decision. The local institutional context changes the settings related to the 
estimations. Data applied to estimate the model, refers to place-based R&D subsidies allocated to 
R&D doing firms and firms’ characteristics provided by ISPAT office in province of Trento, Italy. 
The context and dataset features allow for different empirical modifications with respect to the 
benchmark model applied. The results determine the effect of firm (project) characteristics on all 
stages of the subsidization game. Size, age, exporting status, board size and sector are main factors 
being investigated. The results show different firm characteristics influence the stages and 
mechanisms of R&D subsidies allocation. Moreover, on average there is a crowding out effect for 
R&D grants, while half of the amount of private spending on R&D will spill over the network. 
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1. Introduction and theoretical background  
First chapter has extensively discussed the need for R&D public policies. Direct subsidies, tax 
credits, prizing and procurement contracts , beside intellectual property right (IPR: patent length 
design) are required as industrial policies to deal with the market failure caused by private 
(business) underinvestment in innovation (R&D) input. The R&D investment by private entities 
is usually less than the socially optimum expected amount. (Mansfield et al., 1986; Jones and 
Williams; 1997, Martin, 2002; Griliches, 2007). One main cause can be spillover effects discussed 
in section 1 of Chapter 1. Additional R&D projects carried out by private business firms may spill 
out in the network. Imitating and using the knowledge as the public good generated by R&D 
activities can benefit society and increase the social rate of return of R&D activities. However, if 
the firm cannot sufficiently appropriate profits out of R&D project due to spillovers effect and 
imitation of R&D output by rivals, the firm would not undertake additional R&D expenditures. 
The government as the responsible body to maximize the social welfare, designs and allocates 
incentives to encourage private firms to spend more on innovation. Furthermore, the social planner 
is assumed to be audited and criticized by the society, media and other political parties for efficient 
and effective allocation of the resources. Impact evaluation of R&D policies takes place in this 
context.  
Chapter 1 and 2 explained the main challenges related to the measurement of R&D policy 
effect on targeted outcomes. The methodologies used to carry out the estimation of the effects and 
their advantages and drawbacks were also discussed. Moreover, the chapters provided a detailed 
literature review of studies evaluating the effect of R&D subsidies on R&D input additionality, 
beside R&D output and behavioral additionality and some other outcome variables particularly 
TFP change. The mixed and heterogenous findings of evaluation studies and the need for models 
explaining the channels of the effect have been addressed. 
 Afterwards, Chapter 3 measured the causal effect of a place-based R&D subsidies program 
using a quasi-experimental setting. However, the methodology used had limitations on considering 
unobservables’ impact on R&D subsidies allocation and spillover effects. This chapter in order to 
measure subsidies’ impact on R&D investment, applies another approach in order to tackle the 
discussed limitations. Structural modeling approach focuses on the interactions and mechanisms 
of different stages of R&D support and its effect process. 
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Effect of firms’ characteristics on the mechanisms through which the policy affects the 
outcome, is the focus of estimations by the structural model. One main important characteristic 
widely addressed and investigated in empirical studies related to R&D activities and R&D policy 
is size. Size is the core point of Schumpeterian hypothesis and many studies have investigated the 
effect of firm size on innovation activities (see tables and content of the sections related to 
empirical literature review in chapter 1 and 2). As long as larger firms are more capable of 
managing the risks of R&D activity in imperfect markets, the R&D effort increases proportionally 
with the size of the firm following the hypothesis based on Schumpeter’s second theoretical 
modification about the role of the size in innovation (1943).  
Moreover, age has also been pointed out by Schumpeter in developing his primary 
hypothesis quoted in ‘The theory of economic development’ (1934), identifying the new firm as 
the motive for innovation. Later, in ‘Socialism, capitalism and democracy’ (1943), the hypothesis 
changes in the sense that the established firm (the older incumbent and probably with a higher 
share in the market) is the one responsible for technological progress. Age has been considered as 
one main characteristics in empirical studies related to innovation activity (see the content and 
tables in section related to empirical literature review in chapter 1 and 2). Other variables such as 
sales, export, previous R&D projects and etc. have been considered among firm characteristics 
influencing the innovative activity . Structural models using a system of equations, can measure 
the effect of these explanatory factors on different stages of an R&D program. R&D program 
stages usually consist of participation decision (self-selection), evaluation of R&D project to 
assign a subsidy rate (selection) and firm’s decision about R&D expenditure (investment).  
Levin and Reiss (1988) in their seminal work of structural empirical modeling in 
economics of innovation, have analyzed R&D policies when the returns to R&D expenditure are 
imperfectly appropriable because of existence of spillovers and the endogenous market structure. 
The R&D model is framed by distinguishing the process R&D and costs, product R&D and 
demand creation while assuming spillover. The equilibrium for R spending and D spending by the 
firm is defined by firm’s profit maximization equation considering first-order conditions and free-
entry equation. Furthermore, they empirically estimate the theoretical model using survey data and 
show the effect of differences in technological opportunity on both process and product R&D. The 
results make a distinction between extent of the spillovers and the productivity of spillovers which 
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describe why for example firms in electronics industry perform large amounts of R&D even if 
there is a high level of spillovers in the industry.  
Wallsten (2000) proposes a structural model to evaluate the effects of government-industry 
R&D programs on private R&D for the case of the Small Business Innovation Research program 
(SBIR) in U.S. In addition to a simple OLS while log of employment is the dependent variable, he 
uses simultaneous equation systems and instrumental variable to control the endogeneity of the 
R&D grants in another step. This instrumentation is involved in equations for funding allocation 
process in two stages. In case a firm is awarded in the first stage, then it is eligible to apply in a 
second phase for the subsidy. The agency’s funding decision for both stages is also defined. The 
dependent variables in the three-staged least squares are number of phase 1 and 2 awards and log 
of employment. The study reveals that in the OLS regression the employment is correlated with 
the grants, where as in the structural analysis this is not the fact. This shows the importance of 
control for endogeneity in R&D program’s evaluation. Although, the analysis done by Wallsten is 
called a structural analysis, neither it defines the channels through which public grants affect on 
private R&D, nor deals with spillovers of R&D expenditure.  
Knowledge spillover of innovation projects must be taken into account in innovation policy 
studies as it is supposed to be a main public authority’s criteria to decide for the level of subsidy 
allocated to a specific project. Those policy evaluation studies ruling out spillover effects (such as 
the method used in previous chapter), assume Stable Unit Treatment Assumption (SUTVA) 
defined for the first time by Rubin (1973), i.e. R&D outcome of one firm is not affected by the 
treatment offered to another firm in the population. Although SUTVA assumption is fundamental 
for causal analysis, however, in recent years, researchers in political science, economics and 
sociology have extensively devoted attention to the violation of the assumption (Sinclair et al., 
2012).  
Studies applying structural models can be linked to the literature on principle-agent as well. 
There is a public authority as the principle which interacts over R&D project incentive allocation 
process with the firms as the agents. Reiss and Wolak (2007) discuss principal-agent contracting 
models in which regulator attempts to make a balance between two contradictory goals of 
recovering all incurred costs of the firm and provision of incentives for the firm to efficiently 
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produce under the assumption of incomplete information, which means the agent has private 
information about its production process, unobserved by the agency and econometrician.  
The models explaining R&D activity takes either deterministic or stochastic form. 
Deterministic models using a static framework, allow to trace the R&D relationship with other 
factors and market structure variables. Stochastic models based on the uncertain nature of R&D 
activity, form the model and equations by assuming for instance innovation and input or output 
spillovers follow a stochastic pattern (Athey and Schmutzler, 1995; Martin, 2002). The model in 
this essay follow a static pattern, while determinants of the model can take random form.  
This study benchmarks the structural model by Takalao, Tanayam and Toivanen (2013) 
and models and estimates a subsidy program as a four-staged game of incomplete information 
between a firm with an R&D project and the public agency. There is a perfect Nash Bayesian 
equilibrium for the model assuming specific functional forms for players’ pay-offs. The model 
proposes a framework to measure the social value of R&D subsidies and the effect of the subsidies 
on the authority and the firms investing in R&D, in addition to the effect of firm characteristics on 
these variables. The parameters of the firms’ and agency’s objective functions and firms’ 
application cost function are also estimated to measure the social rate of return, i.e. spillover rate 
of return to R&D subsidies. In the reference model expected welfare effects of individual subsidies 
and the whole subsidy program are estimated as well.  
In the model, spillover level is a component of agency’s utility maximization equation. 
Finding the solution of the equilibrium for agency and the agent simultaneously, spillover rate 
generated by the amount of private investment in R&D is measured. This in parallel ties to the 
amount of the grants allocated by the social planner to the rate of spillover each individual 
applicant’s R&D investment is expected to generate. Consequently, the spillover rate will be 
measured by knowing the optimal amount of incentive decided by the authority and the 
coefficients of this relationship are the effect of characteristics of the R&D project on spillover.  
Another feature of the model proposed by Takalo et al. (2013), following the idea of 
Gonzalez et al. (2005) is taking into account the application cost, and consequently application 
decision by the firms related to the entry cost. To econometrically estimate the theoretical model, 
Takalo et al. (2013) use detailed data about grants assigned by the Finnish authority for R&D 
subsidies provided by public agency called Tekes (the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology 
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and Innovation), and also firm-level data for 14567 firms from a for-profit company responsible 
for collection, standardization and selling firm-specific quantitative information. The observations 
used to estimate the different equations of subsidy rate, application, R&D investment and grading 
process are different as the firms involved in each part of estimation are not always the same firms.  
The R&D investment equation takes a pre-defined theoretical form which is independent 
of  the context. R&D application and the selection process resemble in our context with the Finnish 
context of Takalo et al.’s study. Although The Finnish public agency (Tekes’) deals with subsidies 
nation-wide, however, subsidies allocation process in general perspective resembles APIAE’s. 
Firms self-select and apply for grants and the public agency evaluates the applications on technical 
and financial aspects and decides on specific subsidy rates for each project. The subsidies are 
injected into projects within different installments in both contexts. Moreover, the main focus of 
both agencies are R&D support for SMEs. Tekes grants low-interest and capital loans besides 
subsidies, however, as long as calculating the value of these instruments is complicated Takalo et 
al. have pooled all instruments together as public subsidies. This study applies data on R&D 
subsidy allocation by APIAE and firm-level data provided by ISPAT100. Datasets used in the 
analysis are partially described and discussed in Chapter 3 and current chapter as well.  
The framework is basically a game theoretical model to be estimated econometrically. The 
customized simplified model describes processes related to the firms’ R&D investment and 
subsidy application decision and subsequently the grant allocation by the local authority. The 
parameters of the firms’ and the agency’s objective functions and the firms’ application function 
are estimated using R&D project-level data. These parameters can be applied to calculate the social 
rate of return and the treatment effect of the subsidy program.  
The data on firms’ and projects’ characteristics and balance sheets is provided by ISPAT 
dataset available in provincial statistical office. Datasets compiled and analyzed in different  
studies are mainly cross-sectional panel or time series data. Levels of aggregation include firm, 
industry and country (national) levels. Moreover, laboratories, research institutions, universities 
and non-profit entities are also among the different levels of analysis in some minor studies. In this 
                                                          
100 Statistical Institute of Province of Trento: In Italian (Istituto di Statistica della Provincia di Trento) is the general 
statistical directorate of the province and the provincial counterpart of ISTAT, the Italian national statistical 
institution.  
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essay a cross-sectional panel has been used to estimate the model. A structural model for R&D 
public subsidies is presented to measure the effect of the policy on private R&D at the firm-level 
using the dataset related to firms as agents and the agency authenticated to allocate subsidies in 
the autonomous province of Trento in Italy. In the following, chapter 2 defines the model, chapter 
3 represents data and dataset applied. Results are discussed in chapter 4 and finally chapter 5 
concludes.  
2. The Reference Model 
2.1 Model definition based on Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen model (2013) 
Model is a four-stage game of incomplete information between a firm with an R&D project 
and the public authority (agency). In stage 0, the types of the projects or firms or applicants (all 
used interchangeably in this chapter) are determined. The type of project i, 𝑡𝑖
𝐹 = (𝜀𝑖, 𝜈𝑖) ∈  ℜ
2, 
and the agency’s type pertained to the project i, 𝑡𝑖
𝐴 = (𝜂𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑐, 𝜔𝑖𝑚) ∈  ℜ
3, are drawn from 
common knowledge (joint) distribution. 𝑡𝑖
𝐴 and 𝑡𝑖
𝐹define the expected values of the project i, for 
the agency and the firm respectively. On the contrary to the setting in previous chapter, 
unobservable factors are considered in the econometric model. 
In stage 1, the firm decides whether to apply for the subsidy or not. The firm does not know 
exactly how the agency evaluates the application. Hence, symmetric incomplete information for 
the agency’s type holds while the firm’s type is common knowledge.  
In stage 2, the agency assesses the projects and learns the project’s type. Consequently, 
agency allocate a subsidy rate, 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 ∈  [0, ?̅?𝑖], which is the share of the R&D project’s total cost 
covered by the agency. 𝑠?̅? is the upper bound for the subsidy rate specified for any applicant, ?̅?𝑖 ≤
1. It is assumed that non applicants cannot receive the subsidy and the agency or public authority 
does not bind to budget constraint. 
In stage 3, the firm decides on the amount of the R&D investment, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑖 ∈ ℜ
+ with or 
without the subsidy. No fixed cost for the investment or any constraints on the investment are 
assumed. The subsidy amount is then the subsidy rate multiplied by the investment amount, 𝑠𝑖𝑅𝑖. 
The model assumes that the subsidy cannot be misused and there is no moral hazard or free-riding.  
The game proposed is a perfect Bayesian equilibria. Firstly, a potential applicant has an 
expectation of the agency’s strategies which are contingent to the type of the agency in stage 2. 
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The agency’s and firm’s strategies are sequentially rational. As the posterior belief concerning the 
agency’s type is inconsequential after the subsidy allocation, solving the model equations starts 
from the firm’s maximization problem in stage 3. Players’ payoffs have been modeled by specific 
functional forms due to model empirical estimation by using data in derived equations.  
In the following the main equations of different stages of the model and the solution of the 
model are discussed.  
  2.2. Objective function of the firm 
The firm’s expected profits from project i is specified as:  
Π(𝑅𝑖, 𝑠𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) = exp(𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖) 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑠𝑖)𝑅𝑖      (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖 is the investment in R&D by firm i; 𝑠𝑖 is the share and contribution of the public agency 
to an admitted project; 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of observable firm characteristics and 𝛽 is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated. 𝜀𝑖 is profit random shock which is related to firm i’s type. As implied 
by the utility function there is decreasing returns to scale for firm’s R&D technology. This 
definition of firm’s objective function makes it globally concave and therefore the optimal 
investment 𝑅𝑖 is determined by maximizing the profit which is shown as the first-order condition 
in the following which gives 𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑖) as a function of the subsidy rate:  
𝑅𝑖 =  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
1−𝑠𝑖
          (2) 
This equation shows how subsidy rate affects the profit margin. The economic 
interpretation of εi explains how positive shock to marginal profitability due to unobservable 
factors leads to a higher investment in innovation. Referred to equation (2), if public authority 
covers total expenditures of a project (%100 of the costs which means 𝑠𝑖 = 1), then the firm invest 
as much as possible. However, if the agency does not accept to cover the project (which means a 
subsidy rate of 0) then the firm invests an amount equal to exp(𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖) which is the amount the 
firm would plan to invest had not even been allocated the subsidy. The additional investment by 
being granted can be calculated as: 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 −
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠 =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
1−𝑠𝑖
− 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖) =  
𝑠𝑖
1−𝑠𝑖
 . 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖) . 
As noticed in the previous chapter, the expenditures eligible for the support consist of a) 
expenses for employees including the expenses of the owner and partners; b) spending for research 
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contracts, skilled technicians and patents; c) additional expenses for market search; d) other 
operating costs, and e) costs of tools and equipment. However, the data on firms’ R&D 
expenditures in our setting is the total planned R&D investments reported by the firms. Moreover, 
it is worth to restate that the fixed cost of R&D projects are assumed zero as the firms are R&D 
doing firms with an established R&D business unit.  
  2.3 Agency utility function 
The agency’s expected utility from an applicant’s project i is the sum of values of spillover 
level, employment rate and firm’s expected profit minus the opportunity cost of the grants which 
agency devotes to projects and application screening and project monitoring costs. The 
employment rate is considered in the investment returns for the firms which are mentioned in the 
profit function of the firm. The utility function of the firm is as equation (3): 
𝑈(𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑖), 𝑠𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜀𝑖, 𝜂𝑖) =  𝑉(𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑖), 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜂𝑖) +  Π(𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑖), 𝑠𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) − 𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑖) −  𝐹𝑖 (3) 
where, Fi is the total cost of application screening, and g is the constant opportunity cost of agency 
resources for example cost of funds which are taxed. V( ) is the spillover level as a policy objective 
for the agency beside a goal of the policy maker in the theoretical literature. The public authority 
is seeking for higher levels of spillover to maximize the competency of the firms. V( ) can consist 
of both positive and negative externalities. Positive externalities include consumer surplus, 
technological spillovers to other firms and negative externalities may include cost-duplication, 
business-stealing effects and negative environmentally effects (see section 1.2 of chapter one). 
However it is widely accepted in theory that positive externalities of R&D investment outperform 
the negative ones.  
ηi is the random shock to the spillovers from project i. This is observed by the agency only 
after that application and evaluation take place in stage 2, but is unobserved by the applicant and 
the econometrician in stage 1. It means the applicant is uncertain about how the agency assesses 
the project’s potential to generate spillovers for the agency’s civil servants. 
The term Zi in V( ) is a vector of observable firm characteristics which contains the same 
element of Xi , but also includes the evaluation main factors that technical committee assign to the 
projects based on their evaluation criteria. In the main model, the agency grades the project’s 
quality in two dimensions which are included in Zi, observed by the agency and the econometrician 
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but not by the firm. The remaining parts of the agency’s type, 𝜔𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔𝑖𝑚, are random shocks to 
the evaluation outcome of project i, in the grading dimensions 𝑐 and 𝑚, respectively, and are 
proxies for technical challenge and market risk of the projects. It is assumed in the model that 
grading process, its parameters, and the distribution of 𝜔𝑖𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑚} are common knowledge 
which let the firms anticipate the probability of getting a particular grade in each grading 
dimension conditional on observables. 
Related to our context, the goals of provincial law LP 6/99 articles 5 and 19 directly link 
to investment in applied research and diffusion of scientific research in the province. Moreover, 
the province is expected to increase business efficiency and effectiveness through “granting aids 
and credit facilities to firms, in all sectors apart from agriculture.”. Therefore, firms’ profit, beside 
the spillover generated to benefit the society can be included into the agency’s profit function.  
  2.4 Optimal subsidy rate 
To calculate the optimal rate of subsidy in an estimable model, a linear relationship 
between subsidy rate101 and firms and projects characteristics is predefined as the following: 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑅
=  𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖           (4) 
where 𝜆 is a vector of parameters which links the projects’ characteristics with spillover rate. Later 
it will be shown that this vector of λ represents spillover effects. ηi, as determined before is the 
shock to spillover rate.  
The optimum si to make the agency’s utility maximized takes into account the firms’ profit 
maximization of R&D investments (equations 1 and 2) and the spillover rate assumption (equation 
4).  
Deriving equation (3) with respect to 𝑠𝑖 we have: 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑖
= [ 
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑅𝑖
 ∙  
𝜕𝑅𝑖
𝜕𝑠𝑖
 ] +  [
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑅𝑖
 .
𝜕𝑅𝑖
𝜕𝑠𝑖
 ] +
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑠𝑖
−  𝑔𝑅𝑖 − 𝑔𝑠𝑖
𝜕𝑅𝑖
𝜕𝑠𝑖
  
Now using envelope theorem and substituting 𝑅𝑖 from equation (2) and  
∂v
∂𝑅𝑖
 from equation 
(4), we find si
∗: 
                                                          
101 Spillover per dollar of R&D investment: 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑅
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𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑖
= [(𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖).
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
2 ] +  [{
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
− (1 − 𝑠𝑖)}.  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
2  ] +  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
−
 𝑔  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
−  𝑔𝑠𝑖  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
2 =  [(𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖).
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
2 ] + [{ (1 − 𝑠𝑖) −  (1 −
𝑠𝑖)}. (
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
2  ] + 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
− 𝑔 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
−𝑔 𝑠𝑖 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
(1−𝑠𝑖)
2       
After cancelling out the common terms and multiplying both sides of the equation by (1 − si)
2 we 
have: 
0 =  𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖 +  (1 − 𝑠𝑖) − 𝑔 (1 − 𝑠𝑖) −  𝑔𝑠𝑖 =  𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖 +  1 − 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑔 + 𝑔𝑠𝑖 − 𝑔𝑠𝑖 = 1 − 𝑔 +
𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖  
which results in equation (5). 
𝑠𝑖
∗ = 1 − 𝑔 + 𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖         (5) 
  Equation (5) is verified as the maximum. Obviously, the higher the shadow cost of public 
funds (𝑔), the lower the subsidy rate becomes. Profitability shock of the R&D projects does not 
have effect on the amount of the grants to be allocated. 
Measures of spillover parameters 𝜆 and the variance of 𝜂𝑖 are attained by estimating 
equation (5) using the data for successful applicants. The vector of λ , shows how much the agency 
values the spillover generated from each Euro of R&D by project 𝑖 , in addition to the profit gained 
by the firm. The spillovers level can be measured by inserting λ into the equation of spillover 
obtained from integration of equation (4):   
𝑉(𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑖), 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜂𝑖) =  (𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖)𝑅𝑖        (6) 
The constant of the integration is 0 because spillovers are generated only due to positive 
investment in R&D. The vector of λ determines spillover effects by each project, i.e. the estimated 
marginal effect of the factors influencing the subsidy rate allocated to a project, is the spillover 
rate (𝜆).  
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2.5 The firm’s belief, application costs and application decision equations 
The firm will apply for the subsidy, if the expected profits out of the application are at least, 
as large as the profit of the project without applying. The expected profit obtained from application 
is calculated based on the firm’s beliefs about the agency’s evaluation of the project. The agency’s 
evaluation of project 𝑖, depends on its type, 𝑡𝑖
𝐴 = (𝜂𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑐, 𝜔𝑖𝑚) unknown to the firm prior to the 
application. Therefore, the firm i has a belief about 𝜂𝑖. Let 𝜙(𝜂𝑖) define the belief and Φ(𝜂𝑖) be 
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the belief. In addition, let 𝑝𝑖𝑗ℎ(𝜔𝑖𝑗) denote the 
probability that a firm’s application is graded ℎ ∈ {1, … ,5} in grading dimension 𝑗 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑚}. To 
formulate the application decision equation, an application cost is assumed as in equation (7): 
𝐾𝑖 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑌𝑖𝜃 + 𝜈𝑖)          (7) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is a vector of observable firm characteristics and 𝜃 is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated as application costs parameters. νi, the error term, is the application costs random shock 
observed by the firm and the agency but not the econometrician. Application costs are a component 
of 𝐹𝑖 in equation (3).  
The application decision rule proposed is shown in equation (8). The subscript i and the 
argument 𝜔𝑖𝑗 are dropped for simplicity:  
𝑑 = 1 { ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑝𝑚ℎ {𝜙 (𝜂(𝑐ℎ, 𝑚ℎ)) ∏(𝑅(0), 0)
5
𝑚ℎ=1
5
𝑐ℎ=1
+ ∫ ∏ (𝑅(𝑠(𝑐ℎ, 𝑚ℎ, 𝜂)), 𝑠(𝑐ℎ, 𝑚ℎ, 𝜂)) 𝜙(𝜂)𝑑𝜂 + [1 − 𝜙(?̅?(𝑐ℎ, 𝑚ℎ))] ∏(𝑅(𝑠̅), 𝑠̅)
𝜂(𝑐ℎ,𝑚ℎ)
𝜂(𝑐ℎ,𝑚ℎ)
} − ∏(𝑅(0), 0) − 𝐾 ≥ 0} 
(8) 
where 𝑑𝑖 is an indicator function that takes value 1, if a firm applies for a subsidy and 0 otherwise. 
In equation (8), the summations are over the potential grading outcomes. The first term in the inner 
braces is the expected profit in case the application is rejected. A rejection occurs when 𝜂𝑖 ≤ 𝜂𝑖 ≡
𝑔 − 1 − 𝑍𝑖𝜆 (where 𝑍𝑖 includes the grades 𝑐ℎ and 𝑚ℎ), that is, with probability Φ(𝜂𝑖). 
Correspondingly, the third term demonstrates the expected profits with a maximal subsidy rate, 
which the firm obtains with probability 1 − 𝛷(𝜂𝑖 ≡ 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑔 − 1 − 𝑍𝑖𝜆). The second term is then 
the expected profit where 𝜂𝑖 ∈ (𝜂𝑖, 𝜂𝑖) and the firm receives the optimal interior subsidy rate given 
by equation (5). The two last terms capture the opportunity cost of application. Beside the 
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application costs 𝐾𝑖, the firm takes into account the possibility of executing the project without a 
subsidy, where the project yields Π(𝑅𝑖(0), 0) (Takalo et al., 2013).  
In our context, the R&D subsidies allocation procedure takes three main forms of 
automatic, evaluative and negotiating procedures. As long as all the firms applying for R&D 
subsides in automatic procedures expect the subsidies allocation ex ante and are capable of 
estimating the subsidies rate, therefore the perceived belief of the firms about the subsidies are 
determined per se. In addition, our context is local which reduces the level of uncertainty about 
the decision of public agency in contrary to the national context which Tekes allocates funds. On 
the other hand, no access to the detailed technical and financial rankings of R&D projects in 
evaluative and negotiating procedures, limited us in estimating 𝜙 (𝜂(𝑐ℎ, 𝑚ℎ)). However,  the terms 
related to perceived expectations and beliefs have been discussed in order to show how the 
application decision equation is formed. Finally we can equally estimate the simplified application 
decision to investigate the firms’ characteristics effect on application decision. 
2.6 Equilibrium 
The game has a unique Perfect Nash Bayesian Equilibrium which let the model be 
econometrically estimated. The perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of four components: (a) a 
firm’s system of belief about the R&D project evaluation process including 𝑝𝑖𝑗ℎ(𝜔𝑖𝑗), 𝑗 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑚}, 
ℎ ∈ {1, … ,5}, and Φ(𝜂𝑖) that describes a common distribution of how the agency evaluates the 
firm’s project; (b) the firm’s decision whether to apply for a subsidy, 𝑑𝑖 ∈ {0,1}, given its beliefs; 
(c) the subsidy rate decided by the agency 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖
∗𝑑𝑖 which is the subsidy rate granted to the project 
𝑖, and (d) firm’s investment rule 𝑅𝑖
∗(𝑠𝑖).  
In order to prove the existence of a unique equilibrium, Takalo et al. (2013) show that 
equation (3) which defines the agency’s utility function, 𝑈(𝑅∗(𝑠), 𝑠) is concave and have a 
maximum point satisfying 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑅
= 0, while the profit function for firm’s R&D investment is 
optimized simultaneously. There is an equilibrium where 𝑑𝑖 is given by equation (8), and  𝑠𝑖 =
𝑠𝑖
∗𝑑𝑖 where 𝑑𝑖 is the acceptance or rejection status of project i and Ri(si), the R&D investment is 
identified by equation (2).  
The model like other counterparts in industrial organization literature has limitations and 
drawbacks. As firms are monitored after being allocated the R&D subsidies, it is assumed that no 
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moral hazard by the firms happens. This assumption also holds in our context as APIAE has 
assigned a department due to monitoring the project’s progress. Moreover, strong assumptions of 
no financial constraints (for the firms and agency) and fixed R&D costs (for the firms) hold. Fixed 
R&D costs can be left aside as long as firms with new R&D projects are assumed to do internal 
R&D, operating in the region102.  
Furthermore, to investigate whether firms are financially restricted, one can run the ideal 
test of Hall. Firms are offered a hypothetical payment and asked to choose between alternatives of 
use. If they select additional innovation projects, they must have had some unexploited investment 
opportunities that were not profitable using more costly external finance (Hottenrott & Peters, 
2012). The profit function of the firm can take other forms than logarithmic returns to R&D 
assumed in this model. The effect of subsidy rate on profit is assumed linear as 𝑘 = 1 for (1 − 𝑆𝑖)
𝑘 
in equation (1). If the null hypothesis of 𝑘 = 1 cannot be rejected then there is nonlinear effect of 
subsidy rate on additionality.  
In the following sections, after describing the data applied to estimate the model, the 
econometric model will be modified and framed, taking into account the institutional context 
(related to LP 6/99 in Province of Trento), the data specifications and restrictions and estimation 
settings. Then the constructed dataset gets applied into the econometric model and results obtained 
are discussed.  
3. Data and Variables 
The data on R&D subsidies rates for R&D projects are provided by APIAE. The data about 
firms’ projects and the contribution to the projects are for a period between 2005 to 2011. The 
dataset consists of detailed information on the projects excluding projects’ technical information, 
and the APIAE’s subsidy allocation decision. A part of the data on firm-level characteristics and 
R&D investment are provided by ISPAT office in Autonomous Province of Trento, which is a 
provincial equivalent of ISTAT. In addition, ISPAT provides the dataset ASIA103 which consists 
of the information on firms’ employment. ASIA complete dataset covers the period of 2000 to 
2011. The other part of the data comes from PITAGORA database of Cerved Group.  
                                                          
102 Even firms without internal R&D may externally and collaboratively do R&D activity. 
103 Archivio Statistico delle Imprese Attive 
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Firms doing R&D 
After polishing and cleaning the dataset from all missing values and outliers, the final 
dataset obtains 293 observations at firm level.104 Figure (1) depicts total number of observations 
which consist of the aggregation of all firms which have responded to R&D survey105 (247 
observations) and the firms which have been provided R&D subsidies by APIAE within the period 
from 2008 to 2010 (94 observations). The unit of analysis is firm-year (project-year in equations 
related to R&D projects). The firms’ responses to R&D questionnaire (RS survey) are collected 
by ISPAT, while the data for R&D subsidies are collected from APIAE. The data on firms’ 
characteristics are extracted from PITAGORA and ASIA datasets. The common area in figure (1) 
consists of 48 firms; i.e. 48 firms which have responded to R&S survey between 2008 to 2010 and 
have been subsidized for R&D projects in the same year.  
The variables defining the observations are firms’ responses to R&D questionnaire106 (If 
the survey has been responded), the data on R&D subsidy assigned to accepted applications and 
finally the data on firms’ characteristics. Table (1) describes the number of observations for each 
year with respect to R&D subsidies allocation and R&D survey response categories. 
 
Figure 1. The datasets and observations Venn diagram 
 
                                                          
104 The procedures to construct the final dataset from the primary dataset has been reviewed in Appendix (4.a). 
105 The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
106 CIS2008- CIS2009- CIS2010 
R&D 
surveyed 
firms
2008-2010
[ 247 firms]
R&D 
Subsidised 
firms 2008-
2010
[94 
firm(projects)]
48 firms 
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Table 1. Sample description: Number of R&D subsidized (treated) firms and R&D Innovation 
Survey respondents 
Year All firms R&D Subsidized  R&D Survey 
Respondents 
Subsidized and R&D 
Respondent 
2008 92 26 82 16 
2009 104 33 84 13 
2010 97 35 81 19 
Total 293 94 247 48 
 
Source: Community Innovation Survey (CIS) provided by ISPAT and dataset on grants assigned for applied research 
projects provided by APIAE 
 
 
In the following table (2), all variables being used in econometric estimations of the model 
are described. The description has been shown for all potential applicants (All the firms being 
targeted for R&D survey), subsidized firms and other firms which have not benefited from 
subsidies (either by not applying or not being allocated). Later in the section related to estimation 
of econometric equations, we will discuss about the variables applied in each equation.  
Not surprisingly, subsidized firms are on average smaller than non-subsidized, while the 
age does not differ between two group of the firms. The largest subsidized firm has 450 employees 
as non SMEs can also benefit from the incentives. Subsidized firms have a higher sale-to-employee 
amount with respect to their non-subsidized counterparts. The maximum number of board size of 
a company is 8 members and the minimum is 1. Nearly, half of the firms in all categories are 
exporting firms. At the same time more than 60% of the firms in all categories are SMEs. The 
annual actual R&D expenditure (the amount reported) is also shown in the table. As expected, the 
amount is higher for R&D subsidized firms in comparison to those not using R&D grants. 
The data on subsidized firms show that subsidized firms have planned to do R&D (based 
on their primary applications) on average about 1.3 million euros. The maximum planned project 
investment is expected to be around 9 million Euros. Moreover, the supported firms have had one 
previous allocation on average, while the maximum number of allocations reaches to six 
assignments. The public agency (APIAE) have covered 52% of the total costs of R&D projects in 
our sample, while the maximum subsidy rate allocated attains 80%.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables applied in estimation of the structural model  
 
 All potential applicants Subsidized applicants Non-Subsidized firms 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Size 81.29 172.26 1 1637 57.07 84.90 1 450 92.74 199.91 1 1637 
Age 18.34 14.18 0 62 18.40 14.89 0 62 18.32 13.86 1 53 
Sales per employee 310,177.9 808053.3 0 9,042,264 399,056.2 1,227,169 0 9,042,264 268,195.2 500,077.9 0 5,198,274 
Board Size 1.23 0.92 1 8 1.12 0.39 1 3 1.28 1.08 1 8 
Exporter (Dummy) 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.53 0.50 0 1 0.51 0.50 0 1 
SME 0.64 0.47 0 1 0.68 0.46 0 1 0.62 0.48 0 1 
R&D Expenditures (year) 593,773.3 820,240.6 4,000 5,521,000 739,562.5 815,468.4 7,000 3,351,000 558,608 819,542.6 4,000 5,521,000 
Planned R&D investment     1,298,585 1530747 48,559 8,823,200     
Number of Previous Applications     0.91 1.52 0 6     
Subsidy rate     0.52 0.21 0.05 0.80     
Expected (perceived) subsidy rate     0.54 0.22 0.05 0.80     
Subsidy amount     658,601.2 829126 7,233.9 5,606,350     
Evaluation method     2.06 0.68 1** 3     
Number of observation 293 94 199 
* Amounts are in € 
** Evaluation procedures: Automatic:1, Evaluative:2, Negotiating:3
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The projects have been installed on average an amount of 658 thousands Euros with a 
standard deviation of 829126 Euros. The grants allocated ranges between 7,234 to 5,606,350 
Euros. The allocation procedure tends more towards evaluative method as also described in 
previous chapter. In our representative sample the number of projects being granted by automatic, 
evaluative, and negotiating procedures are 19, 50 and 25 respectively. 
Next section deals with the econometric transformation of the reference theoretical model 
and the application of the data on variables in each estimation referring to model equations. 
4. Data implication, empirical strategy and econometric model  
4.1. Data and variables implication and empirical strategy 
Theoretical model of Takalo et al. (2013) as the reference is used to form an estimable 
econometric model based on the institutional settings. Statistical assumptions of the model are 
determined as well. Equations (2), (5) and (8) identifying R&D investment equation, subsidy rate 
decision equation and application decision equation are the fundamental equations of the 
theoretical model. Econometric equations link to these equations with substantial empirical 
modifications regarding our context. Moreover, the equations form the unique Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium. 
Variables have been described and discussed in the previous section. However, the final 
decision on the use of different variables involved in each specific equation is pointed out in table 
(3). The variables size, age, sales per employee and exporting status are applied in all estimations. 
However, for size factor, log of the number of employees is applied into application decision and 
investment equations, while SME factor is involved into subsidy rate equation due to the effect on 
subsidy amount allocated according to table (1) in chapter three. The table shows contribution 
percentages of evaluation procedures based on size and the effect of the project.  
SME definition is the one determined by EU and it is assumed in the model that a firm will 
not deliberately change the size to be SME for probable higher subsidy, thus SME is considered 
as an exogenous variable. SME definition provided by EU represents enterprises with fewer than 
250 employees or sales less than 40 million Euros or a balance sheet less than 27 million Euros. 
In the Italian context, the definition of SMEs does not always reflect the European Commission’s 
definition. However, in LP 6/99 SME definition is the one in line with EU definition. 
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Table 3. variables applied in equation estimations  
 
Explanatory variable 
in the econometric 
estimations 
Application decision 
equation 
Subsidy rate equation R&D investment equation 
Age ● ● ● 
Log of Employment ● ○ ● 
Sales/employee ● ○ ● 
SME ○ ● ○ 
Exporter ● ● ● 
Board Size ● ○ ● 
Industry dummies ● ● ● 
Dependent variable Dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the firm applies0 
for subsidy, and 0 otherwise 
Subsidy rate R&D investment declared in 
CIS questionnaire 
Sample Potential applicants (Firms 
which does R&D according 
to their response to the CIS 
Survey) 
Subsidized Applicants Subsidized applicants who 
have responded to CIS 
survey at the same year of 
the application acceptance 
Number of Observations 293 94 94 for planned investment 
and 48 for actual investment 
Estimation Probit model OLS OLS 
 
● the involvement of the variable in the estimation of the equation  ○: No involvement 
 
In fact, 99.9% of Italian enterprises are micro, medium and small enterprises employing less than 
250 employees. 
The exponential logarithm of employees squared, 𝐿𝑛(𝑒𝑚𝑝. ) 2, beside 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒⁄
2
 could 
have been taken into account for the estimations, to test the nonlinear correlation of related 
variables to the dependent variables. However, both these variables are excluded due to 
multicollinearity and high variance inflation factor (VIFs). Higher number of previous applications 
can be considered as more experience in completion of an application process because of learning 
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from previous application procedures, and consequently expected lower cost for application. 
Therefore, the number of previous applications cannot take parts in application decision equation 
due to high correlation with subsidy rate in correlation matrix. The variable is not included in 
investment equation estimation as well, because once a firm is subsidized, spends the same R&D 
amount regardless of the frequency of being previously supported. Hence, the variable drops from 
our estimations. 
Being an exporter, a firm can learn from exporting experience how to manage more 
effectively and efficiently the official and informal procedures for other types of interactions and 
transactions such as R&D subsidy application. On the other hand, the public agency probably 
expects an exporting firm to be more capable in accomplishing an R&D project. Therefore, being 
an exporter may influence agency’s decision on subsidy rates. In addition, being an exporter 
implies less financial restrictions in spending on new projects including R&D projects. Export 
dummy is applied in all equations.  
Industry sector dummies can arrive in all equation estimations. The sector classification is 
based on ateco 2007 economic activity coding. In the raw primary dataset there have been some 
industries with very low number of observations. We have kept those industries with at least one 
treatment happening inside. Table (4) shows the frequency of the observations and subsidies within 
each industry. The highest frequency of subsidies occur in manufacturing and ICT sectors. 
Table 4. The number of subsidized and non-subsidized firms in different sectors 
Sector Non-subsidized Subsidized 
Manufacturing (C)  122 60 
Construction (F) 5 7 
Whole sale and retail trade, 
repair of motors (G) 
9 1 
ICT (J) 39 21 
Scientific, technical and 
scientific activity (M) 
24 5 
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Evaluation method due to high correlation to the subsidy rates is excluded from the 
spillover equation estimation. Board size is involved in the application decision equation and R&D 
spending decision. collective decision making by the board members can influence the application 
decision and the amount the firm would invest in R&D. The bigger the board is, the higher 
becomes the probability for conflicts over application decision and R&D investment (Erbetta et 
al., 2011). Therefore, we also take into account board side as a factor variable.  
The sample used for application decision equation in the reference model includes all active 
firms while this study considers the firms which have been targeted by innovation survey. Hence, 
firms already doing R&D activities are considered as potential applicants. One different empirical 
feature of this chapter is that unlike Takalo et al. (2013) which consider all the firms in the country 
as potential applicants, we restrict the potential applicants to firms doing R&D and being targeted 
by RS survey. This does not challenge the estimation while it is assumed that there is no fixed 
R&D cost for R&D projects applications. In case the sample for potential applicants consists of all 
firms, the firm not having an R&D unit may spend the fixed cost for setting up R&D unit in order 
to apply for incentives. However, in this study the fixed set up cost is assumed to be zero, as all 
the potential applicants are the firms doing R&D.  
4.2 Econometric equations 
Equations to be econometrically estimated are formed based on the equations in the 
reference theoretical model. As previously mentioned this study skips estimation of grading 
equation as long the evaluation process is common knowledge and the dataset only includes the 
applications being allocated a subsidy, besides other potential applicants. The subsidy rate 
equation (5) which is the first-order condition of the public agency’s optimization problem is 
repeated as the following for convenience: 
𝑠𝑖
∗ = 1 − 𝑔 + 𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖         (9) 
Actual amounts of 𝑠𝑖 decided by APIAE for each firm-project are applied into the 
equation.107 The explanatory variables are firm characteristics mentioned in table (5). Spillover 
parameter 𝜆 and the variance ηi are realized estimating equation (9). The vector λ measures the 
                                                          
107 In the reference study 𝑠𝑖  has values minimum 0 and maximum of {0.5, 0.6} or the optimal value of ?̅?𝑖  as the 
subsidy rate. In our setting the subsidy rate ranges in an interval of [0.05, 0.80]. 
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spillover rate which shows how much each dollar of R&D by firm 𝑖 is valued by the public agency 
in addition to the effect of this spending on firm’s profit. Integrating equation (4) we have 
𝑉(𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑖), 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜂𝑖) =  (𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖)𝑅𝑖 which measures the spillover (not spillover rate) by inserting the 
estimated coefficients of 𝜆 and 𝜂𝑖.  
Using equations (1), (2), (6) and some algebra following Takalo et al. (2013), equation (8) 
of the model for application decision gets simplified to:  
𝑑𝑖 = 1{𝑋𝑖𝛽 − 𝑌𝑖𝜃 + 𝑙𝑛[−𝐸(𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝑠𝑖))] ≥ 𝜈𝑖 − 𝜀𝑖}      (10) 
where 𝑑𝑖 is a dummy variable in an indicator function form. If the firm has applied for subsidy 𝑑𝑖 
gets value 1, otherwise it takes 0.  
The 𝑠𝑖 in the equation are the perceived shares which firms expect to obtain by APIAE before the 
realization of the actual grants’ rates. An empirical feature of our study different from the reference 
model. In the reference model due to access to the pre-application perception of the firms on the 
grades their project would obtain after evaluation, they can measure equation (8) leading to 
estimation of the application cost function.  
In our setting, we do not possess the data about the ex-ante belief of the firms over their 
applications. However, we have the data regarding the estimated prediction of the firms over the 
R&D project cost before application, beside the admissible amount estimated by the agency and 
finally the ascertained amount installed into the projects.  
By calculating how much the contribution amount would have been assuming the estimated 
predicted amount of the project expenditures; we generate a new expected subsides rates which 
can be applied into the application decision equation. Although, the amount can be less precise 
than the actual belief system of the firms over applications, however, this simplify the model due 
to no requirement of technical and risk (in our setting the technical and financial) grades of the 
evaluation procedure. 108 
Moreover for future work, these expected amounts can be measured by a survey and 
investigation on firms’ applications documents as the firms know the type of their projects based 
                                                          
108 In order to measure expected subsidies, primarily A logic model based on the scheme of allocation related to 
table (1) in chapter 3, has been formed (appendix 4.b) It was an effort to describe the firm expected rate of subsidy 
before applying for the projects, however we do not use it in our estimations. 
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on specific criteria set by the agency. In other words, the firm knows per se whether the project 
falls into the category of automatic or non-automatic evaluation. This consequently leads to an 
expected 𝑠𝑖 which has the possibility to be different than the actual subsidy. For instant, when a 
firm supposes that the project may be awarded a subsidy of 75 percent of contribution by APIAE 
and after the evaluation and allocation the rate turns out to be 60 percent, then the decision function 
must be estimated by 𝑠𝑖 = 0.75, while the profit function must be estimated by 𝑠𝑖 = 0.6 .  
According to the reference model, Equation (10) forms the first stage of a sample selection 
model, where the second stage is the firm’s decision on R&D investment. In application decision 
equation parameters 𝜃 related to application costs are obtained by use of the estimation results of 
parameters 𝛽 of the investment equation.  
The final stage of the game is the R&D investment decision. The same as reference study, 
taking log of equation (2) yields equation (11): 
𝑙𝑛 𝑅𝑖
∗(𝑠𝑖) =  𝑋𝑖𝛽 − ln(1 −  𝑠𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖         (11) 
 The firm decides how much to invest after finding out the subsidy rate. However, as the 
actual investment of the firm is not yet observed, the investment 𝑅𝑖
∗(𝑠𝑖) is the planned R&D 
decision. In order to solve this problem, the planned R&D investment is applied to equation (11). 
The logic is that “an applicant strictly prefers proposing a budget based on a maximum subsidy 
rate over proposing any smaller amount and is indifferent between proposing that budget and any 
larger amount” (Takalo et al., 2013). Therefore, the applicant choose the investment amount 
assuming it would receive the maximum subsidy rate 𝑠?̅?. The investment equation by some 
substitution and rearrangement is: 
ln[(1 −  𝑠?̅? )𝑅𝑖
∗(𝑠?̅? )] = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖        (12) 
Equation (12) estimates 𝛽, which measures the effect of firm characteristics on the 
marginal profitability of R&D, beside the profitability shock 𝜀𝑖. The dependent variable is the log 
of the R&D investment the firm plans to carry out. Explanatory variables in the investment 
equation are as mentioned in table (3).  
In the reference model, the planned R&D has been used as dependent variable, therefore, 
the problem of endogeneity of subsidies in the investment equation does not make a problem. Even 
in cases when spillover shock 𝜂𝑖 is correlated with 𝜀𝑖 , there would be no problem in estimation of 
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the investment equation (12). As described in table (3), for the first stage of the self-selection 
model, we analyze the firms doing R&D, while for the second stage of R&D investment decision 
the sample would be the firms which have applied for R&D subsidy. In addition to planned 
investment, as long as we have the access to realized expenditures of the projects, we apply actual 
R&D expenditures as well. Estimation of investment equation using actual R&D investment, 
besides planned R&D investment is another empirical feature different from Takalo et al (2013).  
4.3 Statistical Assumptions 
 This section reviews the main statistical assumptions according to the reference model. 
All unobservable error terms (ε, η, ν, ϑ, 𝜔𝑗) are uncorrelated with observables. All shocks or error 
terms are assumed uncorrelated with other shocks. This assumption is different from the base 
model which consider application cost correlated with profit shock.109 Relaxing of this assumption 
helps us to measure the effect of the subsidies on additional R&D and spillovers in a less 
complicated method. The same as reference model, All shocks are assumed to be normally 
distributed.  
  Assumptions are as the following: 
(𝑎) ν = (1 + ρ)ε + ν0, (𝑏) η ⊥ ε , (𝑐)η ⊥ ν0, (𝑑) ε ⊥ ν0, (e)𝜔𝑗 ⊥ ε , j ∈ {𝑐, 𝑚}, (f) 𝜔𝑗 ⊥
η, (g) 𝜔𝑗 ⊥ ν0, j ∈ {𝑐, 𝑚}, (ℎ)𝜔𝑐 ⊥ 𝜔𝑚, (𝑖)η ~ Ν(0, 𝜎η
2), (𝑗) ε~ Ν(0, 𝜎ε
2), (𝑘)ν0~Ν(0, 𝜎ν0 ,
2 ),
(𝑙)𝜔𝑗~Ν(0, 1), j ∈ {𝑐, 𝑚}. 
All the parameters have been defined and determined in the section related to model discussion 
and econometric model. 
4.4 Implication of the theoretical assumptions 
The reference theoretical model is based on some assumptions. Information structure of 
the game model is assumed to be symmetric with incomplete information regarding the agency’s 
type in application stage. The agency learns the project’s type after grading and the firm’s type is 
common knowledge. The agency does not have a budget constraint. However, there is a cost of 
financing on the agency.  
                                                          
109 The base model has assumed this to allow those firms with high profitability shocks to face different application 
cost shocks. 
170 
 
Spillover 𝑉( ) is proportional to R&D investment as shown in equation (6). The firm’s 
investment is just a decision made by the firm. There is no binding contract between firm and the 
agency to oblige the firm to spend on R&D a specific amount according to the subsidy it receives. 
Moral hazard problems in the use of subsidy are assumed not to happen. There is no fixed R&D 
cost and constraints for firm’s R&D investment which is controversial with the credit rationing 
assumption. As a strong assumption, this is required to reach to a comprehensive model for the 
whole subsidy program and at the same time it is not that important at the project level than at the 
firm level (Takalo et al., 2013)  
The firm’s specific form of profit function has been defined in a way to make it possible to 
derive the estimation equations. This functional form is chosen ad hoc in the reference model 
assuming logarithmic returns to R&D widely accepted by the literature. The functional form of 
the second part in profit function (equation (1)) is given by the agency’s subsidy rules and has 
previously been used in the literature in industrial organization. The effect of the subsidy rate on 
the profit is assumed linear as 𝑘 = 1 for (1 − 𝑆𝑖)
𝑘 in equation (1). If the null hypothesis of 𝑘 = 1 
cannot be rejected then there is nonlinear effect of subsidy rate on additionality.  
5. Model Estimation and discussion  
Previous sections discussed how the theoretical model is linked to the empirical 
econometric model. Econometric model and all the specification of the equations were reviewed 
in the previous section. Equations (9), (10) and (12) demonstrating subsidy rate, application 
decision and R&D investment equations are estimated using the data described. The explanatory 
variables and the dependent variables involved in each estimation have been determined and 
previously discussed. The data and the samples have been defined in section (4) as well. In the 
following, the results of estimations are realized and discussed to investigate the hypotheses H.5 
through H.8 framed in section 3 of chapter 2. Table (5) reports the significant results for the 
estimations related to subsidy rate equation, application decision equation and R&D investment 
equation.  
5.1 Subsidy rate equation estimation  
In order to estimate the subsidy rate equation (9), we first consider the evaluation method 
categorical variable into the estimation. The other independent variables referred to table (5) 
include age, size (in terms of SME), being an exporter and industry dummies. The dependent 
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variable is the actual subsidy rates for 94 subsidized observations. As expected, the correlation 
matrix shows a high correlation (0.81) between evaluation method and subsidy rate (the dependent 
variable). In order to avoid this trouble, we run the estimations without the evaluation method 
categorical variables. Therefore, we exclude the evaluation method from the estimation. (appendix 
4.c). 
According to the reference model, coefficients can be interpreted as marginal effects of R&D 
on spillovers. The total number of observations to be applied in the estimation is 94. Age of the 
firm has a very slight negative effect on subsidy rates. One year of higher age reduces the subsidy 
rate only by 0.2%. If the relationship is linear, then everything equal, a firm 10 years younger may 
get 3% more subsidy rate.  
Moreover, changing from base industry (manufacturing industry) to construction increases 
subsides rate by 18% (with a 95% confidence interval). However, the number of firms in 
construction sector is relatively low. The constant is also significant which may imply the effect 
of unobservables on the subsidy rate. Furthermore, the constant is highly significant which may 
show that the effect of unobservable factors and 𝜂𝑖 on subsidy allocation play an important role. 
However, the effect is not so strong. This result can challenge the assumptions of previous chapter 
about the effect of unobservables on selection procedure. Finally the F test shows that R-squared 
is not zero (0.215), showing the estimation fits well.110 
Surprisingly, being an SME or the size of the firm have no significant effects on the subsidy 
rate. This shows the agency does not totally allocate the subsidies based on the scheme illustrated 
in table (1) of chapter three. Generally, public incentive programs focus more on supporting SMEs, 
in comparison to less financial-restricted larger companies. However, through a part of the 
literature and also in the reference model, it is declared that sometimes public authorities’ higher 
reliance and trust on larger firms’ projects than SMEs due to either higher project success 
probability and more importantly higher spillovers generation, can influence on public agency’s 
preferences in allocating incentives.  
                                                          
110 We have also estimated the spillover rate equation without taking into account the industry dummies. In this new 
setting, beside the age remaining significant, being an exporting firm reduces the subsidy rate by 13%. This can be 
in contrast to the belief that the agency may allocate more funds to the firms which export outside the region and 
to other states. 
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On the other hand, SMEs own the highest share of firms in Italian economy based on size. 
Trento Province is of no exception. Therefore, an established large firm can send a sign of success 
in survival through time. This can persuade the public agency to relatively direct higher support 
towards larger firms as their projects will be larger and consequently with a higher spillover effect. 
Autonomous Trento Province similar to other fast developing regions, concentrating on rapid 
growth within the past decades, the same phenomenon can occur. All these interactions may cancel 
out the impact of the size of the firm. 
5.2 Investment Equation Estimation 
The investment equation (12), determines the effect of explanatory firms’ characteristics 
on the marginal profitability of R&D projects. The investment amount in estimation equation 
stands for the planned and proposed expenditures for projects111 and total R&D expenditures in a 
specific year (actual annual spending)112. Estimation has been carried out for both variables of 
actual spending and planned R&D investment, as dependent variables. The explanatory variables 
consist of size(in terms of log of employment), the sales-to-employee, exporting, board size and 
sector classification. The results in table (5) for 48 observations, show that size has a significant 
positive effect on actual R&D expenditure. The larger is the firm, the more she spends on annual 
R&D. The R-squared (0.44) is significantly high, showing the data are close enough to the fitted 
regression line.  
After, we take the variable related to planned R&D expenditure as the dependent variable. 
Results for 94 observations, show that age of the firm is negatively related to the planned R&D, 
while size the same as actual investment equation, has a stronger positive effect. Sales/employee 
has a significant positive linear effect, however the effect is quite close to zero. The firms in 
construction sector may plan to invest less in R&D with respect to manufacturing sector. The 
constant is also positive significant implying unobservables may have effect on the R&D 
profitability. Finally, R-squared is significantly high (0.51). The detail estimated measures are 
shown in Appendix (4.d).  
  
                                                          
111 Total expenditure: Spesa-Totale (In Italian) 
112 The investment dependent variable represents the amount declared in the CIS (Community Innovation Survey). 
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Table 5 Subsidy rate, application function and R&D investment estimation results 
 
Variables 
 
Subsidy Rate 
Equation (9) 
 
Application 
decision 
Equation (10) 
R&D Investment 
variable: 
the Planned R&D 
expenditures 
Equation (12) 
 
R&D Investment 
variable: 
the annual R&D 
expenditures 
Equation (12) 
Age -0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.027*** 
(0.008) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
Log of Employment _ -0.167** 
(0.68) 
0.622*** 
(0.95) 
0.53*** 
(0.14) 
Sales/employee -0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.000* 
(0.00) 
0.000** 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
Exporter -0.087 
(0.054) 
0.20 
(0.20) 
0.048 
(0.27) 
0.56 
(0.53) 
Board Size __ -0.204* 
0.124 
-0.20 
(0.24) 
0.21 
(0.44) 
SME -0.058 
(0.055) 
_ _ _ 
Industry sector dummies 0.185** Δ 
(0.084) 
Significant for 3 out 
of 4 sectors  
-1.00** Δ 
(0.397) 
Not Sig. for any 
sector._ 
Constant 0.655*** 
(0.048) 
0.072 
(0.28) 
11.38 
(0.41) 
3.009*** 
(0.076) 
R-Squared 0.26 0.058 (pseudo R2 ) 0.51 0.44 
Number of Observations 94 293 94 48 
* 90% confidence level (p<0.1) **95% confidence level (p<0.05) ***99% confidence level (p<0.001) 
Δ Significant only for construction sector. 
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5.3 Application Decision Estimation  
A probit regression is applied to identify the effects of the firm characteristics on the 
application decision for 293 observations. As previously noticed, previous subsidy application 
variable has been put aside due to the occurrence of statistical error due to multicollinearity in 
probit estimation. The determining factors are age, size (in terms of log of employment), sales per 
employee, being exporter, board size and sector dummies. The uncentered VIFs are checked after 
probit estimation and there is no multicollinearity between variables and the dependent variable. 
The results show that larger firms less probably apply for the subsidies. The sale-to-employee 
has a significant effect, however the effect is negligible. The board size has a negative effect on 
the probability to apply in this estimation. The bigger gets the board size of a firm, the less probable 
the firm applies. The results indicate that sector of activity (except for ICT) affects the application 
decision. Finally, the probit estimates are generated after four iterations and chi-squared is 21.62. 
The previous sections have discussed the effect of firm characteristics on different stages of an 
R&D support program. The analysis investigates the influence of age and size of the firm, beside 
other explanatory factors on the mechanisms which connects R&D subsidies to R&D expenditures. 
It can be implied that beside the sector, age and size of the firms  can influence the application, 
allocation (selection) and investment decisions. This can make us more reliable on the 
determinants applied for subsides effect evaluation in the previous chapter as well. The following 
section concludes the results and suggest policy implications.  
 
6. The effect of subsidies on additional R&D and spillover effect 
In section 2.2, it has been shown that the additional investment by being granted can be 
calculated as: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠 =
 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
1−𝑠𝑖
− 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖) =  
𝑠𝑖
1−𝑠𝑖
 . 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖)       (13) 
Referring to table (5), by applying the estimated coefficients related to covariates for 
investment equations, 𝛽, into additional expenditure equation, we can calculate 𝑋𝑖𝛽.
113 
                                                          
113 Using predict command in stata for investment equation(s) 
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Consequently, as long as the predicted amount gives us ln [(1 − 𝑆𝑖)𝑅𝑖], we can measure the 
predicted optimal amount of planned R&D expenditures, let us call 𝑅?̅?, by 
estimating 
 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
1−𝑠𝑖
. The additional amount spent for each firm referred to equation (13) is 
measured by 𝑆𝑖 𝑅?̅?. Finally, the R&D subsidies additionality can be measures by comparing 
this optimal amount with the planned (and actual) R&D investment by each firm and on 
average for the whole population. All these calculations being carried out, the average for 
additional R&D expenditure is -283,626.8 (with standard deviation of 1,339,751) and less than 
zero, showing a crowding out effect114. The highest crowding out is 7,886,245 and the 
maximum additional investment is 3,558,113Euros.  
Unlike Takalo et al. (2013), we also have the access to data on actual R&D expenditures. 
Therefore, we can measure the additional, substituted or crowded out expenditures comparing 
the estimated predicted R&D expenditure just measured with the actual amount of investment. 
The same as the comparison with planned R&D expenditure, the results show an average of -
1,331,523 Euros have been crowded out. The results for both cases is displayed in table (6). 
 
Table 6. The difference between the optimal R&D expenditure (predicted by model) and the 
planned/ realized R&D spending 
 Mean Std. dev. Min Max Observations 
The additional R&D 
expenditure 
(regarding planned 
R&D investment) 
-283626.8 1,339,751 -7,886,245 3,558,113 
 
94 
The additional R&D 
expenditure 
(regarding actual 
R&D investment) 
-1,331,523 1,413,050 -6,456,908 -95,408.49 48 
 
                                                          
114 As a reminder, crowding out is a reduction in private investment that occurs because of an increase in government 
borrowing. 
176 
 
In order to measure the spillovers effect of subsides, we plug the estimated coefficients 
related to subsidy rate equation (9)115, or in other words spillover rate equation into equation 
(6) in order to estimate 𝑉(𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑖), 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜂𝑖) =  (𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖)𝑅𝑖. 𝑅𝑖can be the planned or the actual 
amount of R&D investment. The variable 𝑉,shows how much spillover will be generated of 
spending 𝑅𝑖 Euro. Hence, (𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖) as also shown in the section related to theoretical 
framework, is the spillover rate of each Euro being spent on research and development. Table 
(7) describes the spillover rate and spillover generated by R&D investment. 
 
Table 7. The spillovers and spillover rate generated by subsidized firms’ R&D investment  
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Spillovers by 
planned 
investment 
647,364.4 753,545.9 27794.08 4,709,812 94 
Spillovers by 
actual investment 
343,899 393,903.4 3.093893 1728.418 48 
Spillover rate 0.519 0.11 0.25 0.79 94 
 
Table (7) shows  out of one euro of additional R&D investment by subsidized firms 50 
Eurocents would spill over the network in the region. However, this all based on the assumption 
that all projects will lead to spillover effect. Moreover, on average 343,899 Euros are leaked into 
the network from annual R&D investment of private firms.  
7. Conclusion  
This chapter has estimated the equations of a modified reference structural model for public 
R&D incentive program using local data related to a place-based R&D grants allocation to firms 
in the province of Trento in Italy. The game-theoretical model structured by application decision, 
subsidy rate and R&D investment equations has a Nash equilibrium. The estimation of the 
econometric model (derived from the theoretical model) identifies the effect of different firm 
characteristics on participation decision of the firm, the subsidy rate decision assigned to firms’ 
                                                          
115 𝑠𝑖
∗ = 1 − 𝑔 + 𝑍𝑖𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖, 𝜆 :spillover rates, We assume agency’s opportunity cost g=1. 
177 
 
projects by the local government and the planned or actual amounts spent on R&D by the firm. 
The estimated covariates within each equation differ according to the mechanism of subsidy 
allocation. 
One empirical feature of this study is showing how a different context can lead to different choices 
on model variables and the different effects of these explanatory variables on outcome. This even 
shows better when the application decision equation based on the belief of the firms over the 
evaluation grades is simplified due to access to data on predicted R&D expenditures. Data on 
actual subsidy rates, R&D expenditures and firms’ characteristics are provided from different data 
sources and merged together to shape the dataset applied for estimations. The results show how 
firm characteristics influence each part of the R&D subsidy program. Age and size characteristics, 
beside the sector in which the firms operates in, affect the decisions of both the firm and the agency 
sides. Moreover, The context and dataset features allow for different empirical modifications with 
respect to the benchmark model applied. The results determine the effect of firm (project) 
characteristics on all stages of the subsidization game. Size, age, exporting status, board size and 
sector are main factors being investigated. The results show not only there is no additional R&D 
expenditure, but also crowding out of subsidies occurs The base model is determined in such a 
format which makes it possible to evaluate the spillover effect and spillover rate of R&D spending 
as well. The results show that on average half (50%) of each euro spent on R&D spill overs. 
Previous Chapter 3 dealt with measuring the effect of R&D subsidies on productivity 
controlling for firm characteristics such as size and age as control variables through different 
sectors. However, unobservable factors’ effect and spillover effects were not presumed in the 
methodology used to estimate the effect. This chapter estimates the impact of characteristics on 
R&D application decision, subsidy allocation and R&D investment allowing for unobservables 
effect and spillovers. This can shed light on the black box of R&D causal effect on outcome 
targeted variables. Therefore, current chapter offers a complementary approach to the previous 
chapter estimating the place-based policy model. 
Finally, the structural model estimation can be compared with the ex-post treatment 
analysis, evaluating the R&D policy after the implementation. The evaluation of direct impact of 
R&D subsidies on target variables such as total factor productivity (chapter 3) combined with 
modelling the R&D policy (chapter 4), may provide policy makers (at local, regional and  national 
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levels) insights about the future policy designs or policy modifications. Application of new model 
specifications related to other different institutional contexts, relaxing some theoretical 
assumptions and finally use of other datasets at regional (local) and national levels, allow for a 
comparative policy estimation which can be an interesting topic for future studies.
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 Appendices: 
Appendix 1.a 
 
Figure 1.a.1 Total R&D Expenditure to GDP (GERD/GDP) and Business R&D Expenditure to GDP 
(BERD/GDP) at EU national level in 2012  
Source: Elaboration to ISTAT report based on The European system of national and regional accounts 
(ESA 2010) 
Figure (1.a.1) shows the amount of gross national R&D expenditures to GDP at national 
level for year 2012. R&D expenditure in the EU-28 countries accounted for 2.01% of the EU GDP. 
Figure identifies the total national R&D intensity as one of the key factors of Europe 2020 strategy 
 in the forms of expenditure116(GERD) and business (private) R&D expenditure117 (BERD) within 
the European context.  
Finland (3.43%), Sweden (3.28%) and Denmark (3.03%) were the only countries 
performed above the 3 percent ratio. These were followed by Germany (2.88%) and Austria 
(2.81%), and well above France (2.23%), the Netherlands (1.81%) and the United Kingdom 
(1.63%). As one of the largest economies in the EU, Italy (1.26%)118 is performing less than 
Portugal (1.37%), Hungary (1.38%) and Spain (1.27%). The R&D intensity (the ratio of GERD to 
GDP) increased from 1.31% in 2013 to 1.38% in 2014. Italy’s 2020 target of 1.53% is not out of 
reach; however, the country still should spend on R&D to achieve the 3% target of the 2020 
strategy, currently matched only by Scandinavian economies. (Sources: Italian National Institute 
of Statistics [ISTAT119] report on scientific research and Eurostat report on research and 
development statistics). 
  
                                                          
116 The gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) 
117 Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) 
118 With an increase of 0.05 percent compared to 2011. 
119 ISTAT (In Italian: Istituto nazionale di statistica) is a public research organization founded in 1926 as the main 
producer of official statistics at the service of citizens and policy-makers. ISTAT has been performing the role of 
directing, coordinating, and providing technical assistance and training within the National Statistical System (Sistan) 
since 1989.  
 Appendix 1.b Share of innovative enterprises120 in total number of enterprises at national and 
regional level   
 
Figure 1.b.1 Share of innovative enterprises for EU countries in 2012 
Source: EU Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
The percentage of Italian innovative enterprises in 2010-2012 period, was above the 
European average (41.5 percent versus 36.0 percent). Figure (1.b.1) illustrates the share of 
innovative enterprises in Europe. Many northern countries like Sweden, Finland and the 
Netherlands follow Germany with a 55% share at the top of the list. Ireland (42.3%), Italy, Portugal 
(41.3%) and Estonia (38.4%), being above the European average had more innovative firms than 
                                                          
120 An innovative firm is one that has implemented an innovation during the period under review according to Oslo 
manual.  
 France (36.7%) and UK (34.0%). Eastern Europe and Spain had a low propensity for innovative 
enterprises compared to the average. 
The number and percentage of innovative enterprises in Italy increased from 31.5% to 35.5% 
(above the European average) between 2010 to 2012. Figure (1.b.1) shows Italy in 2012, has a 
high percentage of innovative enterprises mostly SMEs (more than 40% of enterprises do 
innovation) in Europe. Innovation activity was mostly focused in large industrial enterprises with 
a value of 45.4% in comparison to 29.5% in service sector and 20.3% in the construction sector 
(ISTAT report on Innovation in Italian enterprises, December 2014). 
At regional level, the northern regions represent the majority of innovative enterprises. In 
2010 to 2012 period, the most innovative region has been Veneto (43.5%), followed by Friuli-
Venezia Giulia (41.1%), Piedmont (39.2%) and Lombardy (39.1%). Figure (1.b.2), illustrates the 
number of innovative enterprises for different regions in Italy.  
The noticeable fact here is the significant difference of Veneto region in different rankings 
based on total R&D expenditures and innovative enterprises ratios for this period. For instead, in 
the period of 2010 to 2012, Veneto with an amount just slightly higher than 1% for total R&D 
expenditure to GDP and an amount around 0.7% for private R&D expenditure to GDP; stands just 
in the middle of the ranking table, while at the same time span, the region has the highest ratio for 
innovative firms to total number of enterprises. One explanation can be, although there are many 
innovative enterprises, however those entities invest smaller amount for their R&D projects in 
comparison to their counterparts in other regions like Emilia-Romagna or Trento.  Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia  and Toscana, follow the same story but less striking. Not surprisingly, Lazio does not posit 
in top of the list for innovative enterprises ratio, but it performs as one of the best in respect to total 
R&D expenditures ratio, most probably because the state invest significant larger amounts in R&D 
compared to private enterprises in the region.  
The lowest values happen for Molise (20.1%), Valle d’Aosta (22.3%) and Calabria 
(23.8%). Puglia (30.4%) and Basilicata (28.3%) represent the highest measures for R&D 
enterprises intensity among southern regions. Based on the ISTAT report, enterprises in the north 
regions tend to adopt different types of innovations, while firms in the center except Toscana, do 
not take this combined approach.   
  
Figure 1.b.2 The share of innovative enterprises with less than 10 employees for regions in Italy, 
2010-2012 
Innovative enterprises in Trento has a share of 33.7% of total enterprises (with more than 
10 employees), slightly higher than the Italian average (31.2%). According that the autonomous 
province of Trento has one of the highest total R&D expenditure ratio in comparison with other 
regions, it is implied that public agency (the province) has significantly invested in R&D. The 
regulations for R&D stimulation enacted in 1999 in the province and the agency Trento province 
has introduced due to reach this aim in 2009, confirm the desire of the province for  higher public 
or private R&D investment. 
 Appendix 3.a 
Model (1) formulates the basic model primarily proposed by CCR in 1978 as the following: 
 
    Model (1) 
 
The solution of this model demonstrates the maximum relative efficiency related to unit 𝑗0, 
subject to the fact that the efficiency of all other units is restricted to be below 1 (100%). This is 
more like a system approach and engineering perspective towards a decision making unit in 
specific a firm, which the efficiency of the system is bounded between zero and one. The 
interesting feature of this model is that variables 𝑢𝑟 and 𝑣𝑖 which are the relative weights for 
outputs and inputs respectively are unknown and will be realized by putting information about the 
quantity of inputs and outputs for each DMU for 𝑛 different objective functions with the same 
restrictions.  Variables 𝑢𝑟 and 𝑣𝑖 are actually the unknown parameters to be measured flexibly by 
solving the CCR model. 
Model (1) is a fractional linear model which cannot be solved using standard linear 
programming (LP) methods; hence a trick to set the denominator of the equation equal to 
 1(100%)121 and adding the same assumption to the restrictions the model is subjected to, will turn 
model (1) to a linear programming model as formulated in model (2).  
    Model (2) 
 
Model (2) must be separately solved for each unit which means to generate the relative 
efficiency measures for all the units; a mathematical optimization problem in ‘primary form’ with  
𝑡 + 𝑚 variables and 𝑛 + 𝑡 + 𝑚 + 1 constraints must be solved. Although the constrains are all the 
same in each turn of solution, however in practice because the number of units 𝑛 is large the 
computation problem takes more memory and time. One can benefit from duality theorem in LP 
due to optimize the computation efficiency.  
As long as the constraints are the same in each turn of calculation and the ‘dual form’ of 
the primary model (model M2) will have 𝑚 + 𝑡 constraints which is way less than primary form’s 
𝑛 + 𝑡 + 𝑚 + 1 constraints in application. For example if the number of units are 20 and the model 
has three inputs and one output then solution to primary problem takes into account 25 constraints, 
while solution to dual problem demands consideration of only 4 constraints. Consequently, 
computation of the dual form is more efficient. The dual form of model (2) will be formulated as 
the following:  
                                                          
121 This modification is possible because in maximization of a ratio the important thing is to maximize the relative 
magnitudes of numerator to denominator while the actual values of them do not count. Therefore, it is possible to 
set the denominator constant to any fixed value (arbitrarily and preferably 1 or 100) and optimize the numerator. 
  
Model (3) 
 
It is not only computational convenience that makes the dual form interesting. Values of 
𝜆𝑗s are used to construct a composite unit outperforming counterpart unit  𝑗0. The unit  𝑗0 is efficient 
if slacks 𝑠𝑖
−𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑟
+ are zero and 𝑍𝑜 is equal to one. However, if unit  𝑗0 is inefficient then 𝑍𝑜 is 
lower than one and/or slacks are positive. This model is known as BCC (1984) model which is 
capable to measure the variable return to scale as well.   
 Appendix 3.b Dataset Construction Procedures 
Due to construction of the dataset used in this essay, The APIAE and AIDA datasets will 
be partially merged together with other datasets provided by ISPAT. These datasets include 
PITAGORA dataset and dataset related to CIS (Community Innovation Survey). PITAGORA 
provides balance sheet data and CIS dataset (RS dataset) covers information about R&D activity 
by firms in Trento.Table (3.b.1) shows number of R&D subsidizations for each year. The data for 
R&D subsidies are available from 2001 up to 2013. It describes the number of firm-year 
observations where the complete data for different consecutive years (from two to seven years) in 
order to measure the Malmquist Productivity Index is available. Year 2007 has been dropped out 
because the data for tangible fixed asset as an input in year 2007 is used in order to calculate 
moving average tangible fixed asset for the year 2008 due to measure the frontier.  
Table 3.b.1 Treatment frequency by year from 2001 to 2013 and the total number of observations 
including observations  with missing values from 2007 to 2014 
YEAR NUMBER OF TOTAL 
OBS. IN AIDA 
DATASET USED FOR 
PRODUCTIVITY 
MEASUREMENT  
NUMBER OF  
R&D SUBSIDIES 
 (TREATMENTS) 
 
2001 _ 1  
2002 _ 4  
2003 _ 18  
2004 _ 38  
2005 _ 41  
2006 _ 24  
2007 
 
5484 38  
2008 5485 38  
2009 5478 47  
2010 5466 69  
2011 5453 89  
2012 5419 153  
2013 5488 40  
2014 5506 _  
TOTAL _ 600  
 The occurrence of the consecutive years can obtain different scheme; for example for 4 
years of consecutive data, we can have the years between 2009_2013 or 2011_2014 or other 
possible combinations of years. Interestingly, there are 831 observations with 7 year of consecutive 
data availability which is the main pattern for measuring the impact of R&D subsidy program of 
total factor productivity. However, in case of treatment measurement for a pre and post treatment 
effect we have to notice the fact that the observations without consecutive data can also be 
considered into analysis. For instant, if a firm is treated in 2010 and we have the data required to 
measure Malmquist Index (efficiency or technical change) between 2009 and 2011 then the 
observation can remain in the analysis. Malmquist Index is measured only using observations 
without any missing values for inputs-output variables.  
The number of observations (firm-year) for different previous treatment received is pointed 
out in table (3.b.2). 43,189 out of 44379 observations have not been treated at any point for the 
period between 2001 to 2013. A pattern of the subsidies allocation over time has been provided 
for an example of enterprises in appendix. Each enterprise is labeled  with a unique fiscal code.   
Table 3.b.2 Distribution of number of previous subsidies received for all firm-year observations 
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS R&D SUBSIDIES 
(TREATMENT) RECEIVED BY AN ENTERPRISE IN A SPECIFIC YEAR 
NUMBER OF  
OBSERVATIONS 
0 43,189 
1 580 
2 297 
3 164 
4 64 
5 31 
6 19 
7 12 
8 11 
9 6 
10 6 
 
 Measuring the Malmquist Index, observations with consecutive years of available 
information on inputs and outputs are required due to capture the change. As previously noted, the 
data used for MPI calculation relates to the years after 2008. Hence, the maximum number of 
possible years for the analysis will be seven years while the minimum years of available data is of 
course two years. Moreover, the user-written STATA code to measure the MPI has the feature 
which generates the efficiency results only for observations with the same exact numbers of years 
for data available. In other words, the requirement to compile the data is to build a balanced panel 
dataset.  
Table (3.b.3) traces the frequency of exact consecutive years for available Malmquist 
measures as the output target variables. Availability of an exact period of four consecutive years 
represents the highest number of firms (947), followed by a period of consecutive seven years for 
831 firms. The next frequency represents firms obtaining only exact 2 years of consecutive data 
with 595 firms. Trading off to obtain the highest number of observations; forming a balanced panel 
dataset with observations including firms with seven consecutive years of input/output information 
will be the best option.122 
Table 3.b.3 Number of maximum consequences of years for enterprises (starting 2008 to 2014) to 
form the balanced dataset  
NUMBER OF MAXIMUM CONSEQUENCES OF YEARS 
 FOR OBSERVATIONS (STARTING 2008 TO 2014) 
FREQUENCY OF 
ENTERPRISES 
2  595 
3 276 
4 947 
5 177 
7 831 
 
Finally, the primary balanced panel dataset to measure MPI measures provides information 
on inputs (number of employees, moving-average tangible asset  as the proxy for capital and the 
intermediate inputs) and output(Total revenue), leading to calculation of total factor productivity 
components. After generating the measures for total factor productivity, the panel data will be 
                                                          
122 At the same time 7 × 831 = 5817 represent the highest number of observations in comparison with all other 
settings.  
 merged with the dataset related to the R&D subsidies. Obviously, the subsidies happening before 
2008 will be dropped as the productivity measures dates after 2008. Subsequently, the new panel 
dataset has the information on treatment in binary format and the total factor productivity 
measures, together with variables representing the covariates due to carry out PSM method.  
 Excel table (3.b.4) covers a snapshot of the balanced panel dataset formed and constructed 
by a complex long data cleaning, merging and coding processes. First column denotes the firm as 
the decision making unit (DMU). After data cleaning, polishing and restructuring there remain 
4151 observations (firm-year), i.e. longitudinal data for 593 enterprises within 7 years (from 2008 
to 2014). INP1, INP2 and INP3 represent inputs as number of employees, capital proxy and 
intermediate inputs. The scale for INP2 and INP3 are thousand Euros. DEA method is not scale 
sensitive to the dimension, hence scale of inputs or outputs do not matter as long as they change 
by the same proportion. OUT1 is the total revenue in thousand Euros to be used as the output for 
MPI model. Applying inputs/output quantities in Malmquist model using CRS output-orientated 
DEA; the total factor productivity change and all components of the Malmquist Index will be 
generated.  
These measures will be lagged to investigate the short-term and long term effect of the 
R&D subsidy program. Malmquist Index captures the change of distance measures, therefore there 
will not be any measure for year 2008, as we do not possess the information for one input (moving-
average-fixed-asset) in 2007. Thus, the efficiency measures are related to a period of 6 years from 
2009 to 2014. This allows to check a maximum lag of 5 years (5 different lags) for each index. All 
the indices defining total factor productivity change  have been explained in the main text. 
Control variables as mentioned previously, are size, age and the sector which enterprise 
operates. To measure the impact of R&D subsidy, control variables (the independent variables for 
selection) size and age are lagged one year due to control the delay of their effect on treatment 
decision. Sector (industry) counts for another control observables to be controlled in PSM method.  
The balanced panel dataset constructed and used in this study include many other variables 
which can be used for further investigations or different setting up of the models beside robust 
checks. One variable used is production price index (PPI) which can be used to deflate the 
production factors mainly revenue. PPI index has been merged from the dataset provided by 
ISTAT. The base year for the index is 2010.  The dataset provides information on various other 
 variables like denomination of the firm (company name), number of recorded subsidiaries, SIC 
industry code, mergers or acquisitions, number of directors in the board, number of companies in 
corporate group, total inventory and profit and loss measure. In addition, it consists of detailed 
data on R&D subsidies.  
Table 3.b.4 Excel sheet: A brief illustration of the final balanced panel dataset used for 
policy impact evaluation 
DM U Y ear R &D Sub INP1 INP2 INP3 OUT1 tfpch effch techch pech sech A ll TFP measures  lagged  fo r 5-4 -3 -2 -1 years
1 2008 0 26 462 .49 2886 .317 3769 .669 . . . . .
1 2009 0 26 627.88 2899 .445 3804 .715 1.0012 0 .96554 1.036945 1.06459 0 .907
1 2010 0 25 1074 3015.055 3940 .154 1.0288 1.09388 0 .940543 1.04683 1.0449
1 2011 1 27 1285.9 3103 .736 4042 .052 1.009 0 .88893 1.135111 1.02305 0 .8689
1 2012 0 28 1127.1 3283 .907 4236 .737 0 .9651 0 .90968 1.060889 0 .96684 0 .9409
1 2013 0 25 1042 .5 3284 .503 4188 .073 1.0068 0 .99881 1.007998 1.05638 0 .9455
1 2014 0 25 994 .27 3129 .209 3993 .477 1.0084 1.15848 0 .870468 0 .99553 1.1637
j 2008 0 x1 r1 f1 k1 . . . . .
j 2009 0 x2 r2 f2 k2 t2 a2 c2 p2 h2
j 2010 0 x3 r3 f3 k3 t3 a3 c3 p3 h3
j 2011 1 x4 r4 f4 k4 t4 a4 c4 p4 h4
j 2012 0 x5 r5 f5 k5 t5 a5 c5 p5 h5
j 2013 0 x6 r6 f6 k6 t6 a6 c6 p6 h6
j 2014 0 x7 r7 f7 k7 t7 a7 c7 p7 h7
n 2008 0 y1 s1 g1 l1 . . . . .
n 2009 0 y2 s2 g2 l2 u2 b2 d1 q2 i2
n 2010 0 y3 s3 g3 l3 u3 b3 d2 q3 i3
n 2011 1 y4 s4 g4 l4 u4 b4 d3 q4 i4
n 2012 1 y5 s5 g5 l5 u5 b5 d4 q5 i5
n 2013 0 y6 s6 g6 l6 u6 b6 d5 q6 i6
n 2014 0 y7 s7 g7 l7 u7 b7 d6 q7 i7
 
DM U Y ear CNTR OL1:S ize S ize-lagged CONTR OL2:A ge A ge-lagged Industry Code:A TECO2007 3-2 -1 d ig it  Industry Code Industry Dummies  Production Price Index(PPI)
1 2008 26 26 88 89 471140 471,47,4 W holesale and  retail D 100 .6069
1 2009 26 25 89 90 471140 471,47,4 W holesale and  retail D 100 .2478
1 2010 25 27 90 91 471140 471,47,4 W holesale and  retail D 100 .0081
1 2011 27 28 91 92 471140 471,47,4 W holesale and  retail D 101.5068
1 2012 28 25 92 93 471140 471,47,4 W holesale and  retail D 102 .5249
1 2013 25 25 93 94 471140 471,47,4 W holesale and  retail D 102 .8415
1 2014 25 . 94 . 471140 471,47,4 W holesale and  retail D 103 .3912
j 2008 x1 x2 w1 w2 631110 631,63 ,6 ICT D p1
j 2009 x2 x3 w2 w3 631110 631,63 ,6 ICT D p2
j 2010 x3 x4 w3 w4 631110 631,63 ,6 ICT D p3
j 2011 x4 x5 w4 w5 631110 631,63 ,6 ICT D p4
j 2012 x5 x6 w5 w6 631110 631,63 ,6 ICT D p5
j 2013 x6 x7 w6 w7 631110 631,63 ,6 ICT D p6
j 2014 x7 . w7 . 631110 631,63 ,6 ICT D p7
n 2008 y1 y2 z1 z2 310930 310 ,31,3 M anufacturing  D o1
n 2009 y2 y3 z2 z3 310930 310 ,31,3 M anufacturing  D o2
n 2010 y3 y4 z3 z4 310930 310 ,31,3 M anufacturing  D o3
n 2011 y4 y5 z4 z5 310930 310 ,31,3 M anufacturing  D o4
n 2012 y5 y6 z5 z6 310930 310 ,31,3 M anufacturing  D o5
n 2013 y6 y7 z6 z7 310930 310 ,31,3 M anufacturing  D o6
n 2014 y7 z7 . 310930 310 ,31,3 M anufacturing  D o7
 
  
 Appendix 3.c  
Data and variables related to enterprises active in the region 
The data on entities in the province comes from Aida123 dataset which is the Bureau van 
Dijk’s product on company information for Italy. Aida covers firm-level data about one million 
companies. In this study, the basic primary dataset extracted from the Aida database includes 
information for 5,506 enterprises operating in Trento province for 7 years from 2007 to 2014. This 
shapes a balanced dataset with 44,048 observations at firm-year level. Not surprisingly, the dataset 
contains  missing values for different variables in which we are interested to carry out our analysis. 
However, it will be polished and cleaned before running the related analysis. In the following, 
some characteristics and measures in the AIDA dataset related to next chapters’ analysis  will be 
statistically described in table (3.c.1). As long as the majority of entities are SMEs, the mean size 
of the enterprise in Trento is about 14 employees for 33,697 firm-year observations, while the 
maximum size reaches high to 5,342 employees. The oldest firm ages 211 years old established in 
1806, while the average age is 20 years. Other specific information related to balance sheet data 
can be followed in the table. Data on the location which the headquarter of the enterprise has been 
registered can be found  
Table 3.c.1 Descriptive statistics for enterprises active in Trento Province (2007-2014) 
Variable Number of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Employees 
 
33,697 13.98448 76.21374 0 5,342 
Foundation year 44,048 1996.938 17.58255 1806 2014 
Age (in 2017) 44,048 20.0623 17.58255 3 211 
Number of directors 44,048 3.4753 4.395775 0 68 
Number of companies in corporate groups 44,048 4.395775 85.46729 0 1,906 
Number of recorded subsidiaries 44,048 0.7962223 2.247087 0 58 
Total Assets* 36,404 5,967.093 36,087.25 0 1,460,016 
Total Inventory* 36,402 916.1578 4,807.495 0 365,472.6 
Total Revenue* 36,256 3,653.745 21,309.81 0 805,935.5 
Total R&D Expenditure* 20,069 11.59474 173.4992 0  10,175.78 
* In Thousand Euros      
                                                          
123 Italian company information and business intelligence: In Italian (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende Italiane) 
 Appendix 3.d: Sector classification using ATECO2007 categorization 
ATECO 2007 has been reinforced since 1 January 2008, replacing the previous ATECO 2002 
which was an update of the ATECO 1991 in 2002. The classification of economic activities 
(ATECO) is a type of classification adopted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
It is the Italian translation of the Nomenclature of Economic Activities (NACE) created by 
Eurostat while being adopted to the Italian economic system. This classification represents the 
national version of the European coding system called Nace Rev. 2.124 ATECO 2007 
categorization has been approved and enforced by other institutional figures like related ministries, 
the bodies in charge of managing main administrative data sources on enterprises (the Revenue 
Agency, Chambers of Commerce, social security institutions, etc.) and the main business 
associations. 
Classification of observations into groups by Industry Codes 
Table (3.d.1) shows a classification of industries based on first digit of sector code. The 
first column defines the first digit of the industry ATECO2007 code, while the second and third 
columns represents the sectors covered by this first digit. There are overlaps between the sectors 
with different activities in our analysis; for instant, our analysis on the categorized data for all 
firms with the first ATECO2007 number of 3 does not include only one specific sector, say 
manufacturing. The firms with number 3 as their first digit for ATECO2007 code are classified 
within three different industries; first manufacturing; second, electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning; and third, water supply, sewerage, waste management and rehabilitation. The same 
holds for industries and services starting with digits 4,5,6 and 7. The impact evaluation will be 
carried out using stratifying based on first digit of ATECO code. However, as a result of overlap 
between sectors discussed, this categorization of firms leads to a non-homogenous distribution of 
firms under analysis. Therefore, it is essentially required to  categorize enterprises independent of 
the first sector code digit. Thus, firms are classified based on the exact industry and sector they 
belong to (Table (3.d.2)). That is noteworthily to say industries under analysis are only those that 
an R&D subsidy allocation has occurred at least once within the period of study125.   
                                                          
124 published in the Official Journal of 20 December 2006 (Regulation (EC) no 1893/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006). 
125 This excludes industries and services with letter codes A,B, and O through U 
 Table 3.d.1 . The sector classification of the dataset used for treatment effect analysis  
ATECO2007 Sector Code (First Digit) Industry or Service Code in ATECO2007 
Classification 
1 MANUFACTURING C 
2 MANUFACTURING C 
3 MANUFACTURING 
 (Up to two digit code 35) 
 
ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM 
AND AIR CONDITIONING 
 (two digit codes between 35 
to 36) 
 
WATER SUPPLY; 
SEWERAGE, WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND 
REHABILITATION 
 (two digit codes between 36 
to 40) 
 
C,D,E 
4 CONSTRUCTION (41 to 45) 
 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL 
TRADE; REPAIR OF 
MOTOR VEHICLES AND 
MOTORCYCLES (45 to 49) 
 
TRANSPORTATION AND 
STORAGE ( 49 to 54) 
 
F,G,H 
5 TRANSPORTATION AND 
STORAGE ( 49 to 54) 
 
ACTIVITIES OF 
ACCOMMODATION AND 
FOOD SERVICE (55 to 58) 
 
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
 (58 to 64) 
 
 
6 
 
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
 (58 to 64) 
FINANCIAL AND 
INSURANCE  
(64 to 68) 
REAL ESTATE 
 (68 to 69) 
PROFESSIONAL, 
SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNICAL ACTIVITY (69 
to 75) 
J,K,L,M 
 7 PROFESSIONAL, 
SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNICAL ACTIVITY 
 (69 to 75) 
HIRE, TRAVEL AGENCIES, 
SUPPORT SERVICES FOR 
BUSINESSES  
(77 to 82) 
M,N 
 
Table 3.d.2 . Classification of industries and sectors based on first letter code in ATECO2007 and 
their range in two-digit level of aggregation code 
 
Sector (Industry or Service) 
Classification 
Letter Code in 
ATECO2007 
Start and End 
of Two Digit 
Range in 
ATECO2007 
MANUFACTURING C 10_34 
ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING D 35_36 
WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION E 36_40 
CONSTRUCTION F 41_45 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; REPAIR OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND MOTORCYCLES G 45_49 
TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE H 49_54 
ACTIVITIES OF ACCOMMODATION AND FOOD SERVICE I 55_58 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION J 58_64 
FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE K 64_68 
REAL ESTATE L 68_69 
PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITY M 69_75 
HIRE, TRAVEL AGENCIES, SUPPORT SERVICES FOR BUSINESSES N 77_82 
Elaboration on ISTAT Industry Categorization Database    
  
 Appendix 3.e 
balancing satisfaction 
Manufacturing: 
 
pscore treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged, pscore(myscore_manufacturing) 
 
 ******************************************* 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total       1,036         65       1,101 
                                             
        .4           2          2           4 
        .2           5          1           6 
        .1          52         12          64 
       .05         372         31         403 
   .031282         605         19         624 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         treatment
  Inferior  
and the number of controls for each block 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated
The balancing property is satisfied 
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
********************************************************** 
is not different for treated and controls in each blocks
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score
The final number of blocks is 5
****************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
****************************************************** 
  
 
 
  
pscores_ma~g           65     .087386    .0923018    .031282   .5720045
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> treatment = 1
                                                                                                          
pscores_ma~g        1,063    .0554998    .0424459   .0299227   .7096618
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> treatment = 0
myscore_ma~g           65     .087386    .0923018    .031282   .5720045
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> treatment = 1
                                                                                                          
myscore_ma~g        1,063    .0554998    .0424459   .0299227   .7096618
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> treatment = 0
                                                                                                          
. bysort treatment: sum myscore_manufacturing
 Appendix 3.f 
balancing satisfaction 
ICT 
 
 
                      
        1           23
        0          341
                      
treatment        Freq.
                      
. table treatment
                                                                              
       _cons     -1.68713   .1291632   -13.06   0.000    -1.940285   -1.433975
Employees_~d     .0030261   .0008741     3.46   0.001     .0013128    .0047394
                                                                              
   treatment        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -71.236778                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0742
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0007
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =      11.42
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        312
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -71.236778
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -71.236798
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -71.466943
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -76.944953
Estimation of the propensity score 
      Total          364      100.00
                                                
          1           23        6.32      100.00
          0          341       93.68       93.68
                                                
  treatment        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
The treatment is treatment
**************************************************** 
Algorithm to estimate the propensity score 
**************************************************** 
. pscore treatment Employees_lagged , pscore(pscores2_ICT)
  
  
******************************************* 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
     Total         341         23         364 
                                             
        .6           1          0           1 
        .4           0          1           1 
        .3           0          2           2 
        .2           4          0           4 
         0         336         20         356 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         treatment
  Inferior  
and the number of controls for each block 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated
The balancing property is satisfied 
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
********************************************************** 
is not different for treated and controls in each blocks
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score
The final number of blocks is 5
****************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
****************************************************** 
pscores2_ICT           21    .1221762    .1379745   .0472622   .5654595
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> treatment = 1
                                                                                                          
pscores2_ICT          291    .0626038    .0544322   .0460808   .7917204
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> treatment = 0
                                                                                                          
. bysort treatment: sum pscores2_ICT
 Appendix 3.g  
Manufacturing  
Bin 20 taking into account common support: 
 
Bin 40 taking into account Common support 
 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated: Off support Untreated: On support
Treated
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated: Off support Untreated: On support
Treated
 Bin 40 without common support restriction 
 
ICT : 
 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
 Appendix 3.h 
Some examples of summarization and balancing graphs after treatment effect measurement for 
observables: 
Example: teffects psmatch ( tfpch_lagged3 ) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged, probit) 
 
 
                                                                   
       age_lagged     .3426873   -.1722282      1.154401   .7403386
  Employees_lag~d     .5802458    .1105861      3.279174   .8700136
                                                                   
                           Raw     Matched           Raw    Matched
                   Standardized differences          Variance ratio
                                                                   
                                                                   
                          Control obs   =          528          564
                          Treated obs   =           36          564
                          Number of obs =          564        1,128
                                                                   
                                                   Raw      Matched
  Covariate balance summary
note: refitting the model using the generate() option
. tebalance summarize
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Balancing on pretreatment size: manufactruing sector
  
teffects psmatch ( effch_lagged5 ) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged) 
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Balancing on pretreatment size: manufactruing sector
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Balancing on pretreatment age: manufactruing sector
  
teffects psmatch ( tech_lagged2 ) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged) 
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Balancing on pretreatment age: manufactruing sector
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Balancing on size of the firm
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Balancing on age of the firm
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Balancing on size of the firm
  
 
Fig(s). Other examples of balancing on age and size variables for  treated and control using box 
plot and kernel (after each estimation these balancing graphs can be checked)  
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Balancing on age of the firm
 Appendix 3.i 
Balancing property for each sector: Becker & Ichino (2002) 
Manufacturing: Satisfied
99%     .1887716       .5720045       Kurtosis       80.50567
95%     .1125116       .5454998       Skewness       7.289178
90%     .0790315       .5311844       Variance       .0016307
75%     .0605775       .5267441
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .0403814
50%     .0470862                      Mean           .0568674
25%     .0393853       .0313042       Sum of Wgt.       1,101
10%     .0339764       .0313042       Obs               1,101
 5%     .0326623        .031282
 1%      .031499        .031282
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                 Estimated propensity score
in region of common support 
Description of the estimated propensity score 
The region of common support is [.03128198, .57200453]
Note: the common support option has been selected
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.898106     .12257   -15.49   0.000    -2.138339   -1.657873
  age_lagged     .0065512   .0038066     1.72   0.085    -.0009095     .014012
Employees_~d     .0015361   .0003183     4.83   0.000     .0009122    .0021599
                                                                              
   treatment        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -236.27168                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0495
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      24.63
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       1128
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -236.27168
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -236.27201
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -236.9923
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -248.58809
note: INDUS dropped because of collinearity
Estimation of the propensity score 
  
 
Construction sector: Not satisfied  
 
******************************************* 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total       1,036         65       1,101 
                                             
        .4           2          2           4 
        .2           5          1           6 
        .1          52         12          64 
       .05         372         31         403 
   .031282         605         19         624 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         treatment
  Inferior  
and the number of controls for each block 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated
The balancing property is satisfied 
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
********************************************************** 
is not different for treated and controls in each blocks
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score
The final number of blocks is 5
****************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
****************************************************** 
******************************************* 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total         314          4         318 
                                             
     .0125           5          2           7 
         0         309          2         311 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         treatment
  Inferior  
Try a different specification of the propensity score 
The balancing property is not satisfied 
Variable age_lagged is not balanced in block 1
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
 Wholesale retail and motor repair: Not satisfied 
 
ICT: Satisfied 
 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total         265          3         268 
                                             
         0         265          3         268 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         treatment
  Inferior  
Try a different specification of the propensity score 
The balancing property is not satisfied 
Variable age_lagged is not balanced in block 1
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
99%     .4786346       .6996633       Kurtosis       60.45748
95%     .1352799       .5350713       Skewness       6.876051
90%     .0998512       .4786346       Variance       .0038986
75%     .0792679       .1668779
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .0624388
50%     .0617212                      Mean           .0727386
25%     .0463952       .0332179       Sum of Wgt.         250
10%     .0385185       .0330395       Obs                 250
 5%      .035574       .0330251
 1%     .0330395       .0328728
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                 Estimated propensity score
in region of common support 
Description of the estimated propensity score 
 The region of common support is [.03287283, .69966332]
Note: the common support option has been selected
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.309598    .214278    -6.11   0.000    -1.729575   -.8896208
  age_lagged    -.0267544   .0129667    -2.06   0.039    -.0521687     -.00134
Employees_~d     .0033012   .0009081     3.64   0.000     .0015213     .005081
                                                                              
   treatment        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -69.022675                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1030
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0004
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      15.84
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        312
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -69.022675
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -69.022827
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -69.233179
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -76.944953
note: INDUS dropped because of collinearity
Estimation of the propensity score 
      Total          364      100.00
                                                
          1           23        6.32      100.00
          0          341       93.68       93.68
                                                
  treatment        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
The treatment is treatment
**************************************************** 
Algorithm to estimate the propensity score 
**************************************************** 
.  pscore treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged INDUS if INDUS==4, pscore(myscore4) comsup
  
  
******************************************* 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total         229         21         250 
                                             
        .6           0          1           1 
        .4           0          2           2 
  .0328728         229         18         247 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         treatment
  Inferior  
and the number of controls for each block 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated
The balancing property is satisfied 
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
********************************************************** 
is not different for treated and controls in each blocks
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score
The final number of blocks is 4
****************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
****************************************************** 
 Technical activity sector: Satisfied 
 
The region of common support is [.0207985, .03698406]
Note: the common support option has been selected
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.724108   .2870681    -6.01   0.000    -2.286751   -1.161465
  age_lagged    -.0127776   .0162233    -0.79   0.431    -.0445745    .0190194
Employees_~d     .0000912   .0011173     0.08   0.935    -.0020988    .0022811
                                                                              
   treatment        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -36.367573                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0097
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.7007
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =       0.71
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        294
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -36.367573
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -36.367596
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -36.378728
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -36.723261
note: INDUS dropped because of collinearity
Estimation of the propensity score 
      Total          343      100.00
                                                
          1            9        2.62      100.00
          0          334       97.38       97.38
                                                
  treatment        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
The treatment is treatment
**************************************************** 
Algorithm to estimate the propensity score 
**************************************************** 
.  pscore treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged INDUS if INDUS==5, pscore(myscore5) comsup
  
99%      .036962       .0369841       Kurtosis       1.850818
95%     .0361433       .0369841       Skewness      -.1616813
90%     .0358837        .036962       Variance       .0000218
75%      .033037       .0369546
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .0046711
50%     .0298307                      Mean           .0293614
25%      .025366       .0211531       Sum of Wgt.         217
10%     .0224896       .0211531       Obs                 217
 5%     .0218103       .0211438
 1%     .0211531       .0207985
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                 Estimated propensity score
in region of common support 
Description of the estimated propensity score 
******************************************* 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total         209          8         217 
                                             
  .0207985         209          8         217 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         treatment
  Inferior  
and the number of controls for each block 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated
The balancing property is satisfied 
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
********************************************************** 
is not different for treated and controls in each blocks
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score
The final number of blocks is 1
****************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
****************************************************** 
  
 
Description of balancing scores for each industry : 
 
 
 
******************************************* 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total          51          4          55 
                                             
  .0074703          51          4          55 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         treatment
  Inferior  
and the number of controls for each block 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated
The balancing property is satisfied 
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
********************************************************** 
    myscore5            8    .0290988    .0066779   .0207985   .0369841
    myscore4           21     .147195      .18338   .0328728   .6996633
   myscore33            3     .002553    .0003188    .002369   .0029212
   myscore22            4    .0078483    .0005211   .0074703   .0086193
    myscore1           65     .087386    .0923018    .031282   .5720045
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> treatment = 1
                                                                                                           
    myscore5          286    .0271657     .007758   .0060346   .0401749
    myscore4          291    .0602202    .0567957   .0124469   .8855364
   myscore33        1,221    .0024541    .0015679   .0023467   .0567752
   myscore22          596    .0066879    .0054721   .0043279   .0682215
    myscore1        1,063    .0554998    .0424459   .0299227   .7096618
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> treatment = 0
                                                                                                           
. bysort treatment: sum myscore1 myscore22 myscore33 myscore4 myscore5
 Propensity graphs for construction sector: 
 
Propensity graph for whole sale retail and motor repair sector: 
 
Propensity graph for technical activity sector: 
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 Appendix 3.j 
Treatment effect PSM analysis for low-medium and high tech industries: 
Low medium tech industries: For ATT no effect at any level But for ATE 
 
 
 
 
   (1 vs 0)     -.1522776   .0747305    -2.04   0.042    -.2987466   -.0058085
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
tfpch_lagg~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =          6
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      1,968
. teffects psmatch ( tfpch_lagged2 ) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged, probit)
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)     -.1738618   .0945426    -1.84   0.066    -.3591618    .0114383
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
tfpch_lagg~3        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =          5
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      1,476
. teffects psmatch ( tfpch_lagged3 ) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged, probit)
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)     -.1824348     .08731    -2.09   0.037    -.3535593   -.0113104
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
effch_lagg~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =          6
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      1,968
. teffects psmatch ( effch_lagged2 ) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged, probit)
  
 
 
  
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)     -.1754034   .1005043    -1.75   0.081    -.3723882    .0215814
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
effch_lagg~3        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =          5
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      1,476
. teffects psmatch ( effch_lagged3 ) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged, probit)
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)     -.0828584   .0498917    -1.66   0.097    -.1806444    .0149275
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
effch_lagg~5        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =          1
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =        492
. teffects psmatch ( effch_lagged5) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged, probit)
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)     -.0858564   .0303198    -2.83   0.005    -.1452821   -.0264307
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
techch_lag~4        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =          4
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =        984
. teffects psmatch ( techch_lagged4 ) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged, probit)
 High tech sectors
 
 
. 
                      
        1           32
        0          675
                      
treatment        Freq.
                      
. table treatment
. 
                                                                   
       age_lagged    -.2659138    .1266746      .9917175   1.731739
  Employees_lag~d     .5234243    .0866592      1.502455   .6384539
                                                                   
                           Raw     Matched           Raw    Matched
                   Standardized differences          Variance ratio
                                                                   
                                                                   
                          Control obs   =          378           26
                          Treated obs   =           26           26
                          Number of obs =          404           52
                                                                   
                                                   Raw      Matched
  Covariate balance summary
note: refitting the model using the generate() option
. tebalance summarize Employees_lagged age_lagged
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)      .1279439   .0695052     1.84   0.066    -.0082837    .2641716
   treatment  
ATET          
                                                                              
tfpch_lagg~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =          5
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =        404
. teffects psmatch ( tfpch_lagged2 ) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged, probit),atet
  
 
 
 
                                                                   
       age_lagged    -.2919186    .1186018      1.235487   .9247207
  Employees_lag~d     .4394891    .3679225      .1454684   .1106402
                                                                   
                           Raw     Matched           Raw    Matched
                   Standardized differences          Variance ratio
                                                                   
                                                                   
                          Control obs   =          195          202
                          Treated obs   =            7          202
                          Number of obs =          202          404
                                                                   
                                                   Raw      Matched
  Covariate balance summary
                                                                   
       age_lagged    -.3605517    .0013391      1.063823   .8827313
  Employees_lag~d     .5197428    .2353534      1.854771   .3980883
                                                                   
                           Raw     Matched           Raw    Matched
                   Standardized differences          Variance ratio
                                                                   
                                                                   
                          Control obs   =          290          303
                          Treated obs   =           13          303
                          Number of obs =          303          606
                                                                   
                                                   Raw      Matched
  Covariate balance summary
note: refitting the model using the generate() option
. tebalance summarize Employees_lagged age_lagged
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)      -.061266   .0260387    -2.35   0.019    -.1123009    -.010231
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
techch_lag~3        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =          3
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =        303
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)     -.1111357   .0643207    -1.73   0.084    -.2372019    .0149306
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
techch_lag~4        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =          2
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =        202
. teffects psmatch ( techch_lagged4) (treatment Employees_lagged age_lagged, probit)
 Appendix 3.k 
Balancing property for all sectors pooled together: Not satisfied 
 
Prpensity graph for all sectors pooled 
 
  
******************************************* 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total       2,911        101       3,012 
                                             
        .2           2          2           4 
        .1           6          1           7 
       .05          97         17         114 
         0       2,806         81       2,887 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         treatment
  Inferior  
Try a different specification of the propensity score 
The balancing property is not satisfied 
Variable Employees_lagged is not balanced in block 1
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
********************************************************** 
is not different for treated and controls in each blocks
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score
The final number of blocks is 4
****************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
****************************************************** 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
 Appendix 3.l 
R&D subsidies impact measurement by (aggregation level: first digit of ATECO2007)  
Sector categorization based on first 3-digit or 2-digit industry and service codes, does not 
provide a high number of treated and non-treated observations. Therefore, the analysis levels up 
to 1-digit sector code level. At the same time, particular sectors with at least one R&D 
subsidization occurred are chosen. Hence, results are generated for seven out of nine categories 
based on first digit sector code.126   
The period of sample data analysis is set from 2011 to 2014. In treatment effect analysis; 
the treatment control variables should refer to at least one year before the treatment and the 
Malmquist productivity measures should refer to one or two years after the treatment (to hold the 
assumption that the policy affects the outcome with a lag of one or two years). Therefore, the 
treatment data of year 2011 and 2014 do not count in the analysis when there is one year lag for 
the effect. Data on year 2013 is excluded when there is a two-year lag for the effect, hence it only 
remains treatment data for 2012.  
Table (1.3.i) shows the number of total observations with complete data and the proportion 
of treated and non-treated for different periods by each industry using one-digit code level of 
aggregation. In the following, the treatment effect results for each single sector are generated. The 
numbers of treatments (subsidies) happening in the industry for years under analysis are mentioned 
as well. The method measures the effect of R&D public policy on efficiency change and technical 
frontier change using propensity score matching. The productivity is also measured using 
Malmquist Productivity Index method. 
Table  is referred to link the industries classified under each category of first sector digit. 
Table (1.3.i) in general implies mixed findings with respect to the effect of policy on productivity 
measures in both cases of one year and two years lag. There is no effect of policy on efficiency 
change and technical efficiency change for firms with first sector digits starting with 1, 2 or 3. The 
number of observations treated in comparison with total observations are very low for sectors 1  
  
                                                          
126 In a first run of analysis, four consecutive years from 2011 to 2014 have been chosen. The treatment effect 
analysis has been provided in the appendix. 
 Industry with industry’s 
level of aggregation code: 
ATECO2007 
Effect of R&D subsidy on 
productivity measures 
(one-year lag) 
number treated 
vs. 
observations 
(one-year lag) 
Effect of R&D subsidy on 
productivity measures 
(two-year lag) 
number treated 
vs. 
observations 
(two-year lag) 
Total 
number 
of Obs. 
 Efficiency 
change 
Technological 
Change 
 Efficiency 
change 
Technological 
Change 
  
starting with digit 1 0.11 0.08 6/89 -0.03 -0.04 4/70 296 
starting with digit 2 0.16 -0.09 36/496 0.04 -0.05 28/248 992 
starting with digit 3 - - 2/55 - - 1/27 112 
starting with digit 4 -0.39*** 0.09 6/848 -0.05 0.13* 3/424 1,696 
starting with digit 5 - - - - - - 124 
starting with digit 6 0.00 0.02 26/252 -0.07 0.01 23/126 504 
starting with digit 7 0.72 0.08 6/108 -0.26*** 
 
0.14** 
 
4/54 216 
*90% level of confidence  
**95% level of confidence  
***99% level of confidence 
     
 
Table 3.l.1. Treatment Effect analysis by sector (aggregation level: first digit of ATECO2007) 
and 3. However, firms with first digit 2 have a higher proportion of treated versus total 
observations.  
The number of treated firms in category 3 is quite low (1 firm), so that treatment effect 
results using propensity score matching cannot be generated. Moreover, the number of treated 
firms in category 1 is not that large. The number of total observations treated in category 2 are 28 
treated out of 248 total observations, when the outcome variable is lagged for two years. The 
number of treated observations would increase to 36 out of 496 if the lag decrease to one year.  
Firms with first sector classification digit 4 (category 4) show a negative impact of policy 
on efficiency change (in case of one-year lag) and a positive impact of policy on technological 
(technical frontier) change. Although the number of treated in this category is not as high as 
category 2, however the highest number of non-treated observations can at least make matching 
more effective. The same as category 3, number of treated firms in category 5 is pretty low that 
treatment effect using propensity score matching is not feasible.  
The results for industry 6 show there is no significant effect of the policy on productivity 
measures in both cases of one year and two years lag. The number of total observations treated in 
 this category are 23 treated out of 126 total observations, when the outcome variable is lagged for 
two years. The proportion increases to 26 out of 252 if the lag decrease to one year.  
In 7th category, the policy shows significant negative effect on efficiency change in contrast 
to a positive effect on technological change when the outcome variable (efficiency and 
technological changes) are being lagged for two years. It means the policy shows significant 
impact on target indices after two years. Results do not imply any significant effect of the policy 
on the measures when there is one year lag. The number of treated observations in the first case is 
4 out of 54 total observations, while this increases to 6 out of 108 observations when we assume 
one year lag of policy effect. 
The results based on data categorized by first digit sector code, show mixed findings 
regarded to the impact of R&D subsidies on efficiency change and technical frontier change. 
However, in cases when the effect is statistically significant it is observed that the subsidy 
allocation to a firm impacts negatively on relative efficiency change, while it shows a positive 
influence on the technical frontier. This means a certain firm treated, may perform less efficient 
relative to the best performers while the frontier (best performers) may move the frontier up 
receiving the subsidy. One interpretation is relative efficient firms in categories showing 
significant results, are more capable to apply the grants received into production improvement 
using R&D inputs and outcomes rather than their followers. However, the lag time is not quite 
long in this setting to investigate whether the same happens in long-run or not.  
Impact evaluation based on first sector code digit explained in this section suffers a serious 
drawback. The first digit classification includes different non-related industries into one category 
which may violate the assumption of homogenous operating process to measure relative 
(in)efficiency and frontier measures. Therefore, to solve this problem, the following section 
classifies enterprises simply based on the industry they belong to using our elaboration of industry 
categorization based on sector code (ateco2007). The codes and commands to do such a 
categorization are provided. As previously noted, there are overlaps between sectors based on 
Ateco2007 first one digit classification. Referred to table (6) in the main text, in order to measure 
the impact of R&D subsidies classifying firms based on the exact industry provides us more precise 
results in comparison with impact evaluation based on first sector digit level of aggregation. 
  
 Appendix 4.a 
Dataset construction procedures 
Dataset constructed to estimate the model includes different variables to be used in 
different equations. The number of non-missing observations for each variable in each primary 
dataset (figure1), beside the equations the variable get involved, have been shown in table (4.a.1). 
The age is calculated by subtracting the year of establishment (inizzio-anno) from the year of the 
analysis (2008-2010). The sale variable is labeled as cod_280 in PITAGORA balance sheet 
dataset. The amount of sale for four firms equals to zero. The lowest minimum amount higher than 
0, is 4380 Euros. Number of employees can be fractional as the employee number is calculated 
according to the duration and months of the dependent employees (variable labeled as ‘dip’ in the 
primary dataset) and independent employees (labeled as ‘ind’) within the whole year. Four firms 
employed more than 1000 employees and two firms more than 3000. Independent employees as a 
possible proxy for board of the firm ranges from minimum one to maximum eight employees. 184 
firms out of 379 firms and 160 out of 301 firms which have responded to RS survey are exporting 
corporations. There is a variable representing the previous subsidies. The base year for counting 
up the subsidy allocations is 2005; e.g. a firm being allocated subsidies in 2005, 2007 and 2008 
possesses the previous application variable value of 3 in year 2009. The R&D expenditure variable 
refers to R&D investment variable (labeled C2_01) in R&D survey. However, there are other 
different variables in R&D survey related to R&D spending which can be used as proxy for R&D 
investment.  
Each firm in the dataset is identified by a unique fiscal code which is a categorical 11-digit 
string variable. Domain of each firm is also provided. The primary dataset also includes the 
response to R&D questionnaire defined by a flag variable and the variable to show if the firm has 
been treated by an R&D subsidy. If there is data available to unsuccessful applications then the 
minimum amount of subsidy becomes zero. However, the data set obtains all accepted subsidy 
applications and there is the assumption that all the firms with application have been received and 
assigned subsidies. Four outlier observations were primarily dropped as the subsidy rate turned 
out to be higher than one (100%). The evaluation procedure dummy variable is defined and 
categorized as the previous chapter. Three dummy levels based on this categorization have been 
defined for this variable. 
 Table 4.a.1. variables used to estimate the model and the number of non-missing values for each 
variable 
Variable R&D 
investment 
equation 
Subsidy rate 
equation 
Application 
decision 
equation 
Number of  
Observations 
 without any missing value 
Number 
of observations in RS 
surveyed without any 
missing value 
R&D 
Subsidized 
Number of 
Subsidized firms 
responded to RS 
survey 
Minimum Maximum 
Employees ✓ ✓ ✓ 361 300 118 57 1 3515 
firm’s age ✓ ✓ ✓ 342 285 111 54 0 62 
Sale ✓ ✓ ✓ 319 268 105 54 0 676,495,20€ 
Total R&D ✓ _ _ _ 301 _ _ 2000 € 5,518,000€ 
Industrial sector ✓ ✓ ✓ 360 301 116 57 _ _ 
Geographical position _ _ _ 359 300 116 57 _ _ 
Evaluation procedure _ ✓ _ _ _ 135 57   
Subsidy rate _ ✓ _ _ _ 135 57 0.05 0.83 
Previous treatments _ ✓ ✓ _ _ 135 57 0 6 
Export Dummy _ _ ✓ 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1,255€ 159,210,36€ 
195 184 141 160 75  21 36 
Total    379 301 135 57   
 
Source: Elaboration on merged datasets on R&D subsidies and firm balance sheet provided by ISPAT (APIAE, PITAGORA and ASIA 
datasets) 
 
There are also extra information on the geographical position (city) and whether the firm is artisan 
(handicraft production) or not. Table (4.a.2) displays summary statistics of explanatory variables 
for potential applicants used in the model. Table (4.a.3) conditions the statistics on the status of 
being subsidized or not receiving subsidies.  
Table (4.a.3) provides descriptive data on variables related to R&D investment, the subsidy 
rates and application status. 
  
 Table 4.a.2 Descriptive statistics of variables for all potential applicants 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Size 361 95.57 292.87 1 3515 
Age 342 18.44 13.81 0 62 
Sales per 
employee 
319 295616.9 776354.5 0 9,042,264 
Board Size 357 1.27 0.96 1 8 
Exporter 
(Dummy) 
379 0.48 0.50 0 1 
SME 379 0.61 0.48 0 1 
Number of 
Previous 
Applications 
135 0.83 1.41 0 6 
Total 379     
Source: Community Innovation Survey (CIS) provided by ISPAT and dataset on grants assigned for applied research projects 
provided by APIAE 
 
Table 4.a.3 Descriptive statistics for All firms doing R&D, Subsidized firms and non-subsidized 
firms 
 All potential applicants Subsidized applicants Non-Subsidized firms 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min. Max. 
Planned 
R&D 
investment 
 1,475,312 1,806,123 48,559 10,300,000  
R&D 
Expenditures 
(year) 
550,588 808,750 4000 5,521000 811,351 962,349 7000 4,111,000 489,672 757,891 4000 5,521,000 
Subsidy rate  0.55 0.24 0.05 0.83  
Subsidy 
amount 
 1,475,312 1,806,123 7,234 5,606,350  
Evaluation 
method 
 2.08 0.66 1 3  
Number of 
observation 
301 57 244 
Source: APIAE dataset provided by ISPAT (All amounts are in €  
 Appendix 4.b 
Equation for  Expected subsidy rate based on the firm’s belief of the evaluation process 
The official scheme for subsidy allocation by APIAE yields the expected rate of subsidy by the 
firm for the planned R&D project. The equation shows how the firm calculates the expected 
subsidy rate which is used to estimate the application decision equation: 
𝐸(𝑠𝑖) =  {[𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖 ∗ [((0.6 + (0.1 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖) + (0.1 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖)) ∗  𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖) + ((0.55 + (0.05 ∗
 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖) + (0.1 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖) + (0.05 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖  )) ∗  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖) + ((0.45 + (0.05 ∗  𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖) + (0.2 ∗
 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖) −  (0.05 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖)) ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖)]] + [𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∗ [((0.4 + (0.05 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖) + (0.1 ∗
 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖) + (0.05 ∗  𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖)) ∗  𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 )) + ((0.3 + (0.05 ∗  𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖) + (0.1 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖) + (0.05 ∗
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖)) ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖) + ((0.2 + (0.05 ∗  𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖) + (0.1 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖) +  (0.05 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖)) ∗
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖)]] }    
Where: 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖  ;  𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 : 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓  𝑅&𝐷 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦. 
 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 ;  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖; 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖: 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖: 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 =
0 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡   
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖 : 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖1 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖
= 0 
  
 Appendix 4.c 
Checking for correlation matrix and multicollinearity in estimations: 
Subsidy rate equation:  
Evaluation method independent variable: 
 
 
                                                                                   
            _cons      .206554   .0384834     5.37   0.000     .1300121     .283096
                   
               3      .5221579   .0381843    13.67   0.000     .4462108    .5981049
               2      .4219752   .0291488    14.48   0.000     .3639993    .4799511
        ev_method  
                   
               M     -.0143052   .0511725    -0.28   0.781    -.1160853    .0874748
               J     -.0498372   .0316174    -1.58   0.119     -.112723    .0130486
               G     -.3735365   .1044427    -3.58   0.001    -.5812687   -.1658042
               F      .0420771   .0487231     0.86   0.390    -.0548312    .1389854
    industry_code  
                   
     1.ExportFlag    -.0059116   .0285466    -0.21   0.836    -.0626897    .0508665
sales_to_employee    -6.21e-09   9.11e-09    -0.68   0.497    -2.43e-08    1.19e-08
            1.SME    -.0512186   .0257146    -1.99   0.050    -.1023638   -.0000733
              age     .0001773   .0008333     0.21   0.832    -.0014801    .0018346
                                                                                   
           S_rate        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                   
       Total     4.3182552        93  .046432852   Root MSE        =    .09878
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.7899
    Residual    .809880346        83  .009757595   R-squared       =    0.8125
       Model    3.50837486        10  .350837486   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(10, 83)       =     35.96
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        94
. regress S_rate age  i.SME sales_to_employee  i.ExportFlag  i.industry_code i.ev_method
   ev_method     0.8104  -0.3725  -0.2039  -0.0316  -0.4755   0.4538   1.0000 
industry_c~e     0.2952  -0.4420  -0.2540   0.0917  -0.5606   1.0000 
  ExportFlag    -0.4100   0.2885   0.3043   0.0196   1.0000 
sales_to_e~e    -0.0159  -0.0513   0.0291   1.0000 
         SME    -0.2418   0.2711   1.0000 
         age    -0.3600   1.0000 
      S_rate     1.0000 
                                                                             
                 S_rate      age      SME sales_~e Export~g indust~e ev_met~d
. pwcorr S_rate age  SME sales_to_employee  ExportFlag  industry_code ev_method
 Regression without evaluation method variable:  
Subsidy rate equation: 
 
  
                                                                                   
            _cons     .6267519     .05328    11.76   0.000     .5208171    .7326868
                   
               M      .0831483    .098172     0.85   0.399     -.112044    .2783406
               J      .0266686   .0602507     0.44   0.659     -.093126    .1464632
               G     -.1874329   .2021028    -0.93   0.356    -.5892674    .2144015
               F      .1852897   .0841098     2.20   0.030      .018057    .3525224
    industry_code  
                   
     1.ExportFlag    -.0875002    .054585    -1.60   0.113    -.1960299    .0210294
sales_to_employee    -7.18e-09   1.75e-08    -0.41   0.682    -4.20e-08    2.76e-08
            1.SME     -.047313   .0501189    -0.94   0.348    -.1469628    .0523367
              age    -.0025757   .0015869    -1.62   0.108    -.0057308    .0005795
                                                                                   
           S_rate        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                   
       Total     4.3182552        93  .046432852   Root MSE        =    .19282
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1993
    Residual    3.16015671        85  .037178314   R-squared       =    0.2682
       Model    1.15809849         8  .144762311   Prob > F        =    0.0006
                                                   F(8, 85)        =      3.89
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        94
. regress S_rate age  i.SME sales_to_employee  i.ExportFlag  i.industry_code
 Appendix 4.d 
Investment equation: 
Actual annual R&D investment: 
 
 
  
                                                                                      
               _cons     3.009319   .7563116     3.98   0.000     1.478247    4.540392
                      
                  M      .6108419   1.981574     0.31   0.760    -3.400644    4.622328
                  J     -.3008591   .5473274    -0.55   0.586    -1.408865    .8071472
                  G     -1.061583   1.213314    -0.87   0.387    -3.517809    1.394643
                  F       -1.8661   1.225689    -1.52   0.136    -4.347378     .615178
       industry_code  
                      
        1.ExportFlag     .5623859   .5352322     1.05   0.300     -.521135    1.645907
independent_employee     .2183062   .4466029     0.49   0.628     -.685794    1.122407
   sales_to_employee     1.18e-07   1.77e-07     0.67   0.508    -2.40e-07    4.77e-07
        log_employee     .5348276   .1499085     3.57   0.001     .2313538    .8383014
                 age    -.0146216   .0139597    -1.05   0.302    -.0428816    .0136384
                                                                                      
new_investment_var~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                      
       Total    92.9061595        47   1.9767268   Root MSE        =    1.1658
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3124
    Residual    51.6462477        38  1.35911178   R-squared       =    0.4441
       Model    41.2599119         9  4.58443465   Prob > F        =    0.0040
                                                   F(9, 38)        =      3.37
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        48
> stry_code
. regress new_investment_variable age log_employee sales_to_employee independent_employee i.ExportFlag i.indu
industry_c~e    -0.1969  -0.4420  -0.3798   0.0917  -0.1015  -0.5606   1.0000 
  ExportFlag     0.4330   0.2885   0.4506   0.0196   0.1110   1.0000 
independen~e    -0.0320   0.2430   0.0944   0.0297   1.0000 
sales_to_e~e     0.1869  -0.0513   0.0209   1.0000 
log_employee     0.5540   0.5143   1.0000 
         age     0.2184   1.0000 
new_invest~e     1.0000 
                                                                             
               new_in~e      age log_em~e sales_~e indepe~e Export~g indust~e
> code
. pwcorr new_investment_variable age log_employee sales_to_employee independent_employee ExportFlag industry_
 Planned-investment 
 
 
                                                                                      
               _cons     11.38177   .4120452    27.62   0.000     10.56237    12.20116
                      
                  M     -.2023013    .472193    -0.43   0.669    -1.141309    .7367063
                  J     -.0129004   .2839719    -0.05   0.964    -.5776096    .5518088
                  G     -.6344573   .9328019    -0.68   0.498    -2.489436    1.220522
                  F     -1.006433   .3955759    -2.54   0.013    -1.793079   -.2197872
       industry_code  
                      
        1.ExportFlag     .0481237   .2700246     0.18   0.859    -.4888498    .5850971
independent_employee     -.203304   .2425324    -0.84   0.404    -.6856064    .2789983
   sales_to_employee     2.25e-07   8.29e-08     2.71   0.008     5.98e-08    3.90e-07
        log_employee      .622153   .0950685     6.54   0.000     .4330989    .8112071
                 age     -.026984   .0082634    -3.27   0.002    -.0434168   -.0105513
                                                                                      
dependent_PlannedI~r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                      
       Total    142.108319        93  1.52804644   Root MSE        =    .90954
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.4586
    Residual    69.4900263        84  .827262218   R-squared       =    0.5110
       Model    72.6182929         9  8.06869921   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(9, 84)        =      9.75
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        94
> g i.industry_code
. regress dependent_PlannedInvestment_var age log_employee sales_to_employee independent_employee i.ExportFla
    Mean VIF        1.47
                                    
          8         1.28    0.783740
          7         1.59    0.629040
          6         1.04    0.960969
          5         1.23    0.816008
industry_c~e  
1.ExportFlag        2.06    0.484777
independen~e        1.03    0.972059
sales_to_e~e        1.16    0.859329
log_employee        2.13    0.469891
         age        1.70    0.586889
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
